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Abstract 
Rumination refers to repetitive patterns of negative thinking, which is a 
maintaining factor for numerous mental health difficulties and occurs nonclinically. 
According to control theory (Martin & Tesser, 1996), rumination is triggered by a 
blocked goal and can be reduced by decreasing the resultant actual-ideal self-
discrepancy. Steele’s (1988) well-validated self-affirmation theory proposes that the 
act of affirming a core value, known as value-affirmation, helps to buffer against 
psychological threats by maintaining a positive self-view. Furthermore, clinical 
applications of values and goals (e.g., Acceptance and Commitment Therapy) suggest 
that it is not simply the act of reflecting on a core value, but also the setting and 
attaining of value-driven goals, that has positive effects on well-being. This study 
tested whether value-affirmation, particularly with a goal-setting component, would 
reduce rumination immediately post-intervention and after two weeks. The study 
hypotheses were: following the intervention, value-affirmation (VA) and value-
affirmation plus goal-setting (VA+GS) groups would report lower state rumination 
than a standardised non-affirmation control group (NAC); at two-week follow-up, 
VA+GS would report the lowest level of rumination, followed by VA, then NAC; and 
this would not be mediated by positive mood. A randomised-controlled mixed design 
was utilised, with self-reported state rumination and positive affect measured over 
three time points (pre- and post-intervention and two-week follow-up) within a 
nonclinical sample. Findings did not support these hypotheses: there were no 
significant main or interaction effects of state rumination over time. Exploratory 
analysis revealed there was a significant difference in rumination levels between goal-
completers and noncompleters within the VA+GS group at follow-up, and VA and 
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VA+GS conditions resulted in immediately improved positive affect. There are 
numerous possible reasons for the null main findings, including the conceptualisation 
of rumination, or the possible roles of positive affect, behaviour change or self-
esteem. Alternatively, the study may have been insufficiently powered to find an 
effect because there appeared to be a trend towards some of the expected results. It 
was concluded that whilst this study did not find the expected results, value-
affirmation may under certain circumstances be an effective intervention for 
rumination and thus warrants further investigation.  
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Overview 
Rumination refers to repetitive patterns of negative thinking, which is a 
maintaining factor for many mental health difficulties and occurs in the general 
population (Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000). There are numerous negative consequences to 
rumination even in nonclinical samples, for instance it predicts later depression 
(Nolen-Hoeksema, Wisco, & Lyubomirsky, 2008). Therefore, interventions for 
alleviating rumination in nonclinical samples are important in their own right, as well 
as their potential utility for informing the development of clinical interventions. 
However, the literature investigating interventions for rumination is relatively small 
and focuses predominantly on depression.  
There has been increasing focus within clinical and social psychology on the 
benefits of reflecting on and affirming core values. Within social psychology, it has 
been suggested that affirming a core value helps to buffer against psychological 
threats by maintaining a positive self-view in the face of  actual-ideal self-
discrepancy. This may be relevant to rumination; control theory (Martin & Tesser, 
1996) stipulates that rumination can be reduced by decreasing actual-ideal self-
discrepancy. A previous study found that affirming a core value resulted in reduced 
rumination immediately after participants were given false feedback regarding task 
failure (Koole, Smeets, van Knippenberg, & Dijksterhuis, 1999). Furthermore, within 
clinical psychology, it has been suggested that devising value-driven goals produces 
further positive effects on wellbeing.  
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The current study aims to extend the work of Koole et al. (1999) by 
investigating whether values alone, or with the addition of values-derived goals, can 
help to reduce rumination over a two-week period. This review will begin with an 
introduction to the definitions and conceptualisations of rumination and a summary 
and critique of current interventions for rumination. It will then present values-based 
interventions, including value-affirmation and Acceptance and Commitment Therapy 
(ACT). An argument for investigating values, particularly with the addition of a goal-
setting component, as an intervention for reducing rumination will be presented, 
followed by an overview of the current study hypotheses.  
 
1.2 Rumination 
The literature reports several definitions of rumination, based on differing 
psychological perspectives, but broadly refers to repetitive patterns of negative 
thinking (Papageorgiou & Wells, 2004; Smith & Alloy, 2009). Rumination 
contributes to the development of numerous mental health difficulties (Ehring & 
Watkins, 2008; Harvey, 2004); it is a symptom of depression, anxiety disorders, 
eating disorders and substance misuse (Brozovich et al., 2015; Cowdrey & Park, 
2011; Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991; Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000; Skitch & Abela, 
2008). Researchers have found that elevated repetitive negative thought, including 
rumination, is associated with increased vulnerability to several emotional disorders 
and may therefore account for the high levels of comorbidity between mental health 
problems (McEvoy, Watson, Watkins, & Nathan, 2013; Ruscio, Seitchik, Gentes, 
Jones, & Hallion, 2011). For example, rumination was shown to be a full mediator of 
  
12 
 
the association between symptoms of depression and anxiety in adolescents and a 
partial mediator in adults (McLaughlin & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2011). Similarly, 
experimental studies have shown that rumination exacerbates both depressed and 
anxious mood (McLaughlin, Borkovec, & Sibrava, 2007). 
Researchers have found that nonclinical populations also report ruminative 
thoughts, but applied to negative moods and feelings, rather than symptoms of 
depression. The existing research suggests that the process of rumination is 
quantitatively but not qualitatively different between clinical and nonclinical 
populations (Garnefski et al., 2002; Siegle, Moore, & Thase, 2004). For example, 
(Garnefski et al., 2002) found that both a nonclinical and clinical population 
(individuals on a waitlist for treatment for depression or anxiety at a psychiatric 
clinic) self-reported ruminative thoughts, although this was predictably higher in the 
clinical population. This is also reflected in the same measures of rumination being 
used within both populations (Gortner, Rude, & Pennebaker, 2006; Lyubomirsky & 
Nolen-Hoeksema, 1995; Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1993; Roberts, Watkins, & 
Wills, 2013; Strauss, Muday, McNall, & Wong, 1997). Interventions targeting 
rumination may be able to reduce the onset, relapse, and maintenance of emotional 
disorders (Michalak, Hölz, & Teismann, 2011) as well as the other numerous 
consequences of rumination established in nonclinical studies.  
The subsequent section provides a more in-depth explanation and critique of 
two key theories underlying differing definitions of rumination. Following this, the 
literature concerning rumination in the nonclinical population, and then interventions 
for reducing rumination, will be presented.  
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1.2.1 Theoretical models. A full review of the many theories of rumination is 
beyond the scope of this study, however a description and critique of RST (Nolen-
Hoeksema, 1991) and CT (Martin & Tesser, 1996) is discussed below. 
 
1.2.1.1 The response styles theory (RST). In RST, Nolen-Hoeksema (1991) 
suggested that rumination is a habitual, stable and enduring trait-like tendency to 
repetitively focus on one’s symptoms of depression, and on the causes, meanings and 
consequences of depressive symptoms. This perspective views rumination as a 
process or style of thinking rather than being defined by specific thought-content or 
behaviours. It is a popular definition within clinical investigations of rumination and, 
in particular, depression (Smith & Alloy, 2009). The questionnaire designed to 
measure this conceptualisation of rumination, the Response Styles Questionnaire-
Ruminative Response Scale (RSQ-RRS; Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991), is also 
frequently utilised in the literature (Smith & Alloy, 2009). RST does not provide an 
explanatory account for state episodes of rumination (Chan, Davey, & Brewin, 2013; 
Watkins & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2014) but rather an explanation of how the tendency to 
ruminate leads to depression. 
Within RST, rumination is considered a clinical phenomenon that helps to 
explain vulnerability to and maintenance of clinical depression: the theory was 
originally proposed to explain the maladaptive relationship between rumination and 
depression, particularly how rumination exacerbates and prolongs depressive 
symptoms by intensifying negative thinking, leading to disengagement from goal-
driven behaviours, impairment of problem-solving and reduced social support (Nolen-
Hoeksema et al., 2008). It suggests one’s tendency to engage in rumination is a 
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pathological enduring cognitive style when responding to, or trying to cope with, 
negative mood (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991; Nolen-Hoeksema & Davis, 1999). It will 
lead people to remain fixated on the ruminative trigger and their feelings surrounding 
this, without taking action (Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008).  
There is some evidence for this conceptualisation of rumination as a 
pathological enduring cognitive style. Firstly, rumination has been shown to be stable 
over time (Just & Alloy, 1997; Kuehner & Weber, 1999; Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000). 
However, this finding may be due to the overlap of items on RSQ-RRS with other 
measures of depressive symptoms (Kasch, Klein, & Lara, 2001). Secondly, 
rumination is a maintaining factor and trigger for depression (Nolen-Hoeksema & 
Morrow, 1991). It predicts the onset of major depressive episodes in people who have 
never been depressed and it predicts the severity of episodes in people with chronic 
depression (Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000). Cognitive behavioural therapy (CBT) 
effectively treats depression (Hollon et al., 2002), but people are often left with 
residual symptoms such as rumination, and relapse is common (Paykel et al., 2005). 
Most trials of CBT do not directly assess rumination, but a high level of rumination is 
associated with slower and worse treatment response to both medication and cognitive 
therapy (Ciesla & Roberts, 2002; Jones, Siegle, & Thase, 2008; Schmaling, 
Dimidjian, Katon, & Sullivan, 2002). Levels of rumination post-treatment also predict 
the risk of relapse in major depressive disorder (Michalak et al., 2011), thus 
rumination is an important target for relapse prevention. However, rumination is 
implicated in other mental health difficulties beyond depression (Brozovich et al., 
2015; Cowdrey & Park, 2011; Skitch & Abela, 2008). 
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There are several limitations of RST theory. Firstly, RST does not explain why 
rumination can have constructive consequences (Watkins, 2008). For example, 
(Taylor, Pham, Rivkin, & Armor, 1998) suggest that rumination can, in some 
situations, allow individuals to mentally rehearse the steps they need to go through to 
reach a goal, leading to goal attainment. Similarly, researchers have shown that 
rumination can motivate individuals to engage in healthy behaviour change (Hay, 
McCaul, & Magnan, 2006).  
Another limitation of the theory is that it places rumination within a 
pathological context, as it refers to focusing on symptoms of depression and does not 
consider the process of rumination outside of this context. This goes against the idea 
that rumination lies on a continuum within the general population (Garnefski et al., 
2002) and that it is a transdiagnostic process (McLaughlin & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2011; 
Watkins, 2009).  
Additionally, the theory suggests rumination is triggered by negative mood, 
for which evidence exists (Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1995; Watkins, 2008). 
However, rumination is not an inevitable consequence of negative mood, even in 
‘high-ruminators’ (Chan et al., 2013). Moreover, rumination can also be triggered by 
unresolved goals or life events outside of the context of negative mood (Lavallee & 
Campbell, 1995; Martin & Tesser, 1996; Robinson & Alloy, 2003).  
 
1.2.1.2 Control theory (CT). CT suggests that rumination is triggered by a 
discrepancy in goal progress, serves to facilitate progress towards this unmet goal, and 
continues until the person's goal is met or abandoned. The theory suggests that 
focusing on the discrepancy between one’s current status and one’s target status 
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drives rumination, an idea based on Self-discrepancy theory (SDT; Higgins, 1987). 
According to SDT, individuals have three domains of self: the actual self, the ideal 
self, and the ought self. The actual self represents an individual’s own perception of 
their attributes and characteristics; the ideal self represents the attributes that the 
individual hopes to possess; and the ought self represents attributes the individual 
should have. Discrepancies between the actual self and the ideal or ought self drive 
rumination. The theory implicates the rate of goal progress, rather than the size of 
discrepancy, in driving rumination: low perceived rates of goal progress are 
associated with higher levels of rumination.  
According to CT, individuals can disengage from rumination via one of three 
mechanisms: temporarily through distraction, or more permanently through goal 
disengagement or attainment. Goals are hierarchically organised from abstract 
superordinate values-based goals down to more specific subordinate goals. The 
higher-order goals are pursued by specifying lower-level goals that work towards the 
more abstract higher-order goals.  
CT specifies that the function of rumination is to facilitate progress towards an 
unmet goal. Little research has addressed the function of rumination, but Martin, 
Shira, & Startup (2004) found that rumination was associated with right hemispheric 
activation, which authors concluded indicated a role in looking for methods of goal 
attainment. Thus, contrary to RST’s definition, rumination can be constructive, for 
example if it leads to goal progress, or unconstructive, for example if the goal is 
pursued despite being unachievable, or if it only increases awareness of the 
discrepancy (Watkins & Moulds, 2005; Watkins & Teasdale, 2001, 2004).  
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CT stipulates that rumination is caused by the Zeigarnik effect (Zeigarnik, 
1938): information regarding incomplete tasks remain in memory for longer than 
completed tasks. Rumination occurs because goal-related information is easily 
accessible (Martin, Tesser, & McIntosh, 1993), and, in turn, rumination keeps goal-
related information accessible. The theory proposes that rumination is more likely to 
occur as a result of failure to progress toward higher-order, rather than lower-order, 
goals. This is firstly because higher-order goals are more closely related to an 
individual’s values and therefore their self-identity and what is important to them; this 
makes higher-order goals more difficult to abandon. Secondly, higher-order goals are 
more abstract; the goal may be difficult to attain because it may take a long time, it 
may be loosely defined, it may be difficult to ascertain what is required to complete 
the goal or, if it refers to a value or life direction, it may be ongoing rather than 
something that can be completed.  
The proposal that lack of goal progress or receiving goal-related information 
about lack of goal progress leads to ruminative thinking is evidence-based (e.g., 
Martin et al., 1993; Roberts, Watkins, & Wills, 2013). For example, Roberts, 
Watkins, and Wills (2013) found that cueing an unresolved goal resulted in greater 
recurrent ruminative thoughts than cueing a resolved goal. In an experience sampling 
study, (Moberly & Watkins, 2010) found that greater goal success was associated 
with less rumination. Similarly, in a diary study, goal-related events were associated 
with higher levels of rumination than other ‘bothersome’ events that were not goal-
related (Lavallee & Campbell, 1995). However, participants also ruminated in 
response to goal-unrelated negative events, although this was less common.  
  
18 
 
According to CT theory, rumination is more likely to be triggered by higher-
order goal-discrepancy or value-inconsistent behaviour, as these are more closely 
related to our values and self-identity. Research has found that rumination can be 
triggered by goal-discrepancy whether the goal is higher-order and abstract (e.g., 
‘being compassionate’), or lower-order and concrete (e.g., ‘being an ideal weight’; 
(McIntosh, Harlow, & Martin, 1995). However, individuals who link their lower-
order goals with higher-order goals experience greater levels of rumination (McIntosh 
et al., 1995). In line with CT, the authors suggested that higher-level goals are less 
well-defined and more closely tied to the individual’s sense of self and their values, 
thus more difficult to abandon, leading to rumination. In line with this, rumination 
impairs goal disengagement: it leads individuals to persevere with unattainable goals 
(Randenborgh, Hüffmeier, LeMoult, & Joormann, 2010). Reducing goal-discrepancy 
via goal-setting interventions have been shown to result in reduced rumination in a 
student sample (Sheldon, Kasser, Smith, & Share, 2002), as well as generally 
improved subjective wellbeing in a student population (MacLeod, Coates, & 
Hetherton, 2007) and a depressed population (Coote & MacLeod, 2012). However, 
goal attainment may be difficult in practice as people can set never-ending or 
unrealistic goals for themselves (Armor & Taylor, 1998).  
In summary, there are at least two key ways of conceptualising rumination: as 
an enduring trait-like response style to depressive mood or as a transient, state-like, 
universal process that occurs in response to a thwarted goal. There is a growing 
evidence-base looking at rumination in nonclinical populations, for which the latter 
definition is more appropriate.  
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1.2.2. Rumination in the general population. There is a significant 
literature concerning rumination in the nonclinical population, particularly because it 
has allowed researchers to have a better understanding of clinical rumination, state 
episodes of rumination, and longitudinal aspects of rumination (Nolen-Hoeksema, 
2000; Querstret & Cropley, 2013; Smith & Alloy, 2009). The tendency to ruminate is 
typically assessed using the same measure in clinical and nonclinical samples, using 
the RSQ-RSS (N. Cohen, Mor, & Henik, 2015; Grisham, Flower, Williams, & 
Moulds, 2009; Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1995; Robinson & Alloy, 2003; 
Sloan, Marx, Epstein, & Dobbs, 2008). As such, researchers have shown that 
rumination is present in nonclinical samples, albeit to a quantitatively lesser extent 
than in clinical populations. Scores on the RSQ-RRS can range from 22-88, with 
higher scores indicating greater rumination. In nonclinical student samples, (Roelofs 
et al., 2007) and (Siegle et al., 2004) reported mean scores of 40.7 (SD = 11.1) and 
46.0 (SD = 11.0) respectively. (Portero, Durmaz, Raines, Short, & Schmidt, 2015) 
reported a mean RSQ-RRS of 35.64 (SD = 12.72) in a student sample and mean of 
53.89 (SD = 13.97) in a community transdiagnostic sample. Such findings suggest 
that rumination is similar across clinical and nonclinical populations, but clinical 
samples experience it to a greater extent.  
State episodes of rumination can also be easily triggered in nonclinical 
samples using the rumination induction designed by (Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 
1993). Participants are given simple instructions to “think about” a series of items 
such as, “why you react the way you do” or “what your feelings might mean” 
(Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1993). Given the simplicity of these instructions it 
is apparent that this is a process that individuals engage in outside of the research 
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laboratory, as shown by (Morrison & O’Connor, 2005) in a longitudinal study of 
rumination in a student population.  
Findings show that, when in the context of low mood, there are numerous 
negative consequences to rumination even in nonclinical samples. Rumination 
prolongs negative mood (Morrow & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1990) and anxiety symptoms 
(Blagden & Craske, 1996). Rumination also exacerbates negative thinking 
(Greenberg, Pyszczynski, Burling, & Tibbs, 1992; Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 
1995; Lyubomirsky, Tucker, Caldwell, & Berg, 1999). For example, in a student 
sample comparing dysphoric participants who ruminated versus being distracted, 
ruminators interpreted hypothetical situations more negatively and were more 
pessimistic about the future (Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1995). It results in 
increased recall of negative memories and maladaptive recall of over-general 
memories (Crane, Barnhofer, & Williams, 2007; Moulds, Kandris, Starr, & Wong, 
2007). Rumination also impairs problem-solving (Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 
1995). Dysphoric ruminators tend to rate their problems as more serious and less 
solvable (Lyubomirsky et al., 1999).  
One of the behavioural impacts of rumination is that it leads people to 
disengage from goal-driven behaviours. For example, (Lyubomirsky & Nolen-
Hoeksema, 1993) found that participants, induced to ruminate, reported less 
willingness to engage in activities they believed would improve their mood. 
Moreover, women with breast cancer who scored higher on trait rumination took 39 
days longer on average to speak to their doctor about their initial symptoms 
(Lyubomirsky, Kasri, Chang, & Chung, 2006). Rumination can also lead individuals 
to behave in a manner that impacts negatively on social relationships: rumination is 
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associated with neediness and dependency (Spasojević & Alloy, 2001), and an 
experimental study using fictional scenarios reported that participants viewed 
ruminative fictional characters more negatively (Schwartz & Thomas, 1995).  
Studying rumination in the general population has allowed researchers to 
develop a better understanding of clinical rumination and longitudinal aspects of 
rumination. Rumination in nonclinical samples is common and continuous with 
clinical samples and it predicts later depression (Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008). There 
are many more similarities than differences between clinical and nonclinical 
rumination. For example, goal-discrepancy is a trigger in nonclinical as well as 
clinical populations (Thomsen, Tønnesvang, Schnieber, & Olesen, 2011). Likewise, 
positive beliefs about rumination, such as “I must ruminate to better understand my 
feelings”, are closely linked to the tendency to ruminate in clinical and nonclinical 
samples (Costas Papageorgiou & Wells, 2003; Roelofs et al., 2007). Laboratory-based 
nonclinical studies have allowed the use of active control conditions that would 
otherwise not be ethical in clinical research (Levin, Hildebrandt, Lillis, & Hayes, 
2012). Additionally, clinical studies are often correlational and therefore difficult to 
draw conclusions regarding causality, and clinical populations often contain many 
confounding variables. In contrast, contextual variables can be controlled for in 
nonclinical laboratory studies. 
However, investigating rumination in the general population, particularly as an 
analogue sample, has limitations. For example, the mechanisms underlying depressive 
rumination may not be the same as those underlying nonclinical reactions to 
experimental stressors. Indeed, self-reported measures of rumination have not 
consistently shown the same pattern of results as experimentally-induced rumination 
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(Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008). A factor analysis of the RSQ-RRS did not show 
consistent results between clinical and nonclinical samples (Whitmer & Gotlib, 2011), 
as they found two factors (‘brooding’ and ‘reflection’) in the nonclinical sample but 
not in the clinical sample. Another limitation of analogue studies relates to their time-
limited effects: in studies where nonclinical participants are induced to ruminate, the 
impact can only be assessed short-term. This means that for any findings regarding 
induced rumination, the longer-term benefits of an intervention cannot be assessed nor 
can it be established whether findings relate to either development or maintenance of 
psychopathology. Therefore any results of nonclinical studies cannot be generalised to 
the clinical population with any degree of certainty. However, analogue samples that 
measure rumination over time without a rumination induction, may be more 
ecologically valid.  
In conclusion, rumination is present in both clinical and nonclinical 
populations and results in many negative consequences. It is therefore important to 
find effective ways of reducing rumination. The following section provides an 
overview of current interventions for rumination.  
 
1.2.3  Cognitive and Acceptance-based Interventions for Reducing 
Rumination. Interventions targeting rumination may be able to reduce the onset, 
relapse, and maintenance of emotional disorders (Michalak et al., 2011) as well as the 
other numerous consequences of rumination established in nonclinical studies. 
However, the literature investigating interventions for rumination is relatively small 
and mostly focused on reducing rumination in depressed samples, despite the 
prevalence of rumination transdiagnostically and in the general population. Much of 
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the research focuses on traditional cognitive behavioural techniques, but there is a 
growing body of literature investigating third-wave interventions (e.g., acceptance, 
mindfulness and values) for rumination. These are discussed below.   
 
1.2.3.1 Cognitive-based interventions. Traditional cognitive behavioural 
interventions often use ‘reframing’ techniques to address rumination; that is 
identifying and then challenging maladaptive thoughts. For example, Metacognitive 
therapy (MCT) is a form of cognitive restructuring that looks at challenging an 
individual’s metacognitions, or thoughts about thoughts. (Wells, 2008) suggests that 
rumination is initiated by positive metacognitive beliefs about its positive 
consequences (e.g., “focusing on how I feel will help me know when I’m better”) and 
is then exacerbated by negative metacognitive beliefs about its negative consequences 
(e.g., “I can’t control my thinking”; (Wells et al., 2012). In an uncontrolled trial of 
eight sessions of MCT (Wells et al., 2012), recovery rates from treatment-resistant 
depression (individuals who had previously not responded to anti-depressant 
medication and a psychological intervention) were 60-80% depending on the criteria 
applied. Statistically significant improvements were seen in rumination and 
metacognitive beliefs and this was maintained at one-year follow-up. A randomised 
controlled trial (RCT) is required to investigate this intervention further as this study 
was uncontrolled. The applicability of this strategy for the whole continuum of 
rumination also requires further consideration.  
CT (Martin & Tesser, 1996) predicted that abstract goals are likely to cause 
more problematic goal progress because they are more difficult to achieve or 
abandon. In line with this, rumination is associated with the tendency to process 
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information in an abstract and over-generalised manner (Koster, De Lissnyder, 
Derakshan, & De Raedt, 2011). Concreteness training (CNT) was designed to counter 
this bias by increasing specificity of processing. Participants are taught to focus on 
details and context of events using mental exercises. In a nonclinical study, CNT (as a 
facilitated self-help intervention with one initial training session and seven days 
practicing the learned techniques with audio exercises), was compared to a ‘bogus 
CNT’ (without active engagement in concrete thinking but matched on treatment 
rationale, contact and duration) and a waitlist control group (Watkins et al., 2009). 
CNT reduced rumination after one week, but no significant difference was shown 
between treatment groups, suggesting nonspecific therapy factors were contributing to 
the effect. 
In a review of interventions for depressive rumination, (Querstret & Cropley, 
2013) identified 10 studies measuring rumination. Nine of these studies measured 
rumination as a secondary outcome and only one measured rumination as the primary 
outcome of the intervention: this was a study looking at ‘Rumination-focused CBT’ 
(RFCBT; Watkins et al., 2011). It is a 12-week intervention in which individuals are 
taught to view rumination as a form of behavioural avoidance and encourages 
behaviour change rather than targeting cognitions (Watkins & Nolen-Hoeksema, 
2014). Using functional analysis, RFCBT aims to help patients identify the cues that 
increase rumination, and practice alternative more helpful approach responses such as 
assertiveness (Watkins, 2010). In an RCT with a sample of individuals with 
medication-refractory residual depression (N = 42; (Edward R. Watkins et al., 2011), 
treatment-as-usual (TAU; ongoing antidepressant medication and out-patient clinical 
management) was compared to RFCBT. They found there was a significant 
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improvement in residual symptoms and remission rates, mediated by a reduction in 
rumination: 62% met full remission post-treatment in the RFCBT group, compared to 
21% in the TAU group. Follow-up data were not collected so the long-term benefits 
are unknown. Additionally, the authors noted that the sample size was quite small. 
A group version of RFCBT has also been investigated (Teismann, Brachel, et 
al., 2014): the treatment programme, named ‘cognitive-behavioural group program for 
depressive rumination’ (CBT-DR), is an integration of techniques from BA and 
RFCBT. A sample of patients with residual depression were randomised to either 11 
weekly sessions of CBT-DR or to waitlist control. CBT-DR resulted in significant 
improvements in mood, rumination, perceived control over rumination and unhelpful 
metacognitive beliefs and this was maintained at one-year follow-up. The CBT-DR 
remission rate was 42% and the relapse rate was 26%. However, RFCBT moves away 
from the more traditional method of ‘reframing’ ruminative thoughts. Instead it 
overlaps with more recent third wave interventions, namely mindfulness and 
acceptance, because it encourages individuals to be mindful of when they begin to 
ruminate, to accept this as a cognitive process and to focus on behaviour change 
(Arch & Craske, 2008; Edward R. Watkins et al., 2011). These concepts have been 
examined separately as methods for reducing rumination, as will now be discussed.   
 
1.2.3.2 Mindfulness and acceptance based interventions. Mindfulness and 
acceptance are two closely related concepts that emphasise the importance of 
‘decentering’, that is, to see thoughts and feelings come and go without attaching truth 
or meaning to them (J. Kabat-Zinn & Burney, 1981), rather than the ‘reframing’ 
techniques seen within most cognitive behavioural interventions. They provide an 
  
26 
 
alternative way of responding to negative experiences other than rumination. 
Generally, the practice of mindfulness teaches individuals to intentionally and 
nonjudgmentally bring one’s attention back to the present moment (Segal, 2001). 
Acceptance means being open to remaining in the present with your current 
experience. These concepts are hypothesised to promote disengagement from 
rumination as when a negative thought or feeling occurs, it is mindfully observed and 
accepted as a mental event that will pass, rather than a truth that will drive rumination 
(Hodo, 2002).  
Acceptance within ACT is taught as an alternative to rumination and involves 
learning to experience consciously and actively unwanted private experiences, such as 
low mood, without attempting to alter them (S. C. Hayes, Luoma, Bond, Masuda, & 
Lillis, 2006). Numerous studies have compared an acceptance induction to a 
rumination induction and measured distress (rather than rumination) as an outcome: 
studies have shown that when acceptance is taught as an alternative to rumination, it 
reduces negative mood and negative attitudes towards negative experiences 
(Campbell-Sills, Barlow, Brown, & Hofmann, 2006; Huffziger & Kuehner, 2009; 
Singer & Dobson, 2007; Wade, George, & Atkinson, 2009). In addition, (Ed Watkins 
& Baracaia, 2002) found that just increasing awareness of mental processes can move 
people away from ruminative thinking in depressed and recovered depressed 
participants. Other studies investigating acceptance for rumination have utilised 
mindfulness, because this is considered a technique for accepting current experiences 
(Kohl, Rief, & Glombiewski, 2012).  
There are several mindfulness-based interventions for clinical disorders. 
Mindfulness-based cognitive therapy (MBCT) was originally designed to help 
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depressed clients in remission to learn skills to reduce the risk of relapse, partly by 
targeting rumination (Segal, 2001). It consists of eight weekly two-hour manualized 
group sessions, intended to teach individuals to become more aware of, and alter their 
relationship with, their internal experiences: they learn to recognise counterproductive 
automatic modes of thinking and respond by decentering from these internal 
experiences (Kuyken et al., 2008). This approach can reduce risk of depressive 
relapse by up to 50% (Hofmann, Sawyer, Witt, & Oh, 2010; Piet & Hougaard, 2011). 
In trials of MBCT for individuals with recurrent depression compared to waitlist 
control (Geschwind, Peeters, Drukker, van Os, & Wichers, 2011) or TAU (van 
Aalderen et al., 2012), the intervention reduced rumination. This has also been found 
in a nonclinical population (Shapiro, Oman, Thoresen, Plante, & Flinders, 2008): 
increases in mindfulness mediated the reduction found in rumination.  
Mindfulness-based stress reduction (MBSR; (J. Kabat-Zinn, 1982; Jon Kabat-
Zinn, 2013) is another mindfulness-based intervention, which is an eight-session 
group based intervention originally designed for individuals with chronic health 
conditions. It contains mindfulness training as well as other types of meditation, such 
as yoga, designed to reduce stress. MBSR training was shown to reduce rumination in 
patients with long-term mood disorders (Ramel, Goldin, Carmona, & McQuaid, 
2004), although the study did not randomise participants and so sampling bias may 
have occurred.  
Often these interventions contain a number of other treatment components 
beyond mindfulness, for example behavioural activation or stress management. Some 
are quite time-consuming interventions and identifying the active ingredient may help 
to make these interventions more time-efficient. In a review of mindfulness 
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interventions, effect sizes were significantly associated with the number of treatment 
sessions and not type of mindfulness intervention, suggesting that more exposure to 
mindfulness practice generally results in better outcomes (Klainin-Yobas, Cho, & 
Creedy, 2012). However, as many studies used nontreatment controls such as waitlist 
or TAU, effects found may be attributable to other factors such as attending a group 
therapy or regular contact with a therapist, rather than the practice of mindfulness 
(Skerrett, 2013). In a study comparing MBCT and MBSR, researchers found that 
engaging in formal (rather than informal) mindfulness practice was associated with 
decreased rumination and symptom reduction (Hawley et al., 2013).  
Mindfulness is negatively correlated with rumination (Brown & Ryan, 2003). 
It has also been investigated nonclinically as a stand-alone brief intervention (Deyo, 
Wilson, Ong, & Koopman, 2009). Participants who receive mindfulness training 
demonstrate reduced levels of rumination (Deyo et al., 2009; Feldman, Greeson, & 
Senville, 2010; Hawley et al., 2013). (Hilt & Pollak, 2012) induced negative mood in 
a nonclinical sample of adolescents and then compared three brief interventions for 
rumination: distraction, problem-solving and mindfulness. Both distraction and 
mindfulness reduced state rumination compared to problem-solving, although longer-
term effects were not measured. It has also been investigated in a student population 
in an RCT of mindfulness meditation compared to relaxation (Jain et al., 2007). 
Although there was no significant difference on distress and positive mood states 
between groups, mindfulness showed a significant decrease in rumination compared 
to the control group.  
Both mindfulness and acceptance techniques have been well researched in the 
context of rumination and shown to have positive effects. This is thought to be 
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achieved by providing an alternative response to negative thoughts and feelings. 
However, mindfulness practice requires significant commitment from participants 
given the time-consuming nature of the intervention, including the homework tasks 
that are set.  
In summary, the literature on interventions primarily designed to target 
rumination is limited, despite its prevalence transdiagnostically and nonclinically, 
being a maintaining factor of psychopathology and a significant risk factor for relapse 
(Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008). Interventions have started to focus on rumination as a 
cognitive process rather than modifying the content of ruminative thoughts. There has 
been a move away from the more traditional cognitive restructuring, as theoretical 
models conceptualise rumination as a process and research has shown that 
challenging individual ruminative thoughts can at best be difficult (e.g., how to 
challenge ‘why do I feel depressed?’) and at worst could lead to thought suppression 
and thus increased negative thinking (S. C. Hayes, Strosahl, & Wilson, 1999). More 
successful interventions have incorporated mindfulness and acceptance components, 
as well as behaviour change. Overall, they provide an alternative to avoidance of 
negative thoughts and emotions and are interventions that have been applied 
transdiagnostically and within the broad continuum of rumination. However, these are 
fairly time-consuming interventions and often contain numerous treatment 
components.  
CT proposes that rumination is triggered by actual-ideal self-discrepancy and 
interferes with instrumental behaviour (Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008): working with 
higher-order goals and introducing flexibility in goal-driven behaviours could reduce 
the ruminative process. A brief intervention that may target this process is focusing on 
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values. Reflecting on one’s values may allow individuals to defuse from ruminative 
thoughts about a blocked goal and move toward values-based behaviour change. The 
next section will look at the increasing interest within clinical psychology on using 
values as a brief intervention that addresses rumination on a process level, 
transdiagnostically and nonclinically.  
 
1.3 Values 
Values have been conceptualised in a variety of ways in psychology (Dahl, 
2015; Lundgren, Luoma, Dahl, Strosahl, & Melin, 2012; Plumb, Stewart, Dahl, & 
Lundgren, 2009; S. Schwartz, 2012). Within social psychology, values are thought of 
as the internalised standards we use to evaluate ourselves. They are broad desirable 
goals that guide people’s perceptions, attitudes, and behaviours across contexts, 
cultures and time; examples include ‘knowledge’, ‘friendship’, or ‘health’ (S. 
Schwartz, 2012). From an ACT perspective, values are ‘chosen concepts linked with 
patterns of action that provide a sense of meaning and that can co-ordinate our 
behaviour over long time frames’ (Dahl, 2015). According to ACT, values are not the 
same as goals: values represent a life direction and are hierarchically related to goals 
but, unlike goals, values are never obtained (Dahl, 2015). Examples of values within 
this conceptualisation are ‘compassion’, ‘honesty’, or ‘independence’. It may be that 
values could provide a flexible way to reduce self-discrepancy because goals that are 
value-driven can be more flexible. For example, you may value ‘health’ and may 
express this value by playing football regularly. However, if you are injured and 
unable to play football, you may instead express this value by setting yourself a goal 
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of eating more fruit and vegetables. Values are individual: not everyone has the same 
values, and people hold their values with varying degrees of importance. Values in 
this context are intrinsic in nature, meaning they provide a natural reinforcer or 
motivator (Lekes, Hope, Gouveia, Koestner, & Philippe, 2012).  
There has been increasing focus within clinical psychology on the possible 
psychological benefits of helping clients to reflect on, and connect with, their core 
values by developing goals that are derived from these core values (Plumb et al., 
2009). The clinical application of values to improving mental health is most 
prominent within ACT (discussed below), but dismantling studies have not been 
conducted to test the stand alone benefits of values. However, within social 
psychology literature, values have been investigated extensively. Self-affirmation 
literature has demonstrated that reflecting on a core value is an effective means of 
buffering the self in the face of self-threatening information. This may be relevant to 
rumination: CT stipulates that rumination is triggered by lack of goal attainment and 
can be reduced via goal disengagement or attainment (Martin & Tesser, 1996). 
Although self-affirmation and values within ACT differ in some ways, both suggest 
that clarifying one’s values may reduce rumination by allowing an individual to 
disengage from blocked goals and/or focus on attaining alternative value-driven goals. 
The following sections will focus on values and the psychological benefits of values 
by first considering self-affirmation literature and then ACT literature. A theoretical 
argument will be presented on the potential for values to be used as an intervention to 
reduce rumination.   
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1.3.1 Self-affirmation theory and methods. The psychological benefits of 
working with an individual’s values has been demonstrated in the field of social 
psychology, which has predominantly focused on nonclinical populations. Value-
affirmation is a particular type of self-affirmation, in which participants write a brief 
essay about why a chosen value is important to them and describe a time when it was 
important (McQueen & Klein, 2006). An extensive literature demonstrates that this 
can generate a range of health and psychological benefits. Before reviewing this 
literature, self-affirmation theory will be described.  
According to self-affirmation theory (Steele, 1988), we are all driven to 
maintain a positive self-view. Thus, when we receive information or experience a life 
event that threatens our self-view, or triggers a discrepancy between our ideal versus 
our real self, we are motivated to resolve this (D. K. Sherman & Cohen, 2006). Our 
self-view refers to a flexible global narrative, rather than a specific self-concept; 
people have various adaptable roles and identities within their self-view. Furthermore, 
self-affirmation theory proposes that our self-view is determined by a collection of 
valued domains. According to self-affirmation, a threat to one domain can be tolerated 
by reflecting on competence in another valued domain. This means that when we are 
faced with a psychological threat, such as a blocked goal, our self-view can be 
protected by reflecting on competence and success in another valued domain. This 
may have important implications for reducing rumination (see section 1.3.3). 
Evidence that our overarching goal is to find a way to maintain our positive 
self-view comes from research showing that when someone’s positive view of 
themselves is under threat, they often react defensively. For example, if someone 
receives health information that goes against their lifestyle choices, they may question 
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the truth of that information (Reed & Aspinwall, 1998). However, self-affirmation 
theory posits that, rather than reacting defensively, we can instead maintain our 
positive self-view via self-affirmation: “an act that demonstrates one’s adequacy” (D. 
K. Sherman & Cohen, 2006). If individuals are given the opportunity to affirm their 
positive self-view, this buffers the self against the psychological threat imposed by the 
health message: they then react less defensively to information that threatens this 
ideal-actual self-discrepancy (D. K. Sherman, 2013).  
Affirming the self can occur spontaneously in day-to-day life (Emanuel et al., 
2016), such as by purchasing status goods (Sivanathan & Pettit, 2010) or updating 
one’s Facebook page (Toma & Hancock, 2013). Spontaneous self-affirmations have 
been associated with better psychological wellbeing, including greater happiness and 
optimism (Emanuel et al., 2016). There are also numerous experimental 
manipulations of self-affirmation reported in the literature (McQueen & Klein, 2006), 
for example providing positive feedback about a personally meaningful skill (G. L. 
Cohen, Aronson, & Steele, 2000) or asking participants to reflect on their own 
previous acts of kindness (Armitage, Harris, Hepton, & Napper, 2008; Reed & 
Aspinwall, 1998).  
The most widely studied experimental manipulation of self-affirmation is 
value-affirmation (McQueen & Klein, 2006), which uses values to buffer the self. The 
technique usually involves an individual viewing a list of values, ranking them in 
order of importance to them, choosing the one that is most important to them, then 
writing a brief essay about why their chosen value is important to them and a time 
when it was important. McQueen and Klein (2006), in their review of experimental 
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manipulations of self-affirmation, suggest the value essay is the best option for 
comparison with other studies because it has been used successfully many times.  
However, there are some issues of note with the value-affirmation procedure. 
This methodology often uses a global values scale such as the Allport-Vernon-
Lindzey (AVL) values scale (Allport, Vernon, & Lindzey, 1960), which contains 
values such as ‘politics’ or ‘religion’. The AVL is a restrictive list of values that is 
now considered outdated in content and language (Kopelman, Rovenpor, & Guan, 
2003) and is difficult for individuals with low literacy or education to utilise 
(McQueen & Klein, 2006). Other provided lists have also been restrictive, for 
example only five values were available to choose from in a study by (Creswell et al., 
2005). This relatively limited range of values may reduce the strength of value-
affirmation effects as some participants may not find any of the values available to 
them personally meaningful. It may also increase the chance of socially desirable 
responses rather than personally meaningful affirmations.  
Within ACT literature, values lists usually contain a much broader number of 
items, often between 40-60 items, with a brief description of what each value means 
(R. Harris, 2008, 2011). The list of values used within ACT represent life directions 
(rather than life domains) and are intrinsic in nature, such as ‘forgiveness’. 
Additionally, within self-help ACT literature, individuals are usually instructed to sort 
the list of values into groups labelled ‘very important to me’, ‘quite important to me’ 
and ‘not important to me’, as this is considered a more meaningful activity than 
ranking every value in order (R. Harris, 2008, 2011). Sorting an extensive list of 
values into categories, rather than ranking every value, allows individuals to gradually 
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determine their most important value, rather than be spending time focusing on and 
ranking values that are not so important to them.  
Another issue regarding the value-affirmation procedure is that there is some 
debate about whether it is the focus on values in values essays that produces the 
positive effects of value-affirmation. For example, (Shnabel, Purdie-Vaughns, Cook, 
Garcia, & Cohen, 2013) examined the content of the values essays written by middle 
school students. This revealed that writing about social belonging, defined as 
affirming bonds with others in their social network, was key to buffering against 
identity threat. An affirmation-training intervention has been compared to a social 
belonging intervention for women in male-dominated university courses (Walton, 
Logel, Peach, Spencer, & Zanna, 2015). Both interventions successfully reduced the 
gender differences in academic grades, suggesting they may work via similar 
mechanisms. However, it has been suggested that the active ingredient of value-
affirmation is social belonging only when the individual is faced with a social-identity 
threat (Shnabel et al., 2013). An alternative idea to social belonging is that of focusing 
on social relationships. Researchers have suggested that most value-affirmation essays 
focus on social relationships such as friends and family (Crocker, Yu Niiya, & 
Mischkowski, 2008) and that it is this focus, rather than values per se, that produces 
the positive effects of value-affirmation (G. L. Cohen & Sherman, 2014). Taken 
together, the importance of affirming an intrinsic aspect of the self, meaning relating 
to one’s own interests, goals or choices, rather than a socially imposed basis of self-
worth has been highlighted (McQueen & Klein, 2006; Schimel, Arndt, Banko, & 
Cook, 2004). It would be important to emphasise to participants in a value-affirmation 
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manipulation study that values are unique to the individual and there are no right or 
wrong answers when choosing important values.  
Relevant value-affirmation effects, and the possible mechanisms by which 
these effects work, will now be presented. A theoretical and empirical argument for 
using value-affirmation to reduce rumination will then be presented.   
 
1.3.2 Value-affirmation effects. The process of reflecting on a core value has 
significant psychological benefits, resulting in a range of emotional, cognitive and 
behavioural outcomes that propagate through time (G. L. Cohen & Sherman, 2014).  
Evidence shows that value-affirmation reduces the impact of a psychological 
threat. Value-affirmed individuals show reduced physiological reactions to stress 
(Creswell et al., 2005; D. K. Sherman, Bunyan, Creswell, & Jaremka, 2009). Sherman 
et al. (2009) instructed students to complete two value-affirmation exercises over the 
two weeks before a stressful exam. The students provided urine samples to measure 
epinephrine levels, an indicator of sympathetic nervous system activation that 
increases with stress. Students in the control condition showed an increase in 
epinephrine levels over the two weeks; value-affirmed individuals did not. However, 
another study told participants they had to give an impromptu speech in front of an 
audience. They found no difference in self-reported anticipatory or post-task anxiety 
in participants who engaged in a value-affirmation writing task compared to a control 
writing task (Czech, Katz, & Orsillo, 2011). The authors speculated whether self-
reported stress or anxiety was not a helpful measure of value-affirmation effects, as it 
may be the tolerance of distress rather than distress itself that is altered (Branstetter-
Rost, Cushing, & Douleh, 2009; Páez-Blarrina et al., 2008). (Gregg, Namekata, 
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Louie, & Chancellor-Freeland, 2014) suggested that writing for 20 minutes about a 
strongly held value may actually inadvertently generate more stress for participants, 
particularly if it generates negative thoughts about living value-inconsistently. The 
authors found significantly lower cortisol levels following a social stressor task for 
individuals who had value-affirmed both by writing about an important value and 
reflecting on how they have recently lived in line with this value, compared to a non-
affirmation control: authors suggested this addition may have minimised short-term 
stress reaction related to not currently living value-consistently. In summary, research 
suggests that value-affirmation reduces stress and increases tolerance of pain to 
enable engagement in meaningful tasks (Feldner, Zvolensky, Eifert, & Spira, 2003; 
Levitt, Brown, Orsillo, & Barlow, 2004). 
Self-affirmation theory posits that value-affirming reduces people’s usual 
defensive response to self-view threats by maintaining a positive global self-concept 
and reducing ideal-actual self-discrepancy. People are therefore more able to respond 
in ways that are not dominated by the drive to minimise actual-ideal self-discrepancy 
(D. K. Sherman, 2013). This reduces the defensive reactions to threat and allows 
change or learning to occur for the individual. Value-affirmation reduces defensive 
reactions such as rationalising away threatening information, denial, rumination, 
paranoia, or use of alcohol (Armitage, Harris, & Arden, 2011; Kingston & Ellett, 
2014; Koole, Smeets, van Knippenberg, & Dijksterhuis, 1999; Sherman & Cohen, 
2006).  
Self-affirmation has been associated with positive cognitive outcomes: more 
positive perceptions of threatening health information, attitude change, less biased 
information processing, and reduced stereotyping (G. L. Cohen et al., 2000; Fein & 
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Spencer, 1997; Reed & Aspinwall, 1998; Spencer, Fein, & Lomore, 2001). For 
example, in a study where smokers were given information about smoking being life-
threatening (a psychological threat), after one week value-affirmed individuals were 
more distressed by the information, and reported stronger motivation and greater 
confidence in their ability to quit smoking (P. R. Harris, Mayle, Mabbott, & Napper, 
2007).  
Several studies have shown value-affirmation procedures to have durable 
effects. For example, in relation to academic performance in minority groups, (G. L. 
Cohen, Garcia, Purdie-Vaughns, Apfel, & Brzustoski, 2009) and Sherman et al. 
(2013) found improved academic grades in at-risk minority students at two-year 
follow-up after completing a set of four value-affirmation interventions over one year. 
This finding has been observed in a number of different minority groups (Cohen, 
Garcia, Apfel, & Master, 2006; Miyake et al., 2010; Shnabel, Purdie-Vaughns, Cook, 
Garcia, & Cohen, 2013). The authors suggested that self-affirmation buffers against 
identity threat by broadening an individual’s self-view and this effect can then 
propagate over time because, as self-affirmed individuals have better outcomes, they 
are re-affirmed and the cycle continues. This is particularly apparent in academic 
settings where performance is evaluated on an ongoing basis and each time this 
happens is an opportunity for the self to be affirmed (G. L. Cohen et al., 2009).  
Longer-term effects have also been observed in health settings in the form of 
behaviour change, although findings are mixed (P. R. Harris & Epton, 2009). For 
example, (Logel & Cohen, 2012) reported that self-affirmation resulted in more 
weight loss, lower body mass indexes and smaller weight circumferences in people 
trying to lose weight; the authors suggested that self-affirmation reduced the effects of 
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stress, resulting in better self-control and less preoccupation with weight. (van 
Koningsbruggen & Das, 2009) found that people at risk of diabetes were more likely 
to take a screening test if they had self-affirmed. Similarly, self-affirmation increased 
risk perceptions of HIV and HIV preventative behaviours, such as purchasing 
condoms (D. A. K. Sherman, Nelson, & Steele, 2000) and resulted in less alcohol 
consumption at one-month follow-up (Armitage et al., 2011), compared to 
nonaffirmed individuals. However, other studies have not demonstrated long term 
effects. For example, (P. R. Harris et al., 2007) found that at one-week follow-up, 
self-affirmed individuals reported higher motivation to quit smoking but no reduction 
in cigarette consumption. One study found that self-affirmation only resulted in 
improved physical activity in asthmatic patients in those with greater psychological 
threats such as hospitalisation (Mancuso et al., 2012). 
On examining other studies that have reported positive behaviour change, 
some have utilised the addition of an implementation intentions intervention: similar 
to goal-setting, participants design an action plan for behaviour change which 
incorporates when, where and how goal-directed behaviour will occur, but they also 
consider the link between what they will do if specific situations arise, known as if-
then planning (P. M. Gollwitzer, Marquardt, Scherer, & Fujita, 2013). This has been 
shown to increase the likelihood of goal attainment (Orbell & Sheeran, 2000). 
Combining self-affirmation with implementation intentions resulted in the participants 
eating more fruit and vegetables at a three-month follow-up than either intervention 
alone (P. R. Harris et al., 2014). Similarly, (Ferrer, Shmueli, Bergman, Harris, & 
Klein, 2012) investigated how self-affirmation facilitated behaviour change: self-
affirmed participants were more likely to develop a list of implementation intentions 
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to reduce alcohol consumption, compared to nonaffirmed control participants. 
However, the effect was only found for participants experiencing positive affect, 
indicating a moderating role of affect on self-affirmation.  
Other studies have reported differing effects of value-affirmation and 
implementation intentions. One study reported that implementation intentions, and not 
value-affirmation, had a positive effect on alcohol consumption in the one-week 
follow-up (Norman & Wrona-Clarke, 2016). Furthermore, Jessop et al. (2013) found 
less of an increase in exercise behaviour when combining self-affirmation and 
implementation intentions compared to self-affirmation alone. However, the self-
affirmation intervention was a ‘reflection on kindness behaviours’ intervention rather 
than value-clarification.  
Reflecting on this literature, Cohen and Sherman (2014) suggest that self-
affirmation effects will only be carried forward longer term if a behaviour change, in 
the form of an ‘early behavioural win’ is triggered. They suggested that if self-
affirmation is able to trigger an immediate positive change in behaviour, this could 
not only show people that behaviour change is possible, but could also change the 
individual’s self-view so they will continue to behave in a way that is congruent with 
this altered self-view. This could carry forward self-affirmation effects longer term, 
by reducing ideal-actual self-discrepancy, seeing that change is possible, and seeing 
oneself acting value-consistently (G. L. Cohen & Sherman, 2014). Acting more value-
consistently extends the self-affirmation effect by promoting and maintaining a 
positive self-view (D. K. Sherman & Cohen, 2006). Further research is required into 
how self-affirmation can trigger the potentially important ‘early behavioural win’ (G. 
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L. Cohen & Sherman, 2014); a goal-setting component may be of potential benefit 
(Peter M. Gollwitzer & Sheeran, 2006). 
The majority of research into self-affirmation effects use undergraduate 
student samples rather than addressing clinical problems. Unfortunately, many studies 
only measure the immediate or short-term impact (Howell, 2016) and many studies do 
not report effect sizes (McQueen & Klein, 2006). Additionally, although self-
affirmation effects are wide-ranging, it is unclear exactly how self-affirmation effects 
work. 
 
1.3.2.1 Possible mechanisms of change. A range of mechanisms have been 
proposed for how self-affirmation works. In particular it has been suggested that self-
affirmation broadens the perspective by which people view information and life 
experiences, thus reducing the impact of the threat on self-discrepancy (D. K. 
Sherman, 2013). Consistent with this, self-affirmation resulted in less rumination or 
dwelling on past or possible future failures (Koole et al., 1999; Sherman, Bunyan, et 
al., 2009) because it allowed people to view a psychological threat from the 
perspective of a positive global self-concept, rather than a narrow view of the self that 
is under threat. This suggests that when an individual is faced with a thwarted goal, 
ideal-actual self-discrepancy is not increased because the overarching higher-order 
goal of maintaining positive self-view is still achieved.  
(Wakslak & Trope, 2009) found that self-affirmation altered participants’ 
cognitive processing; objects and events were viewed in more superordinate and 
structured ways. They concluded that self-affirmation results in processing at a higher 
level of construal, allowing individuals to focus on the big picture. This notion was 
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replicated in an academic setting looking at minority student identity threat (D. K. 
Sherman et al., 2013). In the minority student sample (Latino American) self-
affirmations resulted in a higher level of construal, whereas in the nonminority group 
(White) self-affirmation had no effect on construal level. The self-affirmation resulted 
in less of an association between daily stresses and perceptions of racial threat. It 
allowed individuals experiencing daily threats to consider this from a broader 
perspective and not perceive them as threats to their positive self-view, leading to 
better academic grades (D. K. Sherman et al., 2013). (Critcher & Dunning, 2015) also 
found self-affirmed individuals reported that self-threats were less all-defining, which 
mediated a reduction in defensiveness. Indeed, they found that an exercise intended to 
broaden perspective reduced defensiveness as effectively as a self-affirmation 
exercise. 
There are several possible mediators or moderators to the success of self-
affirmation, a thorough examination of which is beyond the scope of this review (see 
(G. L. Cohen & Sherman, 2014; Howell, 2016; McQueen & Klein, 2006; D. K. 
Sherman, 2013). However, positive affect and self-esteem will briefly be discussed as 
these are frequently cited. 
Positive affect. Positive affect is a potential mediator of self-affirmation 
effects. (Koole et al., 1999) found that the effect of self-affirmation on reducing 
rumination was mediated by an implicit measure of positive affect. However, most 
studies find that self-affirmation does not affect self-reported mood (Fein & Spencer, 
1997; Lannin, Guyll, Vogel, & Madon, 2013; Schmeichel & Martens, 2005; Sherman 
et al., 2000; Spencer et al., 2001). (Steele, Spencer, & Lynch, 1993) reported that self-
affirmation resulted in self-justifying attitude change but positive affect alone did not 
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have the same effect. However, participants in this study did not maintain their 
induced positive affect throughout the experiment. It may be that self-affirmation does 
not result in changes to explicit positive affect, but when measured implicitly, as with 
(Koole et al., 1999), it does. One study has also investigated the role of affect as a 
moderator to self-affirmation effects (Ferrer et al., 2012): self-affirmation effects were 
only found for participants experiencing positive affect.  
Self-esteem. Self-esteem has been investigated as a mediator and a moderator 
of self-affirmation effects. Self-affirming may work by boosting one’s self-esteem 
(mediation), meaning their global evaluation of their self-worth (Rosenberg, 1965): a 
person can accept threats to self-identity that would otherwise lower their self-esteem 
(Fein & Spencer, 1997). However, there have been mixed results concerning whether 
self-affirmation results in improved self-esteem, with Fein and Spencer (1997) finding 
it improved self-esteem and Schmeichel and Martens (2005) finding it had no effect 
on self-esteem. (Crocker et al., 2008) found that self-affirmation increased acceptance 
of self-threatening information, thereby reducing defensiveness, via self-
transcendence (defined as feelings of love and connectedness to others), rather than 
by boosting self-worth or self-esteem. People are reminded of important things 
beyond themselves and so are better able to manage threats to self-integrity. Another 
study concluded that affirming a value did not affect self-esteem whereas affirming an 
attribute did: different affirmation interventions may work by different mechanisms 
(Stapel & van der Linde, 2011). Two reviews of self-affirmation literature have 
concluded that self-affirmation does not work by improving self-esteem, but that self-
affirmation and self-esteem can show similar effects (McQueen & Klein, 2006; D. K. 
Sherman & Cohen, 2006). 
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In terms of moderation, there is some debate as to whether individuals with 
lower trait self-esteem benefit more or less from self-affirmation (Gibbons, Eggleston, 
& Benthin, 1997, p. 200; Steele et al., 1993). This may be context-dependent 
(Jaremka, Bunyan, Collins, & Sherman, 2011; Landau & Greenberg, 2006). Jaremka 
et al. (2011) suggested that in their study people with high self-esteem did not actually 
feel threatened by psychological threats to self-integrity so did not benefit from self-
affirmation. (Marigold, Holmes, & Ross, 2007) found that high self-esteem 
individuals were more likely to self-generate self-affirmations and so benefitted less 
from a self-affirmation intervention. On the other hand, in a previously described 
study looking at the effect of self-affirmation on stress, self-reported stress was only 
lower for self-affirmation participants who were high in self-resources (i.e., high self-
esteem, self-enhancement and optimism), whereas self-affirmed participants with low 
self-resources reported the most stress (Creswell et al., 2005). Similarly, another study 
found that self-affirmation was particularly beneficial for individuals with low self-
esteem for promoting openness towards health-risk information (Düring & Jessop, 
2015). The suggestion is that high self-esteem individuals have a more positive self-
integrity from which to draw alternative self-resources. It would be important to 
control for trait self-esteem when investigating self-affirmation effects. 
Taken together, the mechanisms by which self-affirmation works is 
debateable. Nonetheless, there is good evidence to suggest self-affirmation buffers 
against psychological threats by broadening the perspective from which people view 
information and life experiences. This reduces the impact of the threat on self-
discrepancy (D. K. Sherman, 2013). The following section considers how this 
mechanism may be useful for reducing rumination. 
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1.3.3 Value-affirmation and rumination. According to self-affirmation 
theory, affirming a core value could be a possible way of reducing rumination. Self-
affirmation buffers against threat by maintaining a broad self-view, broadening the 
perspective by which people view information and life experience, thereby 
uncoupling the self and the threat, and reducing the impact of the threat on self-
discrepancy (G. L. Cohen & Sherman, 2014; D. K. Sherman, 2013). Martin and 
Tesser (1996)’s CT suggests state rumination is triggered by a thwarted goal, or 
discrepancy in goal progress. (Smith & Alloy, 2009) suggested rumination is 
triggered by awareness of an actual-ideal self-discrepancy, which could incorporate 
the thwarted goal of value incongruence or be related to a more concrete goal-
discrepancy. This suggests that value-affirmation may help individuals to cope when 
unable to progress with a particular goal, by focusing and affirming the self in another 
valued domain. This may protect the self from ruminative processes by broadening 
their perspective, viewing the self-threat from a position of maintained positive self-
view. (Koole et al., 1999) suggested that people are flexible in dealing with specific 
threats to their self-view when they have affirmed a core value because their higher-
order goal of maintained positive self-view (Carver & Scheier, 1981) is attained.  
The idea that value-affirmation could be useful for reducing rumination has 
been previously investigated (Koole et al., 1999). Participants were given failure 
feedback after an alleged intelligence test before or after completing a value-
affirmation intervention or a non-affirmation control condition. The failure feedback 
was a self-identity threat intended to induce rumination because it triggered an actual-
ideal self-discrepancy through lack of goal progress towards the goal of being 
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intelligent. The value-affirmation exercise was intended to remind participants that 
they had attained their higher-order goal of being competent. Value-affirmation lead 
to lower accessibility of goal-related thoughts, as measured by both the recognition of 
words from the intelligence test and by a lexical decision task. As accessibility of 
goal-related cognitions is a trigger for rumination, they concluded that self-
affirmation reduces rumination. This study suggests that value-affirmation may help 
to reduce rumination in students, following an experimentally manipulated failure 
feedback (rumination trigger) task. However, there are a few limitations to the study.  
Of significant note, rather than the well-validated value-affirmation method 
previously described (D. A. K. Sherman et al., 2000), Koole et al. (1999) used a 
value-affirmation manipulation in which participants were only asked to rate and rank 
order a list of six values from the AVL values scale (Allport et al., 1960), but not 
write about or reflect on their most important value. There are several issues regarding 
this. The value-affirmation intervention did not involve reflecting on values in a 
personally-relevant way, as more often utilised in value-affirmation research 
(McQueen & Klein, 2006). Additionally, as previously noted, the AVL is a restrictive 
list of values that is now considered outdated in content and language (Kopelman et 
al., 2003), and a more meaningful activity may be to sort values into piles labelled 
‘very important to me’, ‘quite important to me’ and ‘not important to me’ rather than 
rank them (R. Harris, 2008, 2011).  
In addition, the conclusions of Koole et al. (1999) are restricted to immediate 
effects of value-affirmation on induced rumination. It is unclear whether the reduction 
in rumination would be maintained longer-term and in response to naturally-occurring 
threats. Previous research has suggested that early behavioural change is required to 
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buffer and maintain value-affirmation effects over time (see section 1.3.2.1). An 
additional goal-setting component to a value-affirmation intervention may help to 
trigger value-consistent behavioural change. Living more value-consistently could 
augment the self-affirmation effect and thus in turn increase the buffer effect and 
reduce rumination further. This notion is in line with ACT theory (S. C. Hayes et al., 
2006; Levin et al., 2012). Individuals work towards increasing valued living by 
identifying their values and committing to value-consistent action through goal-
setting (McCracken, 2013; McCracken & Yang, 2006). 
It is also important to acknowledge that, although Koole et al. (1999) 
concluded that value-affirmation reduced rumination, they used two measures of 
accessibility of failure-related cognitions as proxies for rumination, rather than a 
validated measure of rumination. There are advantages and disadvantages of 
measuring rumination via the availability of failure-related cognitions versus the more 
commonly used self-report questionnaires (e.g., Gortner, Rude, & Pennebaker, 2006; 
Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1995; Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1993; 
Roberts, Watkins, & Wills, 2013; Strauss, Muday, McNall, & Wong, 1997). On the 
one hand, there are many factors that can impact on results when relying on self-
report measures, such as participant understanding of questions and rating scales, 
response bias, or introspective ability (Bernard, Killworth, Kronenfeld, & Sailer, 
2003; Fan et al., 2006; Stone et al., 2000). For example, if rumination is an 
unconscious involuntary process, as some authors suggest (Smith & Alloy, 2009), this 
may not be captured in self-report questionnaires. Self-report questionnaires assume 
that people can directly access their internal responses and are willing to report them. 
However, there is less evidence supporting the construct validity of this proxy 
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measure (Luminet, 2004) and even Koole et al. (1999) reported that accessibility of 
failure-related cognitions does not equate with ruminative thinking, but rather it is the 
instigating mechanism of ruminative thinking. Consequently it may be more 
appropriate to use a validated self-report questionnaire for measuring rumination. 
The use of a proxy measure is also only possible in studies with a rumination 
induction. The use of a rumination induction reduces the likelihood of floor effects in 
nonclinical studies, but also means only the immediate impact of an intervention can 
be assessed. It is therefore less helpful for comparison with other studies measuring 
the effects of an intervention on rumination over time. It would be more ecologically 
valid to measure rumination in response to naturally-occurring threats, rather than 
induced rumination, which has not shown the same pattern of results as self-reported 
measures of rumination (Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008).  
Another limitation to the conclusions that can be drawn from Koole’s study 
was that findings were mediated by implicitly-measured positive affect: Koole et al. 
(1999) found that affirming an important value led to higher implicit positive affect, 
as measured by a disguised mood test. This suggests that value-affirmations work by 
improving affect that the participant is not aware of. However, the authors 
acknowledged that their measure was not well-established: in fact, it was originally 
designed to measure negative, rather than positive affect (Has, Katz, Rizzo, Bailey, & 
Moore, 1992), which are considered separate constructs (Crawford & Henry, 2004). 
Furthermore, this finding is anomalous to most self-affirmation research (McQueen & 
Klein, 2006; see section 1.3.2.1). It would be important to control for mediational 
effects of positive affect when investigating self-affirmation effects. 
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Tentatively, it is possible that value-affirmation may be useful for reducing 
rumination; however, this requires more thorough investigation. There are elements of 
the value-affirmation procedure that may benefit from adaptation, such as the use of a 
modern and broader list of values. Furthermore, it is possible that reflecting on values 
with the addition of behaviour change through value-consistent goals may be more 
efficacious than reflection in isolation. Given that ACT is a clinical intervention that 
has a substantial component focus on using values to reduce problematic 
psychological processes, and to increase value-consistent action, the following section 
will review the role of values within ACT, focusing specifically on rumination.  
 
1.3.4 Acceptance and Commitment Therapy, values, and rumination.  
ACT is a third-wave transdiagnostic therapy in which individuals focus on changing 
their relationship to unwanted internal experiences rather than altering the experiences 
themselves. The therapy takes the perspective that psychological pain is a common 
and normal psychological process (Steven C. Hayes, Levin, Plumb-Vilardaga, 
Villatte, & Pistorello, 2013) but maladaptive attempts at reducing psychological pain, 
such as rumination, can inadvertently increase it, which may then become 
psychopathological. The overarching goal of ACT is to increase psychological 
flexibility, meaning ‘the ability to contact the present moment more fully as a 
conscious human being, and to change or persist in behaviour when doing so serves 
valued ends’ (S. C. Hayes et al., 2006; McCracken, 2013; Twohig, 2012). There are 
six core processes within the model that work to increase psychological flexibility and 
these can be categorised into two broader groupings (S. C. Hayes et al., 2006): (i) 
mindfulness and acceptance processes, aiming to change one’s relationship to difficult 
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internal and external events (previously described); and (ii) commitment to valued 
action, increasing the extent to which a client’s life is guided by core values as 
compared to their struggle with difficult thoughts and feelings.  
ACT has a number of exercises designed to help individuals clarify their 
values and ensure they are personally-relevant rather than socially-imposed. It is 
explained to the client that values provide a stable compass from which you can 
choose a life direction that is naturally reinforcing, rather than relying on thoughts and 
feelings to guide action, which can lead you in contradictory directions (S. C. Hayes 
et al., 2006). The client is taught how values create a sense of life direction over a 
long time frame. The ‘committed action’ component then encourages goal-setting 
according to the individual’s chosen values, with the aim of leading a value-consistent 
life (Steven C. Hayes et al., 2013, p. 20). Any psychological barriers that are 
identified during this process are addressed with the other ACT processes. For 
example, ACT has frequently been used for people with chronic health conditions: for 
individuals who are low in mood because they are not able to engage in certain 
values-based activities due to their health condition, the higher-order value is 
identified and alternative value-consistent lower-order goals are explored (McCracken 
& Yang, 2006).  
Rather than focusing on symptom reduction per se, the end goal of ACT is for 
individuals to live in accordance with their chosen values (S. C. Hayes et al., 2006). 
Evidence suggests ACT also effectively reduces the symptoms of depression and 
anxiety (Ruiz, 2010). Only one published study has looked at ACT for rumination 
specifically though (Harrington, 2008): this was a single-case design in which 10 
‘high-ruminator’ students received two 90-minute thought control sessions followed 
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by two 90-minute group ACT-based sessions. The believability of ruminative 
thoughts and avoidance of internal experiences both decreased after the ACT 
intervention. An unpublished doctoral thesis also investigated a group ACT 
intervention for rumination both as a single case study design and as a group 
intervention (N = 40; (Slevison, 2013). The single participant experienced a reduction 
in rumination that was maintained at three-month follow-up, although changes in 
mindfulness and valued living were not maintained. Within the larger sample, 
rumination, mindfulness and valued living significantly improved by the end of the 10 
sessions. However, only 18 participants completed post-treatment measures and the 
study had no control comparison. It is also not known from these studies whether and, 
if so, how the values component influenced outcome. Laboratory based studies 
investigating values and committed action would help us to have a better 
understanding of the mechanisms behind the efficacy of the values components 
specifically and provide a better understanding of the interactive and potentially 
cumulative effects of these components (Levin et al., 2012; Rosen & Davison, 2003). 
There is relatively little research within ACT literature investigating values-based 
interventions alone, or in combination with goal-setting, but early findings, as will 
now be presented, are promising. 
 
1.3.4.1 Values-clarification and rumination. Research into the values-based 
components of ACT is fairly limited (Levin et al., 2012). It has been shown that 
individuals with a greater discrepancy between one’s values and current behaviour 
show higher levels of distress and depression (Plumb et al., 2009; Wilson, Sandoz, 
Kitchens, & Roberts, 2010). According to CT, rumination can be reduced more 
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permanently through goal attainment or goal disengagement. Clarifying values could 
lead to reduced rumination via these two mechanisms. Firstly, in relation to goal 
attainment, value-clarification allows individuals to become more flexible about their 
goal pursuit. If individuals identify the higher-order value, alternative more attainable 
value-consistent lower-order goals, other than the blocked goal, can be explored 
(McCracken & Yang, 2006). This may prevent or lessen rumination by presenting an 
alternative avenue for value-consistent action and thus reducing any ideal-actual self-
discrepancy. Secondly, in relation to goal disengagement, value-clarification may 
broaden the perspective by which individuals view their blocked goal. That is, 
individuals may compare the importance of the blocked goal and their values, 
resulting in adaptive goal disengagement because the blocked goal becomes 
subjectively less significant (Simon, Greenberg, & Brehm, 1995). 
A value-clarification intervention for rumination that has been investigated 
involves 'writing about life goals' (Teismann, Het, Grillenberger, Willutzki, & Wolf, 
2014). Nonclinical participants in the experimental intervention were helped to gain 
clarity on their life goals and values by completing three writing tasks on three 
consecutive days, for example ‘What should be said about you on your 75th birthday 
party to your guests?’ This was compared to a control condition in which participants 
wrote about commonplace topics, for example how they clean their house. The 
experimental intervention resulted in a modest reduction in rumination.  
In chronic pain literature, value-clarification can result in improvements in 
values-based living, thus reduced ideal-actual self-discrepancy (Foote, Hamer, 
Roland, Landy, & Smitherman, 2015; McCracken & Vowles, 2008; Steiner, Bogusch, 
& Bigatti, 2013). This in turn has been found to mediate improvements in well-being 
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(Lundgren, Dahl, & Hayes, 2008; McCracken & Vowles, 2008; McCracken & Yang, 
2006; Wilson, Sandoz, Kitchens, & Roberts, 2010). Acting in accordance with values 
may be more important for well-being than simply identifying what values are 
important (Sheldon & Krieger, 2014). Thus the addition of values-based committed 
action may improve outcomes. 
 
1.3.4.2 Committed action. Increasing the extent to which a person’s life is 
guided by core values (i.e., commitment to valued action), rather than by their 
struggle with difficult thoughts and feelings, is a core feature of ACT and some 
behavioural activation (BA) literature. It has been found that a values-based 
intervention can provide motivation for adaptive acceptance of distress and resultant 
committed action. For example, Branstetter-Rost, Cushing, and Douleh (2009) 
compared an acceptance intervention taken from ACT (S. C. Hayes et al., 2006) with 
an acceptance-plus-values intervention, where participants were instructed to imagine 
they were accepting pain in the service of their most important value. People had 
significantly higher pain tolerance if the pain was part of a valued action: the value 
acted as a motivation to persevere in difficult circumstances. The finding was 
replicated by(Páez-Blarrina et al., 2008): placing pain in a context of valued action 
increased pain tolerance. In both studies the participants were young, primarily female 
undergraduate students and the pain was acute and technically avoidable, so results 
may not be generalisable or ecologically-valid. However, in a clinical ACT 
intervention for 108 individuals with chronic pain, improvement of pain acceptance 
was associated with an increase in values-based actions (Vowles, McCracken, & 
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O’Brien, 2011). Similarly, values-based action is associated with lower impact of 
physical health problems (Foote et al., 2015).  
Values-based committed action as an intervention has been investigated within 
BA literature “as a feature borrowed from acceptance and commitment therapy” 
(Veale, 2008). BA is intended to improve a person's mood by engaging in pleasant or 
neutral activities to increase the number of positively reinforcing experiences (Kanter 
et al., 2010). In a review of BA studies (Kanter et al., 2010), it was proposed that 
value-clarification can provide a reinforcement or longer term positive consequence 
for value-driven behaviour that may not be immediately reinforcing itself, for 
example with quitting smoking. The review concluded that although values-based 
interventions are receiving increasing empirical support (Plumb et al., 2009), it is not 
yet clear how much they contribute or add to BA’s effectiveness because studies have 
not directly compared value-driven BA with standard BA. For example, in a single-
case design (N = 4), (Gaynor & Harris, 2008) included a values-based component to 
BA in which their nonclinical participants identified what their values were and then 
created a list of value-consistent activities. The study found a reduction in depressive 
symptoms, but made no conclusions regarding the addition of value-clarification. 
Similarly, (Houghton, Curran, & Saxon, 2008) looked at a values-driven group BA 
programme and found it to be an effective treatment for depression, but as it was 
uncontrolled one cannot draw specific conclusions about the values component.  
Values-based committed action has also been investigated within a nonclinical 
population in which goal-setting training was compared to values-plus-goal-setting 
training and a waitlist control condition on academic performance (Chase et al., 
2013). Values-plus-goals training significantly improved academic performance in 
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undergraduate students, whereas goal-setting alone had no effect. Values provide an 
underlying motivational system for achieving goals (Michalak, Klappheck, & 
Kosfelder, 2004; Sheldon & Elliot, 1999).  
 
1.3.4.3 Summary. Although there has been relatively little research examining 
the unique contribution of values or values-based committed action, what has been 
shown is it can provide motivation for adaptive acceptance of distress, persevering 
with difficult goals, and it can reduce symptoms of depression, including rumination. 
Given that rumination interferes with goal-driven behaviour (Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 
2008), this focus on valued-living may help individuals to disengage from ruminative 
thinking on blocked goals and focus on value-consistent action. This warrants further 
investigation.  
 
1.4 The Current Study 
This chapter has reviewed the evidence-base for interventions that target 
rumination. It has also examined valued-based interventions, with and without a goal-
setting component, as part of ACT and self-affirmation theory. The research 
tentatively suggests that value-affirmation may be an effective intervention for 
reducing rumination, but value-affirmation research within this area, and clinical 
psychology more broadly, is in its infancy and further research is required.  
The current study aimed to test whether value-affirmation reduces rumination 
over time. This follows on from (Koole et al., 1999) but addresses the limitations 
described previously and contributes to the literature in some novel ways: controlling 
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for positive affect statistically; testing the impact of values on rumination immediately 
and two weeks later; using a validated measure of rumination; and trialling a value-
affirmation plus goal-setting condition. Three interventions will be compared on 
changes in rumination over time: value-affirmation (VA), value-affirmation plus goal-
setting (VA+GS), and a non-affirmation control condition (NAC). It is hoped that this 
study will provide further evidence of self-affirmation effects and meet a need 
regarding how to address rumination.  
This study used a well-validated value-affirmation procedure (D. A. K. 
Sherman et al., 2000), although modifications were made to the intervention. 
Modifications included: (i) providing a definition of a value so as to cue the 
participant into life qualities that are most intrinsically meaningful to them; (ii) 
increasing the range of values from which the participant could determine their core 
values (Harris, 2008); and (iii) the importance of each value was established using a 
card sort task rather than ranking values. Both the value-affirmation and the value-
affirmation plus goal setting procedures, including the list of values, were taken from 
an ACT self-help book (Harris, 2011), as it aimed to be clinically relevant but remain 
suitable for a nonclinical population. The overall reason for the modifications to the 
procedure was to increase its clinical applicability. Value-affirmation has not yet been 
applied clinically and ACT literature provides some useful changes to increase its 
applicability to clinical problems such as rumination: the broad range of values from 
which to choose aimed to increase the likelihood of individuals finding a personally 
meaningful value to affirm; the list of values were personal attributes, such as ‘trust’ 
or ‘independence’, rather than the more restricted use of life domains, such as 
‘family’, to encourage personally-meaningful self-reflection rather than only 
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reflecting on social belonging or socially imposed values (Schimel et al., 2004; 
Sherman, 2013; Shnabel, Purdie-Vaughns, Cook, Garcia, & Cohen, 2013); and 
previous value-affirmation tasks have involved ranking values in order of importance, 
but a more clinically-applied reflective task is to provide brief psychoeducation 
regarding values and then utilising a card-sort task in which values are sorted into 
piles of ‘very important to me’, ‘quite important to me’ or ‘not important to me’.  
An RCT design with a nonclinical student sample was utilized. The rationale 
for recruiting a nonclinical sample was twofold. Firstly, rumination in nonclinical 
samples is common and continuous with clinical samples as it predicts later 
depression (Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008). This suggests that interventions for 
alleviating rumination in nonclinical samples are important. Secondly, value-
affirmation procedures have not yet been applied to clinical problems so would 
benefit from piloting in a nonclinical sample before trialling in clinical samples.  
Based on self-affirmation theory and previous findings (Koole et al., 1999), 
the following hypotheses were formed:  
Immediately following the intervention:  
(i) Participants in the VA and VA+GS conditions will report lower state 
rumination than the NAC group. This may be mediated by an increase in 
positive affect.  
Two weeks after the intervention:  
(ii) VA and VA+GS groups will report lower state rumination than the NAC 
group;  
(iii) The VA+GS group will report lower state rumination than VA alone.  
The effects in (ii) and (iii) will not be mediated by positive affect.   
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2. Method 
2.1 Design 
A randomised-controlled mixed design was utilised: see Figure 2.1 for 
diagrammatic overview. The between-subjects independent variable was intervention 
condition: participants were randomised to either (i) value-affirmation (VA) (ii) 
value-affirmation plus goal-setting (VA+GS), and (iii) the non-affirmation control 
(NAC) condition. The within-subjects dependent variable was state rumination, which 
was measured at three time points: baseline (Time 1: T1), immediately following the 
intervention (Time 2: T2) and at two-week follow-up (Time 3: T3). A state measure 
of positive affect was also administered at the three time points in order to control for 
any covarying effects of this on value-affirmation. Trait measures of depression, 
anxiety, stress, self-esteem and rumination were gathered at T1 to ensure group 
equivalence at baseline.  
 
2.2 Participants 
A nonclinical opportunity sample was recruited, which consisted of 
undergraduate and postgraduate students, friends and family members. A total of 171 
participants were initially recruited and 159 completed the study, an attrition rate of 
7.0%. At baseline, there were N = 57 participants in each condition. Researchers were 
blind to group allocation. At the first appointment, mean age was 25.58 years (SD = 
8.08, range = 17-60) and there were 132 females (77.2%). Further demographic 
information is presented in Tables 3.1 and 3.2 within the results section.  
 
  
59 
 
2.2.1 Power analysis. An a priori power analysis was conducted to 
determine the required sample size. Cohen’s d (effect size) was calculated using the 
group means and pooled standard deviation. No studies have investigated the effect of 
value-affirmation on rumination over time, nor looked at value-affirmation compared 
with value-affirmation plus goal setting. Therefore three studies with similar 
methodology or dependent variables were chosen. Firstly, power calculations using 
the Koole et al. (1999) study yielded effect sizes between d = 0.5-0.8 when 
comparing differences in rumination for a value-affirmation intervention versus 
different control conditions: when compared to non-affirmation, the effect size was d 
= 0.75. As this was a cross-sectional study, power was also calculated based on two 
longitudinal studies that utilized similar interventions but looked at different 
dependent variables. A longitudinal value-affirmation study looking at the effect of a 
self-affirmation task on state anxiety over two weeks (Morgan & Atkin, 2016) yielded 
an effect size of d = 1.11. In addition, power based on a goal-setting intervention with 
a two-week follow-up was calculated (Meevissen, Peters, & Alberts, 2011). Their 
study yielded an effect size of d = 0.67 for the effects of a five-minute imagery-based 
goal-setting task on increased optimism measured over two weeks, compared with 
control.  
Based on these studies, a conservative medium effect size of d = 0.6 was 
chosen. Power analysis for a between-subjects analysis of variance with alpha level of 
0.05 and power of d = 0.8 (Cohen, 1992) indicated a group size of N = 52 (total T3 
sample N = 156). We predicted an attrition rate of approximately 10%, based on 
previous studies (Creswell et al., 2007; Düring & Jessop, 2015; Lindsay & Creswell, 
2014). To minimise attrition: (a) the demands and time required were explained to 
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participants before they signed up, (b) it was checked that participants were available 
two weeks after the appointment to complete the online part of the study, and (c) we 
attempted to recruit an additional 10% of the 156 participants required, so our target 
sample size at T1, and the total that was used for randomisation, was 171.  
 
2.3 Recruitment 
This study was one of two studies investigating VA, VA+GS and NAC. All 
participants thus completed two additional questionnaires to those listed here. 
Recruitment was divided equally between two researchers. The only inclusion criteria 
were that all participants were above the age of 16 and had an adequate level of 
English to understand the information sheet and therefore be able to consent to the 
study. Participants were recruited either via the RHUL undergraduate psychology 
credit system (N = 71) or through advertisement of a prize draw to win one of five 
£20 Amazon vouchers (N = 100). 
Participants from the RHUL undergraduate psychology credit system were 
given three course credits for taking part in the first appointment and one course credit 
for completing the follow-up. The participation scheme website provided a summary 
of the first part of the study and time slots to sign up for. The summary gave a brief 
description of the procedure and explained that it was a two-part study. It was made 
clear that there were no right or wrong answers when completing the tasks and that 
their work would not be marked. They were told that once they had completed the 
first part, they would be emailed a password to be able to sign up for the second part 
of the study.  
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For the individuals who were recruited through advertisement of a prize draw, 
the study was advertised via posters displayed around the RHUL university campus 
and each researcher advertised via a Facebook post. These adverts encouraged people 
who were interested in taking part in the study to email the researchers to express 
interest. They were then contacted via email to introduce the study and, if they still 
wanted to take part, arrange the two appointment dates two weeks apart. Informed 
consent was obtained from all participants at the start of their first appointment.  
All participants were allocated a participant number, which was used to 
anonymise their data. A password-protected electronic file containing participant 
names and their participant numbers was stored on the researcher’s computer and only 
accessible to the researchers and supervisors. A separate file contained a list of the 
participant numbers and the condition that they had been assigned. This was not 
opened by the researchers until recruitment was completed.   
 
2.4 Measures 
Please see Appendix 3 for a copy of all measures used in this thesis. 
 
Demographics. A demographics questionnaire was designed to gather socio-
demographic information to ensure group equivalence at baseline. This is because 
differences in the amount people engage in rumination has been associated with age 
(Sütterlin, Paap, Babic, Kübler, & Vögele, 2012), gender (Nolen-Hoeksema, Larson, 
& Grayson, 1999), education level (Gibson, Baker, & Milner, 2016) and depressive 
symptom levels (Treynor, Gonzalez, & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2003). The demographics 
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questionnaire therefore asked their age, gender and to identify themselves within one 
of five categories of achieved educational level: no education, GCSE, A level, 
bachelor degree, and postgraduate degree. They were also asked whether they are 
currently a student, to identify their ethnic group based on categories recommended 
by the Office of National Statistics (ONS, 2011), and whether they are currently or 
have ever experienced a mental health problem. A summary of descriptive statistics is 
presented in Table 3.1 within the results section (see section 3.2.6).  
 
2.4.1 Trait measures 
Response Styles Questionnaire-Ruminative Response Scale (RSQ-RRS; Nolen-
Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991): This is a 22-item measure of trait depressive 
rumination, ranging from 0 (almost never) to 3 (almost always). It has a possible 
range of scores from 22-88, with higher scores signifying greater trait rumination. 
There are many different measures of rumination, based on the many definitions of 
rumination in the literature (Smith & Alloy, 2009). Papageorgiou & Wells (2004) 
recommend that studies clearly operationalize their chosen definition. The RSQ-RRS 
is based on the RST (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991), a trait rumination definition.  
 The RSQ-RRS asks participants to consider what they generally do in 
different situations, thus is not time-specific to a particular moment or that day. It has 
shown moderate to high test-retest stability when administered 2-3 months, six 
months and one year apart (range: = .47-.80; Just & Alloy, 1997; Nolen-Hoeksema, 
2000; Nolen-Hoeksema, Parker, & Larson, 1994) and is a stable measure of 
someone’s tendency to ruminate in longitudinal studies (Nolen-Hoeksema & Davis, 
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1999; Nolen-Hoeksema, Parker, & Larson, 1994). It has demonstrated good reliability 
in nonclinical participants (range α = 0.88 to 0.92; Luminet, 2004) and convergent 
validity (r = 0.62; Nolen-Hoeksema, Morrow, & Fredrickson, 1990) when correlated 
with participants’ responses to a 30-day diary study of rumination. The RSQ-RRS 
achieved a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.93 in the present sample, indicating very good 
internal consistency. 
Depression, Anxiety and Stress Scales (DASS-21; Lovibond & Lovibond, 
1995): This is a 21-item nondiagnostic measure of symptoms of depression, anxiety 
and stress. It is on a 0 (never) to 3 (almost always) scale, with seven items per 
subscale, producing three separate scores for each subscale (DASS-21-D for 
depression, DASS-21-A for anxiety, DASS-21-S for stress). Each subscale has a 
possible range of scores from 0-21, higher scores indicating higher levels of 
depression, anxiety and stress. It asks participants to consider whether statements 
apply to them ‘over the last week’. It has good internal reliability in nonclinical 
samples (α = 0.87-0.94: Antony, Bieling, Cox, Enns, & Swinson, 1998) and good 
concurrent validity when correlated with other depression and anxiety scales (Antony 
et al., 1998). The DASS-21 achieved a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.89 in the present 
sample, indicating good internal consistency.  
Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (RSE; Rosenberg, 1965): This is a 10-item 
measure of global self-worth, on a 4-point scale (strongly agree to strongly disagree). 
It has a possible range of scores from 0-30, with higher scores indicating higher self-
esteem. It has demonstrated good test-retest reliability in a nonclinical student and 
community sample (mean r = 0.69; Robins, Hendin, & Trzesniewski, 2001). Test-
retest coefficients have been acceptable for both one week ( = 0.82; Byrne, 1983) 
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and seven month ( = 0.67; Silber & Tippett, 1965) intervals, indicating the scale 
captures trait constructs that show stability over time. The RSE achieved a 
Cronbach’s alpha of 0.88 in the present sample, indicating good internal consistency. 
Valued Living Questionnaire (VLQ; Wilson et al., 2010): This is a two-part 
measure of valued living. The VLQ lists 10 life domains and asks participants to 
indicate how important each life domain is to them (1 - not at all important to 10 - 
extremely important) and how consistent their behaviour has been with that over the 
last week (1 - not at all consistent to 10 - completely consistent). The overall score is 
worked out by calculating the product of the importance and consistency ratings for 
each domain and then calculating the mean of these products. The possible range of 
scores is 1-100, with higher scores indicating higher levels of valued living. It has 
demonstrated good test-retest reliability in nonclinical participants (α = 0.75) over 1-3 
weeks (Wilson et al., 2010). Wilson et al. (2010) reported that high levels of value-
incongruent behaviour (i.e., a discrepancy between rated importance and rated 
consistency on the VLQ), will be correlated with more distress and psychopathology. 
The VLQ negatively correlates with measures of depression (r = -0.26, p < .001) and 
positively correlates with areas of psychological strengths (range: r = 0.15-0.27, p < 
.05), such as vitality (r = 0.27, p < .001), indicating good construct validity.  
 
2.4.2 State measures 
Response Styles Questionnaire – State Version (RSQ-S; Ciesla, Reilly, 
Dickson, Emanuel, & Updegraff, 2012): This is a 12-item modified version of the 
RSQ-RRS that measures state rumination (Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991) by 
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asking participants to consider how much they have ruminated today (α = 0.91; Ciesla 
et al., 2012) on a 0-3 scale (not at all to all the time). It has a possible range of scores 
from 0-36, with higher scores indicating higher levels of rumination. An unpublished 
doctoral thesis found an adequate level of test-retest reliability of 0.63, over a period 
of two weeks (Matias, 2015). A previous study reported Cronbach’s alpha of 0.91 
(Ciesla et al., 2012), suggesting that the questionnaire measures one construct. In the 
current study, Cronbach’s alpha for the RSQ-S at T1 was also 0.91.  
Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 
1988): This is a 20-item scale measuring state affect, on a 1-5 scale (very slightly or 
not at all to extremely). It asks participants to consider which emotions or feelings 
they feel at the present moment. It produces two scores ranging 10-50: for each score, 
higher scores indicate higher levels of positive (PANAS-PA) and negative affect 
(PANAS-NA). Watson et al. (1988) found that test-retest reliability was adequate 
over a period of 8-weeks in a nonclinical sample of 600 adults (0.54 for PA; 0.45 for 
NA). Crawford & Henry (2004) documented good internal consistency using 
Cronbach’s alpha (α = 0.89 and 0.85 for PA and NA respectively). They also reported 
good concurrent validity when correlating the PANAS with other measures of 
depression, for example with DASS-depression (PA: r = -0.48; NA: r = -0.60, p < .01; 
Crawford & Henry, 2004). In the present sample, the PANAS-PA was used to assess 
change in positive affect over time. The PANAS-PA at T1 achieved a Cronbach’s 
alpha of 0.91, indicating good internal consistency. 
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2.5 Randomisation 
Participants were randomised to one of three conditions by generating a 
randomisation key using an online tool (www.randomization.com). Blindness to 
condition was maintained by matching participant number to a sealed labelled 
envelope that was packed by a person independent to the study. These sealed 
envelopes contained the instructions for the relevant condition (see Appendix 4).  
 
2.6 Interventions 
This study used a well-validated self-affirmation procedure (McQueen & 
Klein, 2006) called value-affirmation, as described by Sherman et al. (2000; study 2). 
However, modifications were made to the intervention to increase its clinical 
applicability, based on a clinical values intervention described by (Harris, 2008). 
These modifications will be described in more detail below but can be summarised as 
follows: (i) a definition of a value was provided; (ii) the list of values provided was 
taken from Harris (2008); and (iii) the importance of each value was established using 
a card sort task rather than ranking values. For full description of each intervention 
please see Appendix 4.  
 
2.6.1 Value-affirmation condition (VA). Participants first read some 
information about values taken from clinically applied information within ACT 
literature (Chase et al., 2013; Harris, 2008, 2011). It described values as “a life 
direction, an internal compass. They are leading principles that can guide you and 
motivate you as you move through life.” It also stated that “Values are unique to you. 
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Not everyone has the same values, and this is not a test to see whether you have the 
"correct" values.” Participants were then given a pack of cards with one value and its 
definition written on each card, for example “self-care: to look after my health and 
wellbeing, and get my needs met”. The pack contained a comprehensive list of 57 
possible values, plus two cards saying ‘other’ with a space to write their own 
additional value (see Appendix 4). Participants were asked to sort the cards into three 
groups: ‘very important to me’, ‘quite important to me’ and ‘not important to me’. 
This procedure, including the list of values, was taken from an ACT self-help book 
(Harris, 2011). Next, participants were asked to select their most important value from 
the pile ‘very important to me’. Following Sherman et al., 2000 (study 2), participants 
were then instructed to write for 10 minutes about their most important value, why it 
is meaningful to them and to describe a time it made them feel good about 
themselves. They were given a 10-minute timer on the computer to set at the 
beginning of writing and stop when they had finished. This provided participants with 
a guide as to how long they had left and was a way for the researcher to establish that 
sufficient time had been spent reflecting on their chosen value. After completing the 
essay, participants were instructed to list the top two reasons why their chosen value 
is important to them (Sherman et al., 2000). 
 
2.6.2 Value-affirmation plus goal-setting condition (VA+GS). This 
replicated the VA condition. However, a goal setting task was additionally 
administered, based on a validated ACT intervention in which individuals are 
encouraged to take action in line with their valued direction (Harris, 2008). 
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Participants completed the value-affirmation task and were then informed about 
values-based goals: “Values can provide a deep motivation that helps us to pursue 
important goals in life… We would like you to set a short term goal to focus on over 
the next two weeks. Ideally, you want to set a ‘SMART’ goal. This is what ‘SMART’ 
means…” Participants were instructed to identify a ‘SMART’ goal that is in line with 
their chosen value and achievable within the following two weeks. This group was 
included as we hoped to identify whether committing to value-derived goals enhances 
the effects of value-affirmation.  
 
2.6.3 Non-affirmation control condition (NAC). Following Sherman et al. 
(2000)’s validated procedures, the NAC replicated the VA condition, except that 
participants were instructed to write about a valued domain that is ‘not important’ to 
them and why it might be meaningful to someone else. This is the standard active 
control for self-affirmation research (McQueen & Klein, 2006).  
During the development of this condition, it was queried whether this control 
condition would be sufficiently different from VA. (Cohen et al., 2000) suggested that 
students are likely to turn any writing exercise into a reflective self-affirming one, and 
some studies (Creswell et al., 2005; Liu & Steele, 1986) found no difference between 
groups, despite finding significant effects of the self-affirmation manipulation. 
However, most studies in self-affirmation literature utilize this control condition and 
have shown significant differences between groups (McQueen & Klein, 2006). It was 
considered appropriate as it is well-matched to the experimental condition and allows 
for comparison with other studies.  
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2.6.4 Post-task manipulation checks. Participants completed a series of 
manipulation check questions following the VA/VA+GS/NAC intervention, which 
was adapted from Sherman et al. (2000) to test whether participants wrote about a 
personally meaningful value. The manipulation check consisted of four statements 
that participants ranked using a 0-5 scale, ‘strongly disagree’ to ‘strongly agree’: 
i. ‘This value or personal characteristic has influenced my life’ 
ii. ‘In general, I try to live up to this value’ 
iii. ‘This value is an important part of who I am’ 
iv. ‘I care about this value’ 
A score was obtained from this manipulation check by using the sum of all answers, 
with a possible range of scores of 0-20. Higher scores indicated greater endorsement 
of the value they had written about. A significant difference was predicted between 
the two value-affirmation conditions and NAC, which would be calculated using a 
one-way ANOVA. 
 The VA+GS condition received an additional manipulation check at T3 in 
which they were asked, “If you were asked to set a goal at the previous appointment, 
did you complete it?” The response options were “Yes”, “No”, or “Was not asked to 
set a goal”.  
 
2.6.5 Pilot. The VA and NAC conditions and the manipulation check were 
each piloted on five individuals using an opportunity sample. This ensured that the 
written instructions were clearly and unambiguously presented. No modifications to 
the instructions were required following this pilot. The manipulation check was also 
visually examined and confirmed that VA participants were strongly endorsing their 
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chosen value and NAC participants differed from VA in that they did not strongly 
endorse their chosen value.    
 
2.7 Procedure 
This study took part over a two-week period (see Figure 2.1). As an overview, 
participants completed baseline measures (T1: all measures previously described), 
after which they completed one of the three interventions. Immediately post-
intervention (T2), participants completed state measures again. Two weeks later (T3), 
state measures were repeated. At baseline, participants met with a researcher either at 
an RHUL office or a suitable location within the local community. Participants read 
an information sheet (see Appendix 2): This explained what the study would involve, 
the estimated timeline for their involvement, that their participation was voluntary and 
that they could withdraw at any time without consequence. They were given an 
opportunity to ask questions and provided written informed consent (see Appendix 2). 
Participants were shown how to access online questionnaires using a laptop and they 
were presented with other necessary materials on the desk in front of them. They were 
asked to complete the first set of baseline questionnaires, using the laptop provided. 
They were informed that, once they had completed these, they should open the first of 
two envelopes and that the instructions therein would guide them through the 
remainder of the study. They were informed that they could come out of the room if 
they had a question; the researcher then left the experiment room and remained out of 
the room throughout testing. 
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Using a computer provided in the room, participants completed a brief 
demographic questionnaire (see Table 3.1 in results section) and all other measures 
via a web link. All questions used forced responses to minimise missing data. After 
completing baseline questionnaires, participants opened an envelope which contained 
one of three possible intervention instructions (see Appendix 4). After completion of 
VA, VA+GS or NAC, participants completed the manipulation check, followed by 
the T2 state measures. Three days prior to participants’ two-week follow-up (i.e., T3 
measures), they received an email reminder about their online follow-up appointment. 
Two weeks after T1 (at T3), participants received an email with their participant 
number and were asked to complete the online web link containing T3 measures that 
day. At the end of the survey participants were shown a debrief form (see Appendix 
2) and were asked if they would like to receive a telephone call for a further debrief. 
No participants requested a debrief telephone call.  
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Figure 2.1: Overview of Research Procedure  
 
Note. RSQ-RRS: Response Styles Questionnaire – Ruminative Response 
Scale; DASS: Depression, Anxiety and Stress Scale; RSE: Rosenberg Self-
Esteem Scale; RSQ-S: Response Style Questionnaire – State Version; 
PANAS: Positive and Negative Affect Schedule; VLQ: Valued Living 
Questionnaire. 
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2.8 Data Analysis 
The data were managed and analysed using the Statistical Package for Social 
Sciences (SPSS, version 21). All data were checked for univariate outliers and data 
assumptions for each procedure were tested prior to analysis. Randomisation was 
checked by looking for any significant differences between groups, by calculating a 
one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) for each baseline variable. For any variables 
that were found to be significantly different between groups and significantly related 
to rumination, they would be covaried for in the main analysis. To examine the study 
hypotheses, a mixed 3 (Condition: VA, VA+GS, NAC) X 3 (Time: T1, T2, T3) 
repeated measures analysis of variance (ANCOVA) was conducted to establish 
whether there was any statistically significant changes in state rumination (RSQ-S) 
from baseline to post-intervention and at two-week follow-up within any of the three 
treatment groups. It was anticipated that group differences would then be decomposed 
using post hoc comparisons.  
Exploratory analysis was also conducted. To examine whether there was a 
significant difference between individuals who had completed their goal in VA+GS 
condition and those who had not completed their goal, a one-way ANCOVA 
(Between-subjects factor: goal completers vs. goal noncompleters; within-subjects 
factor: T3 state rumination)  was conducted, controlling for T1 state rumination. To 
examine whether the interventions affected positive affect, a one-way ANOVA was 
also calculated with change scores between T2 and T1 positive affect as the 
dependent variable and condition (VA, VA+GS, NAC) as the between-subjects factor.  
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2.9 Ethical Consideration 
The study was reviewed and approved by the Royal Holloway University of 
London (RHUL) Research Ethics Committee (ref: ProjectID: 64; see Appendix 1). It 
was not expected that the procedure would have any negative consequences for 
participants. However, reflecting on whether you are suffering from certain symptoms 
of mental health difficulties, or reflecting on values, could be potentially distressing 
for people. Therefore participants were provided with information in the debrief form 
(Appendix 2) regarding where to receive further emotional support and were offered a 
telephone call to debrief at the end of the follow-up study.  
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3. Results 
3.1 Overview 
 This chapter starts with a description of preliminary statistical procedures that 
were used for data preparation, including procedures for missing values, outliers and 
testing of normality for all variables of interest. Transformations were applied when 
parametric assumptions were violated. Preliminary statistical analyses were calculated 
to assess whether groups were equivalent at baseline on sociodemographic 
information and baseline measures. Baseline measures were also compared between 
participants who completed the study and those that dropped out before follow-up. 
This ensured there was no selective attrition, meaning a certain characteristic 
associated with dropout such as those reporting higher levels of stress. The main 
analyses are then presented, with associated descriptive statistics. Finally, exploratory 
analyses of goal attainment and positive affect are reported.  
The data were managed and analysed using the Statistical Package for Social 
Sciences (SPSS, version 21). Percentages are reported to one decimal place and all 
other values are reported to two decimal places. Statistical significance applied a 
conventional alpha level of p < .05.  
 
3.2 Preliminary Statistics 
3.2.1 Missing data. Questionnaires were completed online and used forced 
responses to minimise missing data. However, due to an administration error four 
participants did not complete the VLQ at baseline (T1). For the analyses involving 
this questionnaire, participant data for these cases were excluded using listwise 
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deletion, where all data for that participant is excluded from any analysis if any single 
value is missing. Although this method affects statistical power, it does not affect the 
standard errors in an analysis. There were 18 participants (six from each condition) 
who did not report on how long it took them to complete the affirmation essay. In 
comparing time taken across groups, these participants were excluded. 
 
3.2.2 Attrition rate. Loss of participants over the course of a study has the 
potential to introduce bias (Marcellus, 2004). Twelve participants did not complete 
the follow-up for this study: three from VA, five from VA+GS and four from NAC. 
This suggests there was no evidence of systematic attrition as an effect of group 
allocation. Using independent-samples t-tests with the whole sample, no significant 
differences were shown between those that completed the study and those that 
dropped out in terms of baseline variables. Listwise deletion was again applied for 
any analyses involving T3 variables.  
 
3.2.4 Outliers. Outliers may be considered either a legitimate extreme value 
or an error in measurement, in data entry or data recording (Field, 2009; Millar & 
Hamilton, 1999). Therefore the following strict criteria were applied: data points that 
were three standard deviations above or below the variable mean were considered 
univariate outliers (Zijlstra, Ark, & Sijtsma, 2007). All sociodemographic and study 
variables were investigated for outliers. Outliers were identified based on the sample 
from each condition at each time point. Variables were initially investigated visually 
using box plots and then calculated based on means and standard deviations. Each 
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outlier was checked to establish whether it could have been a measurement error or 
whether it represented a legitimate extreme value. A list of outliers and any action 
taken is described below.  
Analyses were computed to check whether participants in each condition had 
correctly followed the affirmation instructions. This was done using the manipulation 
check items taken at T2 (see section 2.6.4): higher scores on this measure indicated 
greater endorsement of the value they had written about. Seven outliers were 
identified: these were in the VA and VA+GS conditions and suggested that 
participants had not written about a value that was important to them. The essays 
belonging to these participants were examined to check whether this was indeed the 
case. All seven participants (four in VA, three in VA+GS) had completed the task 
appropriately by writing about a value that was important to them. This indicated that 
they had correctly completed the affirmation task, but incorrectly completed the 
Likert scale. Therefore their data were retained.  
Outliers were also identified for age. Age was examined by group and four 
outliers were identified, all significantly higher than their group means. A between-
groups comparison of age was calculated with and without these outliers: results and 
conclusion are reported within ‘Descriptive Statistics’. An outlier was also identified 
in the time taken on the essays. One participant took significantly less time than 
others, but because they were in the NAC condition it was felt unnecessary to exclude 
them from the analysis.  
One participant was identified as having extreme low scores on all measures 
taken at T3. On visually examining their T3 data, this participant had answered ‘1’ for 
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every question on every questionnaire, suggestive of nonengagement with the survey. 
It was decided to exclude this participant’s T3 data, therefore at T3 N = 158.  
 
3.2.5 Distribution of variables. The use of parametric tests relies on the 
assumptions that measures use interval data (requirement met), observations are 
independent (requirement met), that variances between groups were homogenous and 
that the data is normally distributed (Field, 2009; Judd & McClelland, 1995). 
Mauchly’s Test of Sphericity and Levene’s Test for Equality of Variance were used to 
assess homogeneity of variance for repeated measures ANOVAs and t-tests 
respectively. Where these tests were found to be significant equal variance could not 
be assumed and so the relevant statistics were reported, for example the Huynh-Feldt 
statistic for ANOVAs.   
Normality of variance was initially examined by creating histograms with 
normal curves. All measures were examined separately by condition. Following this 
process, each of the study variables were formally assessed with regard to skew and 
kurtosis by calculating z-scores (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2006). Normality was accepted 
if Z < 3.29 (p > .001); a significant score on skew or kurtosis (Z > 3.29, p < .001) 
indicated nonnormal distributions. For positively skewed variables, a square root or 
an inverse reciprocal transformation was applied and normality was reassessed. There 
were no negatively skewed variables. For comparison purposes, variables that were 
repeated-measured were transformed at all three time points for all three conditions. 
Variables that required a square root transformation were time taken on essay writing 
and DASS-21 depression, anxiety and stress subscales. Age and the RSQ-S required 
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an inverse reciprocal transformation. For skew and kurtosis scores for all variables 
pre- and post-transformation please see Appendix 5.  
 The RSQ-S required an inverse reciprocal transformation because it was 
positively skewed. An issue that can sometimes occur in nonclinical populations is 
that of floor effects (i.e., individuals scoring zero on baseline measures). This is 
because the scope for discerning meaningful change over time can be lost (Lim et al., 
2015) if large numbers of participants exhibit the lowest score. On further examining 
this variable, although the range in state rumination at T1 was 0–27 in this sample 
(from a possible range of 0-36), 36 participants (21.1%) scored zero. This is 
suggestive of a floor effect at baseline as 15% is commonly used as a threshold for 
defining ceiling and floor effects (McHorney & Tarlov, 1995).  
 
3.2.6 Descriptive statistics and baseline variables. A summary of 
sociodemographic characteristics (Table 3.1) and baseline variables (Table 3.2) of the 
whole sample and each condition is provided below. The sample was made up of 
mostly females (77.2%), the majority were ‘white’ ethnicity (74.9%), and majority 
students (48.5% undergraduates, 25.1% postgraduates). The mean age range was 
25.58 (SD = 8.08), although there was a large range from 17-60. Just under one third 
of the sample had experienced a mental health problem (28.7%) and approximately 
half of these had ongoing mental health problems (16.4%).  
A series of separate one-way ANOVAs and chi-squared tests were calculated 
to check that the randomisation process had resulted in the desired equivalence across 
conditions on all socio-demographics and baseline measures (see Table 3.1 and 3.2). 
Age differed significantly between groups (F(2, 168) = 4.10, p = .018) but all other 
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baseline variables were not significantly different between groups. Post-hoc 
comparison of age using Fisher’s protected independent t-tests revealed that 
individuals in VA were significantly younger in age than NAC (t(112) = -2.57, p = .01) 
but no significant differences were shown between VA and VA+GS (t(112) = -1.46, p = 
.15) or between VA+GS and NAC (t(112) = -1.43, p = .16). This difference between 
conditions remained significant when the four outliers on age were removed (F(2, 164) = 
3.98, p = .02) therefore outliers were retained.  
As age was found to be significantly different between conditions, Pearson’s 
correlations were calculated to assess whether age had a significant relationship with 
trait rumination or state rumination at any of the three time points. This is because 
differences in the amount people engage in rumination have been associated with age 
previously (Sütterlin et al., 2012) and may therefore impact on the main analysis 
given there were differences between conditions. These analyses revealed that age 
was significantly negatively correlated with trait rumination (r = -.38, p < .001) and 
state rumination at most time points across conditions (range: r = -.09 to -.41). As age 
was unequally distributed between conditions and also significantly associated with 
state rumination, it was covaried for in the main analysis.   
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Table 3.1  
 Total Sample and Between-group Comparisons for Sociodemographic Variables
 Sociodemographic Variables   
(% within group) 
VA 
N = 57  
VA+GS 
N = 57 
NAC 
N = 57 
Total Sample 
N = 171 
Test Statistic 
Gender Female 40 (70.2%) 49 (86.0%) 43 (75.4%) 
13 (22.8%) 
1 (1.8%) 
132 (77.2%)  
2
(4) = 6.17, p = .19 
Male 
Other 
17 (29.8%) 
0 (0%) 
8 (24.0%) 
0 (0%) 
38 (22.2%) 
1 (0.6%) 
 
Age (years) Mean (SD) 23.74 (7.11) 25.44 (8.03) 27.56 (8.70) 25.58 (8.08)  F(2, 168) = 4.10, p = .018* 
 Range 17-55 18-60 17-59 17-60  
Ethnicity White  40 (70.2%) 41 (71.9%) 47 (82.5%) 
2 (3.5%) 
6 (10.5%) 
2 (3.5%) 
0 (0%) 
128 (74.9%)  2(8) = 6.23, p = .62 
Mixed 1 (1.8%) 2 (3.5%) 5 (2.9%)  
Asian 14 (24.6%) 11 (19.3%) 31 (18.1%)  
Black 2 (3.5%) 2 (3.5%) 6 (3.5%)  
Other 0 (0%) 1 (1.8%) 1 (0.6%)  
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 Sociodemographic Variables   
(% within group) 
VA 
N = 57  
VA+GS 
N = 57 
NAC 
N = 57 
Total Sample 
N = 171 
Test Statistic 
Student Status Undergraduate 34 (59.6%) 28 (49.1%) 21 (36.8%) 
17 (29.8%) 
19 (33.3%) 
83 (48.5%)  
2
(4) = 6.10, p = .19 
Postgraduate 11 (19.3%) 15 (26.3%) 43 (25.1%)  
Not a student 12 (21.1%) 14 (24.6%) 45 (26.3%)  
Highest Education No education 0 (0%) 1 (1.8%) 1 (1.8%) 2 (3.5%)  2(4) = 6.94, p = .54 
 GCSE 2 (3.5%) 0 (0%) 2 (3.5%) 4 (2.3%)  
 A-level 31 (54.4%) 28 (49.1%) 22 (38.6%) 81 (47.4%)  
 Bachelor Degree 9 (15.8%) 15 (26.3%) 15 (26.3%) 39 (22.8%)  
 Post-graduate  15 (26.3%) 13 (22.8%) 17 (29.8%) 45 (26.3%)  
Mental Health  
Diagnosis 
Yes 15 (26.3%) 17 (29.8%) 17 (29.8%) 
40 (70.2%) 
49 (28.7%)  2(2) = .23, p = .89 
No 42 (73.7%) 40 (70.2%) 122 (71.3%)  
Mental Health Ongoing Yes 7 (12.3%) 10 (17.5%) 11 (19.3%) 28 (16.4%)  2(2) = 1.09, p = .58 
No 8 (14.0%) 7 (12.3%) 6 (10.5%) 21 (12.3%)  
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 Sociodemographic Variables   
(% within group) 
VA 
N = 57  
VA+GS 
N = 57 
NAC 
N = 57 
Total Sample 
N = 171 
Test Statistic 
Recruitment Source  Credit Scheme 31 (54.4%) 23 (40.4%) 17 (29.8%) 
1 (1.8%) 
14 (24.6%) 
71 (41.5%)  
2
(4) = 11.45, p = .075 
Paid Pool 1 (1.8%) 3 (5.3%) 5 (2.9%)  
DClinPsy 8 (14.0%) 16 (28.1%) 38 (22.2%)  
 Family/Friends 17 (29.8%) 15 (26.3%) 25 (43.9%) 57 (33.3%)  
Note. VA – Value-affirmation; VA+GS – Value-affirmation plus goal-setting; NAC – Non-affirmation control. 
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Table 3.2  
Between-group Comparisons for Baseline Variables 
                Condition  
Study Variables  
(M, SD) 
VA 
N = 57 
VA+GS 
N = 57 
NAC  
N = 57 
Test Statistic 
RSQ-RSS 42.35 
(11.54) 
43.39 
(11.23) 
40.58 
(12.70) 
F(2, 168) = 0.82, p = .44 
RSE 18.79 
(5.42) 
19.54 
(4.63) 
19.37 
(5.09) 
F(2,168) = 0.35, p = .71 
DASS-21 
Depression* 
3.05 
(3.00) 
3.14 
(3.45) 
3.25 
(3.01) 
F(2,168) = 0.03, p = .97 
DASS-21 Anxiety* 3.46 
(3.00) 
2.93 
(2.88) 
3.12 
(3.17) 
F(2,168) = 0.45, p = .64 
DASS-21 Stress* 5.68 
(3.05) 
5.16 
(3.49) 
6.00 
(3.22) 
F(2,168) = 0.91, p = .40 
VLQ 53.96 
(12.17) 
(N=57) 
51.39 
(14.27) 
(N=56) 
51.32 
(15.19) 
(N=54) 
F(2,164) = 0.66, p = .52 
 
T1 RSQ-S* 6.35 
(6.29) 
4.96 
(6.36) 
4.94 
(5.70) 
F(2, 168) = 0.71, p = .49 
T1 PANAS-PA 25.30 
(7.07) 
26.32 
(7.88) 
26.93 
(8.43) 
F(2,168) = 0.63, p = .53 
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Note. VA – Value-affirmation; VA+GS – Value-affirmation plus goal-setting; NAC – 
Non-affirmation control; RSQ-RRS: Response Styles Questionnaire – Ruminative 
Response Scale; DASS-21: Depression, Anxiety and Stress Scale; RSE: Rosenberg 
Self-Esteem Scale; RSQ-S: Response Style Questionnaire – State Version; PANAS: 
Positive and Negative Affect Schedule; VLQ: Valued Living Questionnaire. Means 
and standard deviations reported are for untransformed data; *to aid interpretation of 
the table, means and standard deviations are reported using untransformed data but 
because statistical assumptions were not met, test statistic is based on transformed 
data.  
 
3.2.7 Timing of T3 completion. Participants were asked to complete the T3 
follow-up survey 14 days after their initial appointment, although a leeway of seven 
days either side of this was considered acceptable. The range of time between T2 and 
T3 was 11-25 days, although 66% completed it 14 days later. Three participants 
completed the questionnaire outside of this seven day window, but as no outliers were 
identified in their dataset, their data were retained. A one-way ANOVA was 
calculated to look for any difference between conditions in timing of T3 completion: 
there was no statistically significant difference (F(2, 156) = 0.15, p = .87).  
 
3.2.8 Time taken on essay writing. A record was kept of how much of the 10 
minutes provided for essay writing was used by each participant. It ranged from one 
to 10 minutes and the mean for VA, VA+GS and NAC were 8 mins 11.02 secs (SD = 
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119.90), 8 mins 9.27 secs (SD = 133.73), and 7 mins 36.53 secs (SD = 123.95) 
respectively. A square root transformation was applied before this information was 
analysed because it was skewed. There was no significant difference between groups 
on time taken to complete the essay using a one-way ANOVA (F(2,150) = 2.04, p = 
.13). This indicated that participants from different groups spent an equivalent amount 
of time writing.   
 
3.2.9 Manipulation check. The manipulation check, measured at T2, was 
analysed to ensure that participants in the value-affirmation conditions (VA and 
VA+GS) were writing about a value that they endorsed in a more meaningful and 
personally relevant way than NAC participants. The aim of the manipulation check 
was to ensure that the VA conditions were significantly more value-affirming than the 
nonaffirming control condition. Therefore it was predicted that there would be 
significant differences between VA and NAC, and between VA+GS and NAC, but 
not between VA and VA+GS. The measure had a possible range of scores of 0-20, 
with higher scores indicating greater endorsement of the value they had written about. 
The means and standard deviations for this manipulation check for each condition, 
after dealing with the outliers previously described, were VA: 18.88 (1.38), VA+GS: 
18.39 (1.56) and NAC: 9.84 (3.54). A one-way ANOVA was conducted to compare 
groups on the manipulation check composite scores: it was statistically significant 
(F(2,168) = 261.53, p < .001). Further analysis, using Fisher’s protected independent t-
tests, revealed the predicted outcome: VA+GS and NAC were significantly different 
(t(76.99) = 16.65, p < .001); VA and NAC were significantly different (t(72.51) = 17.96, p 
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< .001) but there was no significant difference between VA and VA+GS (t(110.23) = -
1.82, p = .07). This confirms as effectively as is possible that participants in the VA 
and VA+GS conditions wrote about more personally meaningful values than NAC 
participants.  
 Although the essays and goals were not qualitatively analysed, they were 
visually examined to determine the values that people chose in each condition and the 
types of goals that they set in the VA+GS group. The list of values chosen is 
presented in Table 3.3. There was a wide spread of values chosen, but the most 
commonly chosen within the value-affirmation conditions were love, trust and then 
open-mindedness; for the non-affirmation condition almost half the participants chose 
‘power’ as their least important value. There was some missing data because 
participants were given a choice to take their essays away with them. Within the 
VA+GS group, participants’ goals were visually examined to explore whether 
participants had set goals that were value-driven. Some goals could be considered 
value-driven (e.g., after writing about gratitude, “at the end of each day, I will think of 
one thing I am grateful for”), others appeared to be unrelated to their value (e.g., after 
writing about trust, “do at least one hour of maths revision a day to help me hopefully 
pass my maths test first time”). For a full list of goals set please see Appendix 6.  
At follow-up, VA+GS participants were asked whether they had completed 
the goal they had set during the intervention. Of the 52 individuals within this group 
who completed T3, 34 (65.3%) reported that they had completed their goal. 
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Table 3.3  
Frequencies of Values Chosen as the Subject of the Affirmation Essays for each 
condition 
Value Domain 
(Frequency, %) 
VA
a
  
(N = 57) 
VA+GS
a
  
(N = 57) 
NAC
b
  
(N = 57) 
Love 6 (10.53%) 5 (8.77%) - 
Trust 4 (7.02%) 5 (8.77%) - 
Open-mindedness 3 (5.25%) 4 (7.02%) - 
Kindness 2 (3.51%) 4 (7.02%) - 
Honesty 2 (3.51%) 4 (7.02%) - 
Authenticity 4 (7.02%) 1 (1.75%) - 
Contribution 1 (1.75%) 3 (5.25%) - 
Persistence 3 (5.25%) 1 (1.75%) - 
Self-development 2 (3.51%) 2 (3.51%) - 
Independence 2 (3.51%) 2 (3.51%) - 
Gratitude 3 (5.25%) 1 (1.75%) - 
Reciprocity  2 (3.51%) 1 (1.75%) 1 (1.75%) 
Forgiveness 3 (5.25%) - 1 (1.75%) 
Freedom 3 (5.25%) - - 
Compassion 2 (3.51%) 1 (1.75%) - 
Self-control 2 (3.51%) - - 
Flexibility - 2 (3.51%) - 
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Value Domain 
(Frequency, %) 
VA
a
  
(N = 57) 
VA+GS
a
  
(N = 57) 
NAC
b
  
(N = 57) 
Respect  - 2 (3.51%) - 
Supportiveness - 2 (3.51%) - 
Humility - 2 (3.51%) - 
Industry 1 (1.75%) - - 
Humour 1 (1.75%) - - 
Friendliness 1 (1.75%) - - 
Fun 1 (1.75%) - - 
Acceptance 1 (1.75%) - - 
Caring 1 (1.75%) - - 
Courage 1 (1.75%) - - 
Curiosity 1 (1.75%) - - 
Equality 1 (1.75%) - - 
Excitement - 1 (1.75%) - 
Responsibility  - 1 (1.75%) - 
Self-awareness - 1 (1.75%) - 
Other: 
closeness/belonging 
- 1 (1.75%) - 
Romance - - 1 (1.75%) 
Justice - - 1 (1.75%) 
Mindfulness - - 1 (1.75%) 
Fitness - - 1 (1.75%) 
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Value Domain 
(Frequency, %) 
VA
a
  
(N = 57) 
VA+GS
a
  
(N = 57) 
NAC
b
  
(N = 57) 
Other: disloyalty - - 1 (1.75%) 
Beauty - - 2 (3.51%) 
Sensuality - - 3 (5.25%) 
Sexuality - - 3 (5.25%) 
Order - - 4 (7.02%) 
Conformity - - 4 (7.02%) 
Adventure 1 (1.75%) - 5 (8.77%) 
Power - - 27 (47.37%) 
Missing data 2 (3.51%) 9 (15.79%) 1 (1.75%) 
a 
Rated as most important value 
b 
Rated as least important value 
 
3.3 Hypothesis Testing 
It was predicted that group allocation would differentially affect state 
rumination over time. More specifically it was hypothesised that immediately 
following the intervention participants in the VA and VA+GS conditions will report 
lower state rumination than the NAC group. Two weeks after the intervention it was 
predicted that the VA and VA+GS groups would report lower state rumination than 
the NAC group and the VA+GS group would report lower state rumination than VA 
alone. It was predicted that these effects would not be mediated by positive affect.  
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The mean measures of state rumination for each condition over time are 
presented in Figure 3.1. The graph shows there appeared to be a trend of reduced 
rumination from T1 to T2 in all three conditions, but particularly VA. For the VA+GS 
condition this reduction is maintained at T3 whereas for VA and NAC the reduction 
in rumination goes back to baseline levels at T3.  
 
Figure 3.1: Mean measures of state rumination for each condition over time (vertical 
lines depict standard error of means)  
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A mixed 3 (Condition: VA, VA+GS, NAC) X 3 (Time: T1, T2, T3) repeated 
measures ANCOVA was therefore conducted to examine any changes in state 
rumination (RSQ-S) from baseline to post-intervention and at two-week follow-up, 
covarying for age. Mauchly’s test of sphericity was significant ( 2(2) = 14.92, p = 
.001) therefore the Huynh-Feldt correction was used. Results showed that the main 
effect of Time was not significant (F(1.89,290.59) = 0.88, p = .41), the main effect of 
Condition was not significant (F(2,154) = 1.12, p = .33), and the Time x Condition 
interaction was also not significant (F(3.77,290.59) = 1.13, p = .34). Therefore the 
hypotheses were not supported. 
 
3.4 Exploratory Analyses 
Two sets of exploratory analyses were computed. It was noted that only 65% 
of participants in the VA+GS condition completed the goals that they set. It is 
therefore possible that VA+GS did influence a reduction in rumination, but only for 
this sub-sample of participants. Thus, exploratory analyses were computed to test 
whether goal completion, rather than just the process of setting a goal, was a 
mechanism that affected state rumination within the VA+GS condition. 
Secondly, although the current study did not find an effect on rumination, it 
was explored whether value-affirmed participants showed an increase in positive 
mood between T1 and T2.  
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3.4.1 Goal attainment. The effect of goal attainment was explored. This 
was investigated because goal attainment, rather than merely goal-setting, may be 
necessary to improve valued living and reduce rumination.  
To test whether goal completion influenced state rumination at T3, a one-way 
ANCOVA was computed, comparing T3 state rumination for those who completed 
their goals (N = 34) versus those who did not (N = 18), controlling for T1 state 
rumination: results showed a significant difference (F(1, 49) = 5.72, p = .021). Those 
who had completed their goal (M = 14.94, SD = 2.90) reported lower state rumination 
than those who had not (M = 19.56, SD = 8.22): see Figure 3.2. Having found this 
difference, the main analysis was re-run excluding those individuals that had not 
completed their goal, while still covarying for age. Mauchly’s test of sphericity was 
significant ( 2(2) = 18.04, p < .001) therefore the Huynh-Feldt correction was used. 
Results showed that the main effect of Time (F(1.84, 250.13) = 0.45, p = .62), Condition 
(F(2, 136) = 2.77, p = .076) and the interaction effect (F(3.68, 250.13) = 1.84, p = .13) 
remained nonsignificant.  
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Figure 3.2: Mean measures of state rumination over time for VA+GS 
participants, split by goal completers or noncompleters (vertical lines depict 
standard error of means) 
 
  
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
T1 T2 T3
St
at
e 
ru
m
in
at
io
n
 
Goal completers Goal non-completers
 95 
 
3.4.2 Positive affect. In this study, it was suggested that value-affirmation 
may lead to increased positive affect immediately after the VA and VA+GS 
interventions. Indeed, positive affect (measured by the PANAS-PA) increased post-
intervention compared to baseline for the VA and VA+GS conditions: VA increased 
from 25.30 (SD = 7.07) to 27.32 (SD = 7.46) and VA+GS increased from 26.32 (SD 
= 7.88) to 27.11 (SD = 7.88). Positive affect then fell again at two-week follow-up: 
mean PANAS-PA was 24.22 (SD = 8.54) for VA and 22.50 (SD = 7.77) for VA+GS 
at T3. 
As there was no directional hypothesis regarding positive affect at follow-up, 
only the change between T1 and T2 was further investigated. A one-way ANOVA 
was calculated with change scores between T2 and T1 positive affect as the dependent 
variable and condition as the between-subjects factor. This showed a significant 
difference between conditions (F(2, 168) = 5.84, p = .004). Paired samples t-tests with 
alpha level adjusted for family-wise error using a Bonferroni correction (p = .017) 
indicated that there was a significant increase in positive affect in the VA (t(56) = 3.07, 
p = .003) and VA+GS (t(56) = 2.69, p = .009) condition, but no significant change in 
the NAC condition (t(56) = 0.07, p = .95). This showed that the value-affirmation 
interventions lead to an immediate improvement in positive affect but the control 
condition did not.  
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4. Discussion 
4.1 Overview 
 CT (Martin & Tesser, 1996) suggests that rumination can be reduced by 
decreasing actual-ideal self-discrepancy. Value-affirmation theory and research 
suggest that affirming a core value helps to buffer against psychological threats by 
maintaining a positive self-view in the face of self-discrepancy (Cohen & Sherman, 
2014; Sherman, 2013). Furthermore, clinical applications of values and goals (e.g., 
ACT) suggest that it is not simply the act of reflecting on a core value, but also 
devising goals and following through with those goals that has a positive effect on 
well-being (Harris, 2008; Hayes et al., 2006). These findings led to the hypothesis that 
value-affirmation, particularly with the addition of a goal-setting component, would 
reduce rumination over time. However, results did not support this hypothesis. This 
chapter will review the current findings in the context of existing research and theory, 
followed by a consideration of their theoretical and clinical implications. The 
strengths and limitations of the study will be discussed, and implications and 
suggestions for future research will be considered.   
 
4.2 Main Findings in the Context of Research and Theory 
A summary of the literature that led to the study hypotheses is presented 
before the findings are discussed.  
The hypotheses were initially developed from investigation into how to reduce 
rumination. According to CT (Martin & Tesser, 1996), rumination is triggered by a 
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discrepancy in goal progress, as shown in experimental and diary-based studies 
(Lavallee & Campbell, 1995; Roberts et al., 2013). Rumination discontinues when the 
person's goal is attained or abandoned. However, goal attainment can be difficult 
because often people set never-ending or unrealistic goals for themselves (Armor & 
Taylor, 1998). Goal abandonment may also be difficult, particularly if the goal is 
higher-order, thus closely tied to the individual’s self-view and their values.  
Within self-affirmation literature, it has been found that value-affirmation 
buffers against psychological threats by maintaining a positive self-view, broadening 
the perspective from which people view information and thereby reducing the impact 
of the threat on self-discrepancy (Cohen & Sherman, 2014; Sherman, 2013). This 
suggests that value-affirmation may help individuals to cope when they are unable to 
progress with a particular goal, by focusing and affirming the self in another valued 
domain. This may protect the self from ruminative processes by viewing the self-
threat from a position of a maintained positive self-view. Koole et al. (1999) 
suggested that people are flexible in dealing with specific threats to their self-view 
when they have affirmed a core value because their higher-order goal of maintained 
positive self-view is attained (Carver & Scheier, 1981). One previous study has shown 
that value-affirmation is able to prevent rumination (Koole et al., 1999), although this 
effect was mediated by positive affect. This is incongruent with self-affirmation 
literature more generally (Fein & Spencer, 1997; Lannin, Guyll, Vogel, & Madon, 
2013; Schmeichel & Martens, 2005; Sherman et al., 2000; Spencer et al., 2001). 
Nonetheless, Koole et al. provided initial evidence that value-affirmation may be able 
to reduce rumination over time.  
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The psychological benefits of values and value-consistent goals have also been 
investigated clinically within ACT (Harris, 2008; Hayes et al., 2006). ACT theory 
suggests that value-clarification allows individuals to become more flexible about 
their pursuit of a goal. Rather than focusing on the blocked goal that triggered the 
rumination, individuals identify a higher-order value, which enables them to explore 
alternative value-consistent lower-order goals that may be more attainable 
(McCracken & Yang, 2006). Additionally, value-clarification could promote adaptive 
goal disengagement because the blocked goal may seem less subjectively significant 
when compared with one’s values (Simon et al., 1995). Value-clarification has been 
shown to reduce rumination (Teismann, Het, et al., 2014). Based on these theoretical 
and empirical findings, it was hypothesised that a value-affirmation (VA) intervention 
would reduce rumination over time.  
One way of bolstering value-affirmation effects that has been identified in the 
literature is triggering behavioural change (Cohen & Sherman, 2014). If value-
affirmation is able to trigger an immediate positive change in behaviour it could show 
the individual that behaviour change is possible, and also improve their self-view so 
they will continue to behave in a way that is congruent with this altered self-view 
(Sherman & Cohen, 2006). This could further reduce ideal-actual self-discrepancy by 
seeing oneself acting value-consistently (Cohen & Sherman, 2014). A key component 
of ACT interventions also incorporates this concept: Individuals are encouraged to 
use core values to guide their behaviour by setting value-driven goals, with the aim of 
leading a value-consistent life (Hayes et al., 2013, p. 20). Research has shown that 
acting value-consistently was more important for well-being than simply identifying 
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values of importance (Sheldon & Krieger, 2014). Additionally, reducing goal-
discrepancy via goal-setting interventions resulted in reduced rumination in a student 
sample (Sheldon et al., 2002). Therefore it was hypothesised that an additional goal-
setting intervention (the VA+GS group) would bolster the effects of value-affirmation 
on rumination.  
More specifically, the current study’s first hypothesis was that immediately 
following a value-affirmation intervention, participants in the VA and VA+GS 
conditions would report lower state rumination than nonaffirmed controls. It was also 
predicted, based on Koole et al. (1999), that this effect would be mediated by an 
increase in positive mood. At two-week follow-up, it was hypothesised that VA and 
VA+GS groups would report significantly lower state rumination than NAC and that 
VA+GS would report lower state rumination than VA alone. This effect would not be 
mediated by positive mood. However, these hypotheses were not supported as there 
was no statistically significant difference in state rumination between conditions or 
over time. Mediational effects or specific differences between groups and over time 
were therefore not examined. However, exploratory analyses revealed that there was a 
significant increase in positive affect between pre- and post-intervention for the value-
affirmation groups that was not found in the control condition. Additionally, 
exploratory analysis revealed that individuals who had completed their goal in the 
VA+GS group reported lower state rumination at T3 than noncompleters, after 
statistically controlling for the effect of T1 state rumination.  
There are numerous possible reasons for why the main hypotheses were not 
supported in this study. The following section will discuss the current findings in light 
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of the discrepancy with the results found by Koole et al. (1999), before considering 
other values-based research. The study findings will then be discussed in relation to 
broader existing theory. 
 
4.2.1 Current findings in the context of existing research. This study was 
unable to replicate and extend the findings of Koole et al. (1999), who reported that 
value-affirmation can prevent ruminative thinking. As such, differences in design 
between Koole et al. and the current study were explored. Two differences may be of 
particular significance: how rumination was measured and the use of a rumination 
induction procedure. Following this, other research that looked at values will be 
considered.  
 
4.2.1.1 A comparison with Koole et al. (1999). In their series of three studies, 
Koole et al. (1999) measured rumination via the accessibility of goal-related thoughts, 
using both the recognition of words from a previously administered alleged 
intelligence test and a lexical decision task. These measures related to the specific 
blocked goal of being intelligent: Koole et al. induced rumination about a thwarted 
goal and then measured goal-related thoughts about this particular thwarted goal. This 
measure may have been more sensitive to identifying group differences than the more 
general self-report measure utilised in the current study. However, the current study 
aimed to investigate whether value-affirmation was able to reduce rumination more 
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generally, over time, to establish whether the intervention may have useful clinical 
applications.  
In addition, Koole et al. (1999) only measured rumination on one occasion, 
following the self-affirmation task. Consequently, they did not have an initial measure 
of rumination from which to compare groups at baseline. Likewise, they were only 
able to examine differences between rumination across groups after self-affirmation, 
compared to within-subject and between-subject in the current study. The current 
study was unable to examine the specific between-group effect after self-affirmation 
because the overall effect was not significant. However, the power analysis was based 
on Koole et al.’s between-subjects effect. It is possible that the current sample was 
insufficiently powered to find significant differences longitudinally. For example, the 
trend observed in the current study was that value-affirmation reduced rumination 
immediately post-intervention but returned to baseline at two-week follow-up. This 
was not observed in the statistical analysis because the overall effect was not 
significant.  
The second key difference between the current study and Koole et al. (1999) 
was that they measured the effect of value-affirmation in response to a rumination 
induction. Koole et al. used failure feedback on an alleged intelligence test as a 
rumination induction: a self-identity threat intended to induce rumination because it 
triggered an actual-ideal self-discrepancy regarding the goal of being intelligent. The 
current study did not utilise a rumination induction and a difficulty that arose was a 
floor effect on state rumination at T1. This is a problem because participants with low 
levels of rumination at pre-intervention can only show relatively small degrees of 
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improvement after the intervention (Hofmann et al., 2010). The use of a rumination 
induction is common in nonclinical studies of rumination (Lyubomirsky & Nolen-
Hoeksema, 1993; Watkins & Moulds, 2005) to reduce floor effects and to observe the 
effects of rumination in the present moment. However, the rationale for not using a 
rumination induction in the current study was that it attempted to explore the 
longitudinal effect of value-affirmation on real-world, naturally-occurring threats. 
Rather than establishing the effect of value-affirmation on one manipulated goal 
discrepancy at one time point, the aim was to establish whether it had a more general 
effect on the naturally-occurring ruminative process over time. It is possible that the 
lack of rumination induction, or manipulated blocked goal, decreased the likelihood 
of finding an effect. Alternatively, affirmations may only be effective at buffering 
against rumination about a specific threat, rather than being an effective intervention 
for more general elevated levels of rumination. 
A rumination induction has the added benefit of providing a specified goal-
discrepancy, whereas the current study had no control over ruminative triggers. This 
may be problematic because engaging in value-affirmation in the same domain in 
which the self is threatened can actually intensify defensiveness (Blanton et al., 1997). 
A sub-sample may have experienced increased rumination, if their chosen value 
reminded them of any of their ruminative triggers. This would not have been evident 
when looking at group analyses. Koole et al. (1999) controlled for this by excluding 
any values related to the manipulated self-threat of intelligence. The current study was 
not able to measure possible ruminative triggers during the two week period between 
T2 and T3, so cannot draw any firm conclusions regarding this.  
 103 
 
In summary, the current study was unable to replicate the findings of Koole et 
al. (1999) and this may be the result of differing methodologies. The current study 
measured rumination using self-report measures, whereas Koole et al. used a proxy 
measure relating specifically to the induced thwarted goal. It may be that value-
affirmation is able to prevent the initiation of rumination in the present moment, 
specific to a current thwarted goal, but that effects will not be generalised to other 
thwarted goals or maintained over time. In addition, Koole et al. utilised a rumination 
induction, thus controlling the specific rumination trigger and reducing the likelihood 
of floor effects of rumination. This may have impacted on the current study’s ability 
to replicate their findings. 
 
4.2.1.2 Values work within ACT. Values have a central role within the ACT 
model, but research into the values-based components of the model is fairly limited 
(Levin et al., 2012). Considering the current findings in the context of previous 
research into rumination interventions, it may be that the other components of ACT 
are also necessary for individuals to benefit from the values work. 
The overall aim of ACT is to increase psychological flexibility via two broad 
processes (Hayes et al., 2006): (i) mindfulness and acceptance processes, aiming to 
change one’s relationship to difficult internal and external events; and (ii) 
commitment to valued action, increasing the extent to which a client’s life is guided 
by core values. Only two known studies have investigated ACT as an intervention for 
rumination. A single-case design study that looked at ACT for rumination 
(Harrington, 2008) reported reduced believability of ruminative thoughts and 
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avoidance of internal experiences after the ACT intervention. An unpublished 
doctoral thesis also investigated a group ACT intervention for rumination both as a 
single case study design and as a group intervention (Slevison, 2013) and found 
reduced rumination at three-month follow-up in both parts of the study. It is not 
known from these studies what ACT components, or combination of components, led 
to a decrease in rumination. It has been suggested that mindfulness and acceptance 
processes ‘clear the path’ for committing to valued action (Hayes et al., 1999). 
Acceptance within ACT is taught as an alternative to rumination and involves 
learning to experience unwanted private experiences, such as low mood, without 
attempting to alter them (Hayes et al., 2006). Studies investigating acceptance for 
rumination have utilised mindfulness (Kohl et al., 2012), which is negatively 
correlated with rumination (Brown & Ryan, 2003). Research has shown that 
mindfulness techniques can reduce rumination in clinical samples (Geschwind et al., 
2011; Ramel et al., 2004; van Aalderen et al., 2012) as well as nonclinical samples 
(Deyo et al., 2009; Feldman et al., 2010; Hawley et al., 2013; Hilt & Pollak, 2012; 
Jain et al., 2007).  
Additionally, acceptance has been investigated in combination with values in 
pain tolerance studies. An acceptance-plus-values intervention had additive benefit to 
acceptance alone as people had significantly higher pain tolerance if the pain was part 
of a valued action (Branstetter-Rost et al., 2009; Páez-Blarrina et al., 2008). 
Acceptance-plus-values has not been investigated within the context of threats to self-
view, but the acceptance component may help to alter the relationship with the threat, 
whereas the values component may act as a motivation to persevere despite the threat. 
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In conclusion, evidence regarding the effectiveness of ACT components for 
rumination is limited, but the acceptance component may provide added benefit to 
values interventions. Future studies may benefit from exploring the combined impact 
of values and acceptance for reducing rumination, rather than values work alone.  
 
4.2.2 Current findings in the context of existing theory. The broader 
theoretical literature, on which the study hypotheses were based, will now be 
considered. Firstly, the study hypotheses were based on the CT account of rumination 
(Martin & Tesser, 1996): as will be discussed, there is some evidence against this 
conceptualisation of rumination as a transient, state-like phenomenon triggered by 
actual-ideal self-discrepancy. Secondly, the study hypotheses were based on an 
extensive literature demonstrating that self-affirmations can generate a range of health 
and psychological benefits. However, there is much debate regarding the mechanisms 
by which self-affirmations work. The current study may have found null findings 
because it did not effectively target these mechanisms. Possible mechanisms of 
change that will be discussed are the content of the essays, positive affect, behaviour 
change and self-esteem. These ideas are discussed below.    
 
4.2.2.1 Control theory account of rumination. The study hypotheses were 
based on the CT account of rumination (Martin & Tesser, 1996), which states that 
rumination is triggered by actual-ideal self-discrepancy and will be terminated by 
reducing this discrepancy. In the context of the present findings, there are two 
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problems with this: the first is that the act of writing about an important value could 
actually trigger actual-ideal self-discrepancy and thus trigger rumination (especially in 
those that do not then complete their goals); the second is that there are alternative 
ways to conceptualise rumination that may explain why value-affirmation was unable 
to reduce it in this study.  
 It has been suggested previously that the act of writing about a value could be 
an emotionally distressing experience, particularly if one is not living value-
consistently (Czech et al., 2011). It thus follows that, for some participants, the act of 
writing about a valued domain may have triggered actual-ideal self-discrepancies and 
thus initiated rumination rather than reduce it. This may particularly be the case for 
individuals who did not complete their goal. Within the exploratory analysis of the 
current study, results were suggestive of an increase in rumination for individuals who 
had set a values-based goal but had not completed it. Thus, these individuals did not 
appear to benefit from the value-affirmation plus goal-setting intervention.  
Additionally, it has previously been reported that engaging in value-
affirmation in the same domain to which the self is threatened can intensify 
defensiveness (Blanton, Cooper, Skurnik, & Aronson, 1997). In the current study, it is 
possible that over the two-week follow-up period some individuals were ruminating 
about their chosen value. These individuals may also not have benefitted from the 
value-affirmation intervention.  
Overall, the current study found that value-affirmation resulted in increased 
positive affect immediately following the intervention, suggesting it was not 
emotionally distressing. However, a sub-sample may have experienced adverse 
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effects that were not evident when looking at group analyses. Gregg et al. (2014) 
asked participants to write about a value and also describe a time they had lived in 
line with this value. The authors suggested that this would minimise any short-term 
stress reaction by triggering thoughts of living value-consistently, rather than 
inconsistently. These were the instructions used in the current study. Despite this, 
reflecting on past experiences of being value-consistent could have triggered current 
thoughts about being value-inconsistent. Future studies may wish to measure valued-
living regarding the specific domain written about as a moderator of value-affirmation 
effects on rumination. 
There are also alternative ways to conceptualise rumination that may explain 
why an effect of value-affirmation was not found in this study. CT (Martin & Tesser, 
1996) suggests that rumination can be thought of as a transient, state-like 
phenomenon or situational characteristic that all individuals engage in to varying 
degrees. An alternative theory is RST (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991), which suggested that 
rumination is a habitual, stable and enduring trait-like tendency to repetitively focus 
on one’s symptoms of low mood, and on the causes, meanings and consequences of 
depressive symptoms. RST suggests rumination is an enduring cognitive style or 
dispositional trait that is resistant to change. The two conceptualisations differ in 
terms of what triggers rumination and whether it is a state or trait phenomenon; there 
is evidence for and against both ideas.  
Firstly, RST suggests rumination is triggered by negative mood rather than 
goal-discrepancy. There is evidence that rumination can be triggered by low mood 
(Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1995; Watkins, 2008), but rumination has also 
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been shown to be triggered by unresolved goals or life events outside of the context of 
negative mood (Lavallee & Campbell, 1995; Martin & Tesser, 1996; Robinson & 
Alloy, 2003). Furthermore, there is some evidence  that one’s propensity to ruminate 
is a stable individual difference, resistant to change, in line with RST (Just & Alloy, 
1997; Kuehner & Weber, 1999; Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000). It is likely that any brief 
intervention will not have durable effects if rumination is an enduring cognitive style. 
For example, in a review of mindfulness interventions for rumination, effect sizes 
were positively correlated with the number of treatment sessions, suggesting that 
more exposure to mindfulness practice generally results in better outcomes (Klainin-
Yobas et al., 2012). The same may be true for a values intervention: it may take 
ongoing practice for individuals to benefit from values clarification or goal-setting 
interventions. However, previous value-affirmation studies have demonstrated long-
term effects from only one brief intervention, albeit with different dependent variables 
(Cohen et al., 2006; Logel & Cohen, 2012; Sherman et al., 2000; Shnabel et al., 
2013).  
There have been some suggestions that CT and RST theories could be 
integrated to explain findings regarding rumination. Some people may be more 
susceptible to experiencing state rumination, based on an underlying and more 
enduring trait-like disposition. One proposal for how this may work has been put 
forward: Goal-discrepancy triggering state rumination, as in CT, will become a 
habitual way of thinking if state rumination repeatedly occurs in a context of negative 
affect, as in RST (Watkins & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2014). Once the habit has formed, 
rumination could be activated by contextual cues rather than by goal-discrepancy. 
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Habits are formed slowly, with experience, and once formed are resistant to change, 
making habitual rumination difficult to treat. It is therefore possible that if rumination 
has become a habit and is not always triggered by actual-ideal self-discrepancy, 
value-affirmation may not be an effective intervention for reducing it, without the 
addition of other techniques such as mindfulness. However, this theory of rumination 
as a habit has received relatively little attention and warrants further examination.  
Overall, the study hypotheses were based on the CT account of rumination 
(Martin & Tesser, 1996). There is some evidence against this conceptualisation that 
may explain why value-affirmation was not an effective intervention for reducing 
rumination in the current study. Additionally, the notion that writing about a value 
may actually trigger rumination warrants further investigation.  
 
4.2.2.2 Possible mechanisms of change within value-affirmation. The study 
hypotheses were based on the extensive literature demonstrating that self-affirmations 
can generate a range of health and psychological benefits. This section considers how 
proposed mechanisms of self-affirmation effects may have led to the null findings. 
There are numerous potential factors; the following discussion will focus on the 
impact that content of the essays, positive affect, behaviour change and self-esteem 
may have on self-affirmation effects. It is possible that the experiment may not have 
tapped into these mechanisms, perhaps because of modifications made to the value-
affirmation intervention. 
Content of the essays. There is a significant body of literature supporting the 
notion that a threat to one valued domain can be tolerated by writing an essay 
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reflecting on competence in another valued domain. However, there is some debate 
regarding the necessary content of value-affirmation essays. For example, Shnabel et 
al. (2013) examined the content of the values essays written by middle school 
students. This revealed that writing about social belonging (i.e., affirming bonds with 
others in their social network) was key to buffering against identity threat. However, 
this may only be relevant to this specific minority group threat or this younger 
sample. An alternative idea to social belonging is a focus on social relationships. 
Researchers have suggested that most value-affirmation essays focus on social 
relationships such as friends and family (Crocker et al., 2008) and perhaps this focus, 
rather than values per se, produces the positive effects of value-affirmation (Cohen & 
Sherman, 2014). This would suggest that if the current participants did not write about 
social relationships, the expected results of reduced rumination may not be found.  
The current study, as is often the case in self-affirmation literature, did not 
analyse content of essays. Other than each chosen value, it is unknown what 
participants specifically wrote about. This study employed a list of 57 values from 
ACT (Harris, 2008). These values are defined as ‘chosen concepts’ that represent life 
directions, and examples of values chosen by participants in our study were ‘love’, 
‘honesty’, or ‘trust’. The rationale for using this set, rather than the traditional set of 
10 used within Social Psychology (Allport et al., 1960), was to provide a broader, 
more extensive and less outdated list, as well as to increase the clinical applicability 
of the intervention. On the other hand, previous value-affirmation interventions have 
often employed values lists that represent valued life domains, such as ‘spirituality’ or 
‘friendship’ (Allport et al., 1960; Wilson et al., 2010). It is possible that the more 
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diverse list of values chosen within the current study (see Appendix 4) meant that a 
sub-sample of individuals did not write about social belonging and so did not benefit 
from the value-affirmation intervention. However, this is only problematic if the 
effects of value-affirmation are an effect of writing about social belonging, which is a 
hypothesis requiring further research.  
Positive affect. Koole et al. (1999) found that the impact of self-affirmation on 
reducing rumination was mediated by an implicit measure of positive affect; they 
found an effect on rumination because value-affirmation increased positive affect. 
Previous researchers have reported that improving mood will reduce the incidence of 
rumination (Bahrami, Kasaei, & Zamani, 2012): positive emotions facilitate cognitive 
reappraisal, enabling individuals to find positive meaning in negative circumstances 
(Tugade & Fredrickson, 2004). However, it was hypothesised in this study that the 
effect of positive affect would be short-lived (Watkins & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2014) but 
the value-affirmation effect would be maintained over time. Koole et al. did not 
measure the longer term effects of value-affirmation on rumination to see whether the 
effects went beyond that of immediately improved mood. The current study found an 
increase in positive affect, but was unable to explore the immediate effect of the 
intervention on rumination because the overall main effect was not significant. One 
possible interpretation of the current findings is that value-affirmation does not reduce 
rumination any more than simply increasing positive affect and thus the effects of 
value-affirmation on rumination will not be seen longer term.  
The relationship between value-affirmation, rumination and positive affect 
warrants further investigation. Sherman and Cohen (2006) argued that a more 
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appropriate strategy for determining the differential effects of value-affirmation and 
positive mood on rumination is to separate out the two processes by comparing value-
affirmation to a positive mood induction procedure. However, there are a number of 
difficulties with this approach. Firstly, there is considerable literature that casts doubt 
on the validity of many mood inductions (Zhang, Yu, & Barrett, 2014). Furthermore, 
most positive mood induction procedures differ from value-affirmation procedures in 
important ways, for example by using music or video clips rather than a written task 
(Mayer, Allen, & Beauregard, 1995). This would make it hard to interpret any 
between-group effects. Those that are comparable in methodology (e.g., include a 
writing task) often use methods that tap into values. For example, some methods 
found in the literature ask participants to write about something that happened to them 
that made them feel happy (De Dreu, Baas, & Nijstad, 2008; Garland et al., 2010; 
Mayer et al., 1995; Velten Jr., 1968). Again, this would make it difficult to draw any 
firm conclusions regarding the presence or absence of differing effects between value-
affirmation and positive mood on rumination.  
Behaviour change. It has been suggested that for self-affirmation effects to be 
maintained over time, behaviour change is required. Likewise, an effective 
intervention for reducing rumination may require positive behavioural change. Both 
of these ideas will now be discussed. 
Reflecting on the literature regarding the longitudinal effects of self-
affirmation, Cohen & Sherman (2014) suggested that self-affirmation effects will only 
be maintained over the longer term if behaviour change is initiated. They suggested 
that acting more value-consistently (i.e., increasing valued living) would extend the 
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self-affirmation effect by promoting and maintaining a positive self-view (Sherman & 
Cohen, 2006). This was part of the rationale for the additional goal-setting component 
in the current study.  
It is unknown from the current study whether the value-affirmation condition 
triggered any value-consistent behaviour change over the two-week period. Other 
studies reporting positive behaviour change have measured health outcomes such as 
weight loss (Logel & Cohen, 2012), taking a diabetes screening test (van 
Koningsbruggen & Das, 2009), purchasing condoms (Sherman et al., 2000) or 
reduced alcohol intake (Armitage et al., 2011). It is possible that some positive 
behaviour change was triggered in the value-affirmation condition but that the study 
did not capture this.  
In the VA+GS condition, the study found that participants who had completed 
their goal reported significantly less state rumination at T3 than participants who had 
not completed their goal, even after controlling for T1 state rumination. This provided 
preliminary evidence that behaviour change in the form of values-based goal 
completion, rather than only setting a goal, is helpful for reducing rumination. 
However, splitting the VA+GS participants into two groups for this analysis was 
selective rather than random sampling: the difference found between these two groups 
may have been the result of a third unknown variable. For example, the finding that 
goal-completers reported lower rumination than goal non-completers may be the 
result of their psychological state or mood, rather than any behavioural engagement. 
Nonetheless, given the preliminary finding that values-based action appeared to 
reduce rumination, the literature was investigated to determine how previous value-
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affirmation and/or goal-setting interventions have produced value-consistent 
behaviour change. This may be important given that one third of the VA+GS group 
did not complete their goal and did not appear to benefit from the intervention.  
Two potentially important features have been noted in previous value-
affirmation interventions that resulted in positive behaviour change. Firstly, some 
studies utilised the addition of an implementation intentions intervention, rather than 
only goal-setting; and secondly, some had multiple interventions over a given time 
period. 
Goal intention (i.e., setting a goal) does not always successfully translate into 
goal attainment. This was the case in the current study, as more than one third of the 
VA+GS sample reported having not completed their goal. Implementation intentions 
may provide an additional benefit to goal-setting. In an implementation intentions 
intervention, participants design an action plan for behaviour change incorporating 
when, where and how goal-directed behaviour will occur. They also consider what 
they will do if specific situations arise, known as if-then planning (Gollwitzer et al., 
2013). Focusing on the enactment of goals, through if-then planning, provides a 
strategy for goal attainment, to ensure behaviour change (Gollwitzer & Sheeran, 
2006). A previous study found that this process mediated the positive effects of self-
affirmation on behaviour change (Ferrer et al., 2012). 
However, findings regarding the utility of combining value-affirmation and 
implementation intentions have been mixed. Some studies have found that the 
combination has added benefit over self-affirmation alone (Harris et al., 2014), some 
have found no difference between self-affirmation and the combination (Armitage et 
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al., 2011), and one study even found a detrimental effect (Jessop et al., 2013). 
Reflecting on these conflicting findings, (Dijk & Dijkstra, 2014) suggested that before 
combining individually-effective interventions it is important to establish what exact 
mechanism drives the behaviour change process in both techniques. This warrants 
further investigation. In addition, a comparison of the effects of values-based goal-
setting on rumination, with or without implementation intentions, is worth examining.  
 Another factor noted in some self-affirmation studies that have observed long-
term behaviour change is the number of interventions offered. It may be unrealistic to 
expect sufficient behaviour change after offering a single, brief writing task in a 
laboratory setting (Dijk & Dijkstra, 2014). Considering this within a clinical context, 
it is likely that the therapist and client will discuss values and how to move towards 
valued-living over a number of therapy sessions and throughout treatment, rather than 
only on one occasion (Hayes, Strosahl, & Wilson, 1999). Various examined self-
affirmation reviews have drawn no conclusions regarding whether the number of 
interventions provided had an impact on outcomes (Cohen & Sherman, 2014; Epton, 
Harris, Kane, van Koningsbruggen, & Sheeran, 2015; McQueen & Klein, 2006; 
Sherman & Cohen, 2006). However, looking at self-affirmation studies that have 
reported behaviour change, some only provided one intervention (Cohen et al., 2006; 
Logel & Cohen, 2012; Sherman et al., 2000; Shnabel et al., 2013), but others provided 
multiple opportunities to affirm the self over a period of time (Cohen et al., 2009; 
Miyake et al., 2010; Sherman, Bunyan, et al., 2009). Taken together, this implies that 
only one intervention is actually needed to result in behaviour change.  
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 In conclusion, for self-affirmation effects to be maintained over time, 
behaviour change may be required, because this promotes and maintains a positive 
self-view (Sherman & Cohen, 2006). However, it is not clear exactly how or when 
value-affirmation effects result in behaviour change, for example whether goal-setting 
or implementation intentions are necessary, or whether more than one intervention is 
required. Further research is required.  
Although behaviour change may be important for longer-term self-affirmation 
effects generally, it is uncertain whether behaviour change is important for reducing 
rumination specifically. Theoretically, increased valued living could reduce 
rumination as it would decrease actual-ideal self-discrepancy (Martin & Tesser, 1996; 
Smith & Alloy, 2009). Within BA and RFCBT, rumination is conceptualized as a 
form of avoidance, and functional analysis is used to facilitate the reduction of this 
avoidance and replace it with more helpful approach behaviours. This suggests value-
consistent behaviour change is one method for reducing rumination and is a possible 
reason why value-affirmation did not result in reduced rumination in the current 
study. However, cognitive interventions, such as metacognitive therapy or 
concreteness training, have been shown to result in reduced rumination in clinical 
samples (Watkins et al., 2009; Wells et al., 2012). Further research should consider 
whether behaviour change is a necessary outcome of interventions aimed at reducing 
rumination. The trend in the current study suggests that value-affirmation alone is not 
able to maintain reduced rumination, but value-driven goal completion may be able 
to. 
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Self-esteem. Self-esteem has been investigated as a potential moderator of self-
affirmation effects as there is some debate regarding whether individuals with lower 
trait self-esteem benefit more or less from self-affirmation (Steele et al., 1993; 
Gibbons et al., 1997). For example, in one study the beneficial effects of value-
affirmation on self-reported stress were only evident in participants who were high in 
self-resources, including high self-esteem, self-enhancement and optimism (Creswell 
et al., 2005). However, Marigold et al. (2007) found that high self-esteem individuals 
were more likely to self-generate self-affirmations and so benefitted less from a self-
affirmation intervention. Similarly, Jaremka et al. (2011) suggested that people with 
high self-esteem did not feel threatened by a psychological threat to self-integrity so 
did not benefit from self-affirmation. It is unknown from the current study whether 
value-affirmation was only effective for individuals with low self-esteem: the study 
was not sufficiently powered to complete a moderation analysis. Further research with 
a larger sample, particularly of individuals with low self-esteem, is required.  
Other potential mechanisms of change. There are a number of other potential 
moderators of change that have not been considered here, a thorough examination of 
which is beyond the scope of this thesis (see Cohen & Sherman, 2014; Howell, 2016; 
McQueen & Klein, 2006; Sherman, 2013). For example, culture has been suggested 
as a possible moderator of change because cultures endorsing individualism versus 
collectivism may experience value-affirmation exercises differently (Sherman & 
Cohen, 2006). Culture also shapes what people view as threatening to their self-view 
(Hoshino-Browne et al., 2005). In a meta-analysis of self-affirmation on health 
behaviour, (Epton et al., 2015) reported self-affirmation was more effective in 
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changing health behaviour when samples contained a smaller proportion of ‘white’ 
participants. The current sample was majority ‘white’ and thus culture may have 
impacted results.  
Taken together, the mechanisms by which self-affirmations work are 
debateable (Sherman, 2013). It is possible that the null findings in the current study 
are due to particular mechanisms of change required for self-affirmation to work, 
particularly as there were differences within the current value-affirmation intervention 
compared to some others in the literature. For example, the altered values list may 
have affected the content of the essays in a way that impacted results. Alternatively, 
two possible mediators of value-affirmation effects have been discussed. It is possible 
that value-affirmation results in improvements in positive affect, but does not directly 
impact on rumination, resulting in an inability to replicate the findings of Koole et al. 
(1999). Previous authors have also suggested that for value-affirmation effects to have 
an impact longer term, value-consistent behaviour change must be triggered. Indeed, 
goal attainment appeared to result in reduced rumination. It is therefore possible that 
value-affirmation will only impact on rumination over time for those that have made a 
value-consistent behaviour change. Furthermore, there is a possibility that value-
affirmation will reduce rumination for individuals with low self-esteem, but not high 
self-esteem. In summary, further research is required into the mechanisms by which 
value-affirmation effects are produced. It is also worth investigating whether value-
affirmation is able to reduce rumination for individuals with low self-esteem.  
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4.2.3 Summary. Firstly, differences in study design between the current study 
and that of Koole et al. (1999) may explain the null findings. Alternatively, in 
considering the ACT literature, it is possible that the acceptance component may 
provide added benefit to a values intervention. The null findings have also been 
considered in the context of conclusions draw from the broader theoretical literature. 
The first of these was the conclusion that rumination is a state-like phenomenon 
triggered by actual-ideal self-discrepancy (Martin & Tesser, 1996). There is some 
evidence to suggest that rumination could be an enduring process that is resistant to 
change and will be instigated by triggers other than goal-discrepancy, such as low 
mood (Just & Alloy, 1997; Kuehner & Weber, 1999; Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000). 
Furthermore, the study hypotheses were based on self-affirmation theory and there is 
considerable debate regarding the mechanisms of change required for self-affirmation 
effects. It is possible that the study did not adequately tap into these mechanisms, 
perhaps due to differences in value-affirmation and goal-setting interventions 
compared with other studies. Possible mediators or moderators of value-affirmation 
include the themes discussed in the essays, positive affect, behaviour change and self-
esteem, although this list is not exhaustive.  
In conclusion, a number of possible explanations for the null findings have 
been raised and discussed within the context of the literature. Many of these require 
further research.  
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4.3 Theoretical and Clinical Implications 
 Theoretical and clinical implications of the study results will be considered in 
relation to nonclinical rumination, self-affirmation theory and values interventions as 
part of ACT and BA.  
 
4.3.1 Theoretical implications for nonclinical rumination. The current 
study was not designed to provide evidence for or against the differing theories of 
rumination. However, results from the study provide support for certain 
conceptualisations of rumination, particularly its relationship to low mood and 
psychopathology.  
It has been proposed that the frequency of rumination lies on a continuum, 
with some individuals ruminating more than others, and high levels of rumination 
characteristic of psychopathology, including depression, anxiety, substance misuse 
and PTSD (Brozovich et al., 2015; Cowdrey & Park, 2011; Nolen-Hoeksema & 
Morrow, 1991; Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000; Skitch & Abela, 2008). It has also been 
suggested that rumination in clinical samples differs quantitatively, but not 
qualitatively, from rumination in nonclinical samples. As such, nonclinical samples 
have been utilised as analogue samples, particularly to develop a better understanding 
of rumination without the confounding variables associated with clinical populations. 
The current study showed that rumination is present within nonclinical populations, 
particularly within the trait measure of rumination. However, a floor effect was found 
in the state measure of rumination. This provides evidence for the conceptualisation 
of rumination as a common process within the general population, but suggests that 
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nonclinical research investigating the immediate effects of a particular strategy on 
rumination may benefit from utilising a rumination induction procedure. Previous 
studies have used the trait measure at follow-up to determine change (Ekkers et al., 
2011; Robins, Keng, Ekblad, & Brantley, 2012; Watkins et al., 2009; Watkins et al., 
2011), which may be more helpful.  
 One finding from the current study was that participants in the value-
affirmation groups reported improved positive affect immediately following the 
intervention, but rumination was not reduced. This suggests that rumination and mood 
are not directly related and that rumination will not be reduced by improving positive 
mood alone because the induction of positive mood is unlikely to be sustained over 
time.   
 
4.3.2 Theoretical implications for self-affirmation theory. In the current 
study, value-affirmation with or without goal-setting was not able to reduce 
rumination. It may be the case that value-affirmation is not a useful intervention for 
reducing rumination. This is counter to the previous finding of Koole et al. (1999). It 
is possible that previous research reporting value-affirmation effects had actually 
found an effect of something separate to value-affirmation but that had been triggered 
by the value-affirmation intervention. For example, it may be that writing about social 
relationships, increasing positive affect, or triggering value-consistent behaviour 
change, results in the previously reported value-affirmation effects. Alternatively, 
value-affirmation may only be an effective intervention for individuals with low self-
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esteem. Currently, there are no firm conclusions regarding how value-affirmation 
works or these potential mediating or moderating effects: further research is required.  
The literature reports differing results of value-affirmation on positive affect, 
with some finding it mediates value-affirmation effects (Ferrer et al., 2012; Koole et 
al., 1999), and others finding no impact on positive affect (Fein & Spencer, 1997; 
Lannin, Guyll, Vogel, & Madon, 2013; Schmeichel & Martens, 2005; Sherman et al., 
2000; Spencer et al., 2001). A previous review concluded that value-affirmation may 
only affect implicit positive affect (Sherman & Cohen, 2006). However, the current 
study found an increase in explicitly measured positive affect. This finding adds to the 
literature regarding possible mechanisms by which value-affirmation works and 
confirms that future studies investigating value-affirmation should measure positive 
affect as a possible mediator of effects.  
 
4.3.3 Clinical implications for values-based interventions. ACT is a clinical 
intervention that has a substantial component focus on using values to reduce 
problematic psychological processes, and to increase value-consistent action. 
Research looking at the isolated effect of values and value-driven goals may have 
some helpful implications for the use of values clinically. However, the current study 
utilised a nonclinical population and so any clinical implications must be considered 
tentatively.   
The psychological flexibility model within ACT has two broad categories 
(Hayes et al., 2006): (i) mindfulness and acceptance processes; and (ii) commitment 
to valued action. Only two studies have investigated whether an ACT intervention 
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was able to reduce rumination, and both showed promising results (Harrington, 2008; 
Slevison, 2013). Additionally, research found that participants who received 
mindfulness training demonstrated reduced levels of rumination (Deyo et al., 2009; 
Feldman et al., 2010; Hawley et al., 2013). There is relatively little research within 
ACT literature investigating values-based interventions alone, or in combination with 
values-based goal-setting. Laboratory-based studies investigating values and 
committed action would improve our understanding of the mechanisms behind the 
values components and the interactive and potentially cumulative effects of these 
components (Levin et al., 2012; Rosen & Davison, 2003). Given that self-affirmation 
literature suggested that a brief values intervention can be effective for reducing 
distress, this was a promising area of research (Branstetter-Rost et al., 2009; Creswell 
et al., 2005; Koole et al., 1999). The current laboratory-based study added to this 
literature-base.  
The findings showed that value-affirmation, adapted to increase its clinical 
applicability based on ACT (Harris, 2008; Hayes et al., 2006; Levin et al., 2012), was 
not effective at reducing rumination but resulted in improved immediate positive 
affect. This was also the case when a values-based goal-setting component was added. 
Although perhaps counter-intuitive, it is possible that affirming a personally 
meaningful value results in improved positive mood but this might not correspond 
with any change in their rumination. It is possible that the additional components of 
ACT (i.e., mindfulness and acceptance), or the combination of components, are 
important for reducing rumination. However, values work within ACT is more 
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thorough and comprehensive than the value-affirmation intervention utilised in this 
study, so clinical implications are made with caution.  
Mindfulness and acceptance allow the individual to notice when they are 
engaging in rumination, practice willingness to experience it, and redirect attention to 
value-driven committed action. It may be the case that mindfulness and acceptance 
are necessary skills to learn in order to increase awareness of the ruminative process 
and provide an alternative response to negative experiences. This increased awareness 
and flexibility may reduce the negative consequences associated with rumination, 
such as low mood, that can interfere with goal-driven behaviours (Nolen-Hoeksema et 
al., 2008). The values components then provide the context in which acceptance is 
tolerable (Plumb et al., 2009): they may teach the individual how to reduce actual-
ideal self-discrepancy by disengaging from ruminative thinking on blocked goals and 
focusing on value-consistent action. Future research could investigate whether there is 
an additive benefit of a values component to acceptance-based interventions or 
whether acceptance alone is sufficient. Previous studies have investigated this with 
regards to pain tolerance and found values provided additional benefit (Branstetter-
Rost et al., 2009; Páez-Blarrina et al., 2008), but further research is required into the 
impact of values on psychological distress.  
Similarly, some BA interventions provide a values-clarification component. A 
previous review of BA interventions concluded that although values-based 
interventions are receiving increasing empirical support (Kanter et al., 2010), it is 
unclear how much they contribute or add to BA’s effectiveness. Future studies could 
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directly compare value-driven BA with standard BA to determine whether values 
have an additive benefit.   
Furthermore, the current study utilised a very brief value-driven goal-setting 
intervention that, for one third of the VA+GS sample, did not result in goal 
attainment. Results suggested that goal attainment was important for reducing 
rumination: ensuring goal-attainment in a clinical intervention may be useful for 
improving outcomes. There are a number of potential ways to increase likelihood of a 
goal-setting intervention resulting in goal attainment. For example, many previous 
studies provide more than one intervention, and some provide input from a clinician 
for support with identifying appropriate goals (Coote & MacLeod, 2012). In addition, 
the implementation intentions intervention discussed previously may provide a 
strategy for goal attainment (Gollwitzer et al., 2013).  
Overall, in ACT, ‘value-clarification’ and ‘committed action’ are more 
detailed and comprehensive therapy components than those used in the current study. 
Therefore it would not be appropriate to make firm recommendations from the current 
study about ACT components. However, results indicate that goal attainment may be 
particularly important and therefore further research should consider how to ensure 
goal attainment after goal-setting. 
The current study utilised a nonclinical population and the majority of 
research into self-affirmation effects have employed student or general populations 
(McQueen & Klein, 2006). Therefore, firm conclusions cannot be drawn regarding 
the effect of value-affirmation with or without goal-setting on rumination within a 
clinical population, or how a clinical population would respond to the process of 
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reflecting on their values. It is possible that a clinical population would find the 
exercise of reflecting on values more difficult practically (e.g., identifying a value) or 
emotionally (e.g., thinking about a painful memory) than a nonclinical population, but 
as yet there are no published studies utilising a clinical population so this requires 
further research.  
However, it is also possible that a clinical population would show a greater 
effect of value-affirmation. Firstly, a previously described study, looking at the 
moderating impact of self-esteem on self-affirmation effects, found individuals with 
low self-esteem benefited more from the intervention (Düring & Jessop, 2015). The 
authors suggested that these individuals had fewer positive self-resources previously 
at their disposal. Although this sub-sample of individuals with low self-esteem was 
nonclinical, it may be more akin to a clinical sample. Secondly, an unpublished 
doctoral thesis (Cullen, 2014), investigating self-affirmation for two individuals with 
bulimia nervosa, suggested that starting a psychological intervention with a value-
affirmation exercise may facilitate engagement in treatment by focusing on positive 
existing self-resources within the client, rather than a negative narrative. It would 
potentially provide an immediate improvement (e.g., in positive affect), develop a 
positive therapeutic relationship and lay a foundation for more difficult emotional 
therapeutic work. In the qualitative aspect of their research, they reported that 
participants found the positive focus of recalling positive memories and recognising 
achievements helpful. The study provides preliminary evidence that it is an acceptable 
intervention for clinical populations, but more research, particularly with a larger 
sample of differing psychopathologies, is required.  
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4.3.4 Summary. In conclusion, there are a number of theoretical implications 
of the study findings in relation to rumination and self-affirmation theory. In 
particular, the current study showed that trait rumination is present within nonclinical 
populations, but future nonclinical research investigating the immediate effects of a 
particular strategy on rumination may benefit from utilising a rumination induction 
procedure. Additionally, the study found that value-affirmation did not reduce 
rumination. A number of factors might account for this, such as the role of possible 
mediating or moderating variables, the possible enduring nature of rumination 
meaning that it may require more intensive values work, and study characteristics, 
such as lack of power. Furthermore, clinical implications of the study results suggest 
that, in isolation, reflecting on a core value may not be as useful as additionally 
attaining value-driven goals. Future studies might usefully investigate whether values 
add to the efficacy of acceptance and BA interventions and how to ensure goal 
attainment after goal-setting.  
 
4.4 Strengths of the Study 
 A considerable strength of the present study is the experimental approach: the 
study used an RCT design. There was an active control condition so that any findings 
could not be attributable to other factors (Skerrett, 2013). Participants were 
randomised to condition in order to manipulate one variable (the condition) while 
controlling for potentially confounding variables such as age, gender, educational 
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level and depressive symptom levels (Gibson et al., 2016; Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 
1999; Sütterlin et al., 2012; Treynor et al., 2003). Participants and the researchers 
were blind to the condition that participants had been randomised to.  
The study confirmed a previously reported finding that age was significantly 
negatively correlated with measures of trait and state rumination: older individuals 
reported lower scores on rumination measures (Sütterlin et al., 2012). This highlighted 
the importance of controlling for these variables in experimental studies. Other 
potential confounding variables were self-esteem (Jaremka et al., 2011; Marigold et 
al., 2007) and trait rumination (Watkins & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2014), which were also 
controlled for via randomisation and checked via baseline measures, as suggested by 
McQueen & Klein (2006) in their review of experimental manipulations of self-
affirmation. Positive affect was also measured over time so that this could be 
statistically controlled for (Koole et al., 1999).  
Furthermore, the present research used a nonclinical sample, which allowed 
the study of rumination without confounding variables associated with clinical 
populations and the use of an active control condition that would not otherwise be 
ethical in clinical research (Levin et al., 2012). It also attempted to explore the 
longitudinal effect of value-affirmation on real-world, naturally-occurring threats. 
This is something that is lacking in nonclinical rumination literature, as most studies 
use experimentally-orchestrated self-threats (Koole et al., 1999; Nolen-Hoeksema & 
Morrow, 1993) and measure in-the-moment rumination. Therefore a strength of this 
study was the attempt to measure naturally-triggered rumination over time in a 
nonclinical population, rather than relying on a rumination induction. This is because 
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self-reported measures of rumination have not consistently shown the same pattern of 
results as experimentally-induced rumination (Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008). 
Additionally, rumination inductions often require following instructions but 
performing the task in your head, so researchers cannot establish for sure whether 
participants are following instructions accurately (Papageorgiou & Wells, 2004). 
However, there are also advantages to inducing rumination, as previously described. 
  
The current study looked at the relationship between value-affirmation and 
rumination, an area that is currently in its infancy, but has potentially important 
implications for the interventions used with those prone to rumination. The study 
brings together the ideas of two theoretically-overlapping areas from social and 
clinical psychology (value-affirmation within self-affirmation literature and values-
clarification and committed action within ACT and some more recent CBT 
interventions), which have previously been investigated separately. Values within 
self-affirmation literature has a growing evidence base in academic and health settings 
(Cohen & Sherman, 2014; McQueen & Klein, 2006). However, values within clinical 
psychology have rarely been investigated in isolation, despite being a component of 
some clinical interventions. For example, in their review of BA literature, Kanter et 
al. (2010) reported that numerous interventions had a values component but none 
drew conclusions regarding the effectiveness of this aspect of the intervention 
compared to BA alone. The current study utilised an experimental approach and so 
was able to take two components, value-affirmation with and without the addition of 
goal-setting, and explore their relative causal influences on rumination. Specifically, 
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the study has highlighted the possibility that value-affirmations may not be effective 
for reducing rumination, even with the addition of the goal-setting component. This 
component-based approach has been encouraged in the literature to attempt to clarify 
the active ingredients of clinical interventions such as CBT, ACT and BA (Kanter et 
al., 2010; Levin et al., 2012). 
 In bringing together the ideas of two theoretically-overlapping areas, the study 
modified the value-affirmation manipulation to ensure participants were affirming a 
personally meaningful intrinsic value, rather than socially imposed values, and aimed 
to increase the clinical applicability of the intervention, based on a clinical values 
intervention from ACT (Harris, 2008; Hayes et al., 2006; Levin et al., 2012). The 
value-affirmation manipulation check demonstrated as effectively as possible that this 
modified intervention is an appropriate method for affirming a personally-meaningful 
value. This is important given the novel aspects of the approach, including use of a 
card sort task, rather than using a value-ranking exercise, and providing a description 
of values from ACT.  
   
4.5 Limitations of the Study 
Of particular relevance in comparing the results of this study with Koole et al. 
(1999), was the previously described methodological differences: how rumination was 
measured and the use of a rumination induction procedure. In addition, there are other 
limitations to the study design, some of which may have influenced the null findings, 
including the issue of power, floor effects, nonengagement with the intervention, the 
control condition, and the failure to successfully randomise the heterogeneous sample.  
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Although the study did not replicate the findings of Koole et al. (1999), there 
was a possible trend towards the expected results (see Figure 3.1 in section 3.7). The 
graph indicated that all three conditions showed reduced rumination immediately 
post-intervention, but only the VA+GS participants continued to show a maintained 
reduction at two-week follow-up. The level of rumination returned to baseline for the 
other two conditions. It is possible that the size of the effect is smaller than was 
originally predicted: a medium effect size of 0.6 had been chosen. There had been no 
previous study looking at the effect of value-affirmation on rumination over two 
weeks. Therefore the power analysis was based on Koole et al., which yielded effect 
sizes between 0.5-0.8, as well as two other studies that had found medium effects over 
two weeks of a value-affirmation intervention on state anxiety (Morgan & Atkin, 
2016), and a goal-setting task on increased optimism (Meevissen et al., 2011). It is 
possible that with a larger sample, a significant effect of VA+GS on reduced 
rumination over time, would have been found. 
Regarding the self-report measures, there are two issues of note: the choice of 
measures and a floor effect. Koole et al. (1999) felt that the very act of measuring 
rumination through self-report measures can interfere with the extent to which people 
ruminate and so used ‘accessibility of goal-related cognitions’ as a proxy measure of 
rumination. Some researchers consider rumination an unconscious involuntary 
process, whereas self-report questionnaires assume that people can directly access 
their internal responses and are willing to report them (Smith & Alloy, 2009). It is 
commonly reported that there are also many factors that can impact on results when 
relying on self-report measures, such as participant understanding of questions and 
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rating scales, response bias, or introspective ability (Bernard et al., 2003; Fan et al., 
2006; Stone et al., 2000). For example, on inspection of the data in this study, 
nonengagement and misreading of questions were identified as issues (see section 
3.2.4). However, self-report measures are a common approach to measuring 
rumination, and are less time-consuming for participants and less specific to one 
experimental psychological threat than the proxy measure used by Koole et al. (1999).  
With regard to the specific self-report measures of rumination used in this 
study, the RSQ-RRS is a well-utilised and well-validated measure that is frequently 
used in research to assess rumination in the context of low mood (Just & Alloy, 1997; 
Luminet, 2004; Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000; Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 1994). However, the 
state version of this questionnaire (the RSQ-S) has not been subject to validation 
(Ciesla et al., 2012) and so it cannot be assumed that it was measuring the relevant 
constructs. In addition, the RSQ-S is adapted from the RSQ-RRS, which looks at 
rumination in the context of negative mood. Negative mood was not manipulated or 
measured in this study, which may have impacted on the construct validity of the state 
measure. In addition, the RSQ-S may not be sensitive to rumination about thwarted 
personal goals and may restrict this study of rumination to the assumptions of the 
RST, which suggest that rumination is an enduring pathological thinking style that 
occurs in the context in the low mood. Previous studies investigating rumination over 
time have used the RSQ-RRS at multiple time points (Ekkers et al., 2011; Robins et 
al., 2012; Slevison, 2013; Watkins et al., 2009; Watkins et al., 2011). An alternative 
option was to use a measure of goal-driven rumination, such as the Scott McIntosh 
Rumination Inventory (Scott & McIntosh, 1999), but this is less commonly used and 
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also not well-validated in the literature. This lack of a formally-validated measure of 
state rumination is an ongoing problem for research in this area, and further research 
should look to validate the RSQ-S. 
Another issue with the state measure was that of a floor effect of state 
rumination at T1, thus even if value-affirmation was able to reduce rumination, the 
current study may not have been able to find this effect. Previous studies have utilised 
student samples, who often report higher levels of rumination than working-age adults 
(Sütterlin et al., 2012): the current study found that age was significantly negatively 
correlated with rumination. This suggests that to investigate the effect of an 
intervention on rumination over time with a nonclinical sample, it may be more 
appropriate to utilise a ‘high-ruminator’ nonclinical sample (Chan et al., 2013; 
Harrington, 2008) or a student-only sample, rather than an inclusive nonclinical 
sample.  
In our study, participants were recruited from different sources, producing a 
heterogeneous sample. For example, there was a wide range in age and there were 
psychology students and nonstudents, whereas Koole et al. employed a solely 
undergraduate student sample. Increased heterogeneity has benefits because often 
nonclinical studies within psychology focus too narrowly on undergraduate 
psychology students and so are less generalisable to the wider population. However, 
the increased heterogeneity within the current sample may have resulted in lower 
levels of rumination at baseline compared to the sample within Koole’s study, given 
that it is known that older individuals report lower levels of rumination (Sütterlin et 
al., 2012). 
 134 
 
Additionally, randomisation was unsuccessful in the current study, because 
age was significantly different between groups. It is possible that other variables that 
had not been measured were also significantly different between groups. This failure 
to successfully randomise the sample may have impacted on results, particularly 
regarding differences between treatment groups. For example, knowledge of 
psychological processes or differing motivations for taking part could impact on 
awareness of the self-affirmation process, which may reduce its effectiveness 
(Sherman, Cohen, et al., 2009; Silverman, Logel, & Cohen, 2013). Although 
speculative, it is possible that having measured rumination at the start of the study, 
psychology students may become aware of the hypotheses of the study, thus 
influencing results in some way. These factors are difficult to identify and difficult to 
tease apart. Some studies have included a question during the debrief stage to 
establish whether participants have correctly deduced the study hypotheses (Koole et 
al., 1999). 
Future studies utilising a combined student and nonstudent sample may benefit 
from applying stratified random sampling. Unfortunately, in the current study, 
randomisation occurred prior to the decision to recruit nonstudent participants in 
addition to the student sample. 
In choosing the control condition for this study, there was some concern 
regarding whether it would also be self-affirming, thus too similar to the experimental 
conditions. Firstly, some researchers have suggested that certain measures completed 
by all participants at T1 could interfere with the self-affirmation process: completing 
the VLQ has been used as a way of clarifying values in ACT (Hayes et al., 1999; 
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Plumb et al., 2009; Wilson et al., 2010) and completion of a self-esteem measure has 
been shown to be self-affirming (Kimble, Kimble, & Croy, 1998; Steele et al., 1993). 
Concerning the control condition specifically, some studies have used completion of a 
values scale without a written component as a values intervention (Liu & Steele, 
1986; Steele & Liu, 1983; Tesser & Cornell, 1991), which was part of our control 
condition. It has also been suggested that people will use any self-reflective writing 
task as an opportunity to self-affirm (Cohen et al., 2000) and so some authors asked 
participants to write about what they have eaten in the last 48 hours or about their 
daily routine (Burson, Crocker, & Mischkowski, 2012; Cohen et al., 2000). On the 
other hand, the control condition benefits from being an active and standardised 
control condition in experimental manipulations of self-affirmation (McQueen & 
Klein, 2006). There was a significant difference in the value-affirmation but not the 
control condition in positive affect immediately following the intervention. There was 
also a statistically significant difference on the manipulation check between 
experimental and control groups on endorsement of chosen values, suggesting the 
conditions were sufficiently different. However, the mean score for the control 
condition manipulation check was more than zero, showing that some individuals in 
the control group did at least partially endorse the value they had written about. As 
these individuals were not identified as outliers they were not excluded from the 
dataset.  
In addition, participants were not forced to spend the same amount of time on 
the task. Although the overall time taken on the written task was not significantly 
different between groups, one participant in the NAC condition was found to be an 
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outlier in time spent on writing the essay. This participant spend significantly less 
time on the task, but it was decided to retain their data. There was also a range of 
times taken overall, which may affected resulted as some participants may engaged in 
the task in a more meaningful way than others.  
Finally, there was limited data collected in the current study regarding 
engagement with the intervention, and what was collected was not examined on an 
individual basis, other than to check for outliers. It is possible that some individuals 
did not benefit from the intervention due to nonengagement. In particular, the goal-
setting component to the value-affirmation intervention was a novel approach, but 
adherence to the task of setting a value-driven SMART goal was not measured. It is 
therefore not known whether individuals followed instructions accurately and set a 
value-driven SMART goal. Indeed, the value-affirmation manipulation check 
examined endorsement of their chosen value but did not reliability establish 
adherence to the task. Nevertheless, previous studies have shown that lack of 
adherence to a self-affirming task does not actually undermine the effects. Previous 
authors suggested this was because any self-affirming thought might be sufficient to 
offset self-view threats (Armitage et al., 2011; Armitage & Rowe, 2011; Harris & 
Epton, 2009). On the other hand, for goal-setting to be effective, it may require closer 
adherence to the task instructions, to enable goal completion, and this was not 
checked in the current study.   
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4.6 Implications for Future Research  
There are several potential areas for further investigation, some of which have 
been suggested previously. In light of the above findings, important avenues for 
further research will now be highlighted.  
Although identified as a strength of the study, the attempt to measure 
rumination as triggered by real-world, naturally-occurring threats meant there were 
floor effects within the rumination measure. As such, future studies may benefit from 
replicating the study with the addition of a rumination induction such as a failure task, 
in line with Koole et al. (1999).  
 Early findings suggest that ACT is an effective intervention for reducing 
rumination (Harrington, 2008; Slevison, 2013), of which value-clarification and 
value-driven goal-setting are components. However, acceptance and mindfulness are 
also components of ACT that have been shown to reduce rumination (Geschwind et 
al., 2011; Shapiro et al., 2008; van Aalderen et al., 2012). Future research could 
further utilise dismantling studies to establish whether mindfulness and acceptance-
based interventions are sufficient for reducing rumination or whether individuals 
would additionally benefit from value-clarification and value-driven goal-setting 
components. Within ACT literature it has been suggested that mindfulness and 
acceptance ‘clear the path’ for individuals to benefit from values work. By first 
altering the way individuals relate to their difficult internal and external events, they 
are then able to use core values, rather than internal experiences, to guide their life 
direction (Hayes et al., 2006). However, this is incongruent with self-affirmation 
literature that has found that value-affirmation alone can reduce stress, rumination, 
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paranoia, and increase tolerance of pain (Branstetter-Rost et al., 2009; Creswell et al., 
2005; Feldner et al., 2003; Kingston & Ellett, 2014; Koole et al., 1999). Therefore this 
warrants further investigation.   
 In addition, future research that applies the value-affirmation plus goal-setting 
component could look to expand on this intervention. In the current study, the goal-
setting component was intentionally brief so as to avoid added a confounding variable 
of providing more time for reflection for these participants. However, future studies 
may wish to expand on their explanation of goal-setting, provide additional support in 
setting appropriate goals, or utilise an implementation intentions.  
Furthermore, future research could include more thorough manipulation 
checks for the value-affirmation and goal-setting components to check adherence to 
each part of the task. One way of assessing adherence within the goal-setting 
component could be to qualitatively analyse the goals that participants had set for 
themselves, particularly regarding whether they were SMART and value-driven. 
Furthermore, future studies may benefit from qualitatively analysing the written 
essays: this could act as an additional manipulation check for the value-affirmation 
condition. It may also help to identify whether the control condition is self-affirming, 
as some authors have suggested (Burson et al., 2012; Cohen et al., 2000) and would 
add to the relatively sparse literature base on whether the type of value written about 
or content of essays has an impact on self-affirmation effects (Crocker et al., 2008; 
Shnabel et al., 2013). 
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Finally, there were a number of possible mediating or moderating effects of 
value-affirmation. In particular, it may be beneficial to establish whether self-esteem 
is a moderator or positive affect is a mediator of value-affirmation effects.  
 
4.7 Conclusions 
In conclusion, findings presented in this study did not support the notion that 
value-affirmation, with or without a goal-setting component, reduces rumination. 
Value-affirmation was however shown to improve positive affect immediately 
following the intervention. It was also shown that individuals who had reported goal 
attainment showed lower levels of state rumination compared to individuals who had 
not completed their goal.  
There are numerous explanations for these findings, including the 
conceptualisation of rumination as an enduring cognitive style rather than a state, or 
the possible roles of essay content, positive affect, behaviour change and self-esteem. 
Alternatively, the study may have been insufficiently powered to find an effect 
because there appeared to be a potential trend towards the expected results. It is 
possible that under certain circumstances, such as in a larger sample of individuals 
with low self-esteem or higher levels of state rumination pre-intervention, reflecting 
on a core value particularly when combined with attaining value-based goals, may 
reduce rumination. This warrants further investigation.  
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Appendix 2: Information Sheet, Consent Form and Debrief Form 
Information Sheet 
 
'The study of how values relate to our thinking style and thoughts about other 
people' 
 
Before you decide to take part, it is important for you to fully understand what the 
study involves and all relevant information. Please take time to read the following 
sheet carefully. 
 
1. What is the study about? 
We are interested in finding out how our values relate to thoughts about ourselves and 
other people. In this study, values are aspects of life that are important and meaningful 
to someone. Examples of values include: adventure, respect, freedom, power, humour, 
etc.  
 
2. What does the study involve? 
Taking part in this study will involve two appointments two weeks apart, one at Royal 
Holloway (or at a suitable location within your local community) and one online. At 
the first appointment, you will be asked to complete a set of questionnaires about your 
mood, your thinking style, and your thoughts about others. You will then be asked to 
complete a short piece of writing that is related to values. The exact piece of writing 
will be one of three possible ones, decided at random. There are no right or wrong 
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answers when completing the tasks and your work is not marked. Immediately after 
completing the task, you will be asked to complete another set of questionnaires about 
your mood, your thinking style and your thoughts about others. This first appointment 
will take between 45-60 minutes. 
 
Two-weeks later, at the second appointment, we will ask you to complete the same set 
of questionnaires again. The second appointment will take around 20 minutes and can 
be completed online. 
 
3. Who is involved in this study? 
The principal investigators for this study are Rebecca Carpenter and Nicole Evans, 
Trainee Clinical Psychologists. Other investigators are Professor Andy Macleod, Dr 
Jessica Kingston and Dr Lyn Ellett, lecturers in Clinical Psychology at Royal 
Holloway University. 
 
6. Do I have to take part? 
It is up to you to decide if you would like to take part in the study. You can withdraw 
at any time without giving a reason. The data you have supplied up to that point can 
be removed and won’t be used in the study. 
 
8. What are the incentives to complete the study? 
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If you are a first year undergraduate psychology student you earn 4 course credits for 
your participation in this study. If you are not, you will be entered into the university 
prize draw to win one of five £20 Amazon vouchers. 
 
9. How will my data be used? 
All information that is collected during the course of the research will be kept 
confidential. The questionnaire scores and task data will be anonymised and stored 
securely on a database, separate from your personal details. Only the researchers will 
have access to the information you give during the study. Two different aspects of the 
research study will be written up and submitted in two separate Doctoral Theses.  
 
12. Who has reviewed the study? 
The study has been reviewed by the Royal Holloway University of London 
Department Research Committee. 
 
13. Who is organizing the funding of the research? 
The research is a requirement of Nicole Evans’ and Rebecca Carpenter’s doctoral 
training in Clinical Psychology. Their training is funded by Camden and Islington 
NHS Foundation Trust. 
 
14. How can I get more information? 
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Please do not hesitate to contact Rebecca Carpenter or Nicole Evans via email 
(Rebecca.carpenter.2014@live.rhul.ac.uk; Nicole.evans.2014@live.rhul.ac.uk) should 
you need any further information about the study.  
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Consent Form 
 
'The study of how values relate to our thinking style and thoughts about other 
people' 
ID number: ……………………………….. 
You have been asked to participate in a study about how values relate to 
thoughts about ourselves and other people. 
Have you (please circle yes or no): 
Read the information sheet about the study? Yes No 
Had an opportunity to ask questions? Yes No 
Got satisfactory answers to your questions? Yes No 
Understood that you’re free to withdraw from the study at any 
time without giving a reason (and without it affecting your 
care/education if applicable) 
Yes No 
Understood that you are free to deny answering any questions 
that you do not want to? 
Yes No 
Do you agree to take part in the study? Yes No 
 
Name: _____________________________________ 
Signature: __________________________________ 
Date: ______________________________________ 
This consent form will be stored separately from the anonymous information you 
provide. 
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Debrief Form 
Thank you for participating in this study! 
'The study of how values relate to our thinking style and thoughts about other 
people' 
This study is being written up as part of two Doctoral theses: one about 
rumination, which is a particular type of thinking style involving repetitive patterns of 
negative thinking; the other is about paranoia, which is unfounded thoughts that 
others intend you harm. Rumination and paranoia are both common and distressing, 
so we are seeking to understand factors that may help reduce them.  
This study is looking at one potential intervention, known as value-
affirmation. Value-affirmation involves reflecting on personally meaningful values, 
and has been shown to lead to self-affirmation. Self-affirmation refers to any event 
that boosts the perception of the self as being sound, moral, capable and cohesive. 
Previously, research has found that when people are self-affirmed they respond more 
adaptively to experiences and information that could threaten their self-concept. 
Rumination and paranoia are two ways that people might respond to such negative 
experiences, however, these responses are usually maladaptive and lead to further 
distress. We are interested in whether self-affirmation might reduce the tendency to 
respond in these ways. 
In this study, there were two experimental conditions: value-affirmation, 
where you selected and wrote about your most important value; and value-affirmation 
plus goal setting, where you did the same, but also set two value-consistent goals to 
achieve in the following two weeks. These conditions were compared to a 
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standardized control condition, where you were asked to write about a personally 
unimportant value. The experimenter does not know which treatment group you were 
in.  
We predicted that both value-affirmation conditions would reduce rumination 
and paranoia over the two-week period. We also thought that value-affirmation with 
the additional component of setting values-consistent goals would result in further 
reductions. We measured these changes by asking you to complete questionnaires a 
different time points. If you are interested in hearing about the results and conclusions 
of the study, please inform the principal researcher via email 
(Rebecca.carpenter.2014@live.rhul.ac.uk; Nicole.evans.2014@live.rhul.ac.uk) who 
will send you a summary once the research is complete. 
We do not expect people to feel worse after completing this study, but if you 
do feel you would like some support to help with difficult emotions, please contact 
your GP and inform the principal researcher via email. The university also offers a 
counselling service, and you may also wish to contact the Samaritans: 
 
Royal Holloway Counselling Service 
Website: http://www.rhul.ac.uk/ecampus/welfare/counselling/home.aspx 
Telephone: 01784 443 128; Email: counselling@rhul.ac.uk; Location: FW171 
 
Samaritans 
Website: http://www.samaritans.org  
Telephone: 08457 90 90 90 (UK) or 1850 60 90 90 (ROI); Email: jo@samaritans.org 
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Thank you for your participation in this study. If you have further questions about the 
study, please contact the principal researchers.  
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Appendix 3: Questionnaires 
 
Response Styles Questionnaire - Ruminative Responses Subscale  
(RSQ-RRS; Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991) 
People think and do many different things when they feel depressed. Please read each 
of the items below and indicate whether you almost never, sometimes, often, or 
almost always think or do each one when you feel down, sad, or depressed. Please 
indicate what you generally do, not what you think you should do. 
 1 Almost 
Never      
2 
Sometimes      
3 Often 4 Almost 
Always 
1. think about how alone you feel 1 2 3 4 
2. think “I won’t be able to do my 
job if I don’t snap out of this” 
1 2 3 4 
3. think about your feelings of 
fatigue and achiness 
1 2 3 4 
4. think about how hard it is to 
concentrate 
1 2 3 4 
5. think “What am I doing to 
deserve this?” 
1 2 3 4 
6. think about how passive and 
unmotivated you feel. 
1 2 3 4 
7. analyze recent events to try to 
understand why you are depressed 
1 2 3 4 
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8. think about how you don’t 
seem to feel anything anymore 
1 2 3 4 
9. think “Why can’t I get going?” 1 2 3 4 
10. think “Why do I always react 
this way?” 
1 2 3 4 
11. go away by yourself and think 
about why you feel this way 
1 2 3 4 
12. write down what you are 
thinking about and analyze it 
1 2 3 4 
13. think about a recent situation, 
wishing it had gone better 
1 2 3 4 
14. think “I won’t be able to 
concentrate if I keep feeling this 
way.” 
1 2 3 4 
15. think “Why do I have 
problems other people don’t 
have?” 
1 2 3 4 
16. think “Why can’t I handle 
things better?” 
1 2 3 4 
17. think about how sad you feel. 1 2 3 4 
18. think about all your 
shortcomings, failings, faults, 
mistakes 
1 2 3 4 
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19. think about how you don’t feel 
up to doing anything 
1 2 3 4 
20. analyze your personality to try 
to understand why you are 
depressed 
1 2 3 4 
21. go someplace alone to think 
about your feelings 
1 2 3 4 
22. think about how angry you are 
with yourself 
1 2 3 4 
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  Depression, Anxiety and Stress Scales  
(DASS-21; (Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995) 
Please read each statement and circle a number 0, 1, 2 or 3 which indicates how much 
the statement applied to you over the past week. There are no right or wrong answers. 
Do not spend too much time on any statement.  
 0 
Never      
1 
Sometimes      
2 
Often 
3 Almost 
Always 
1 I found it hard to wind down 0 1 2 3 
2 I was aware of dryness of my mouth 0 1 2 3 
3 I couldn’t seem to experience any 
positive feeling at all   
0 1 2 3 
4 I experienced breathing difficulty (e.g., 
excessively rapid breathing, breathlessness 
in the absence of physical exertion) 
0 1 2 3 
5 I found it difficult to work up the 
initiative to do things   
0 1 2 3 
6 I tended to over-react to situations   0 1 2 3 
7 I experienced trembling (e.g., in the 
hands)   
0 1 2 3 
8 I felt that I was using a lot of nervous 
energy   
0 1 2 3 
9 I was worried about situations in which I 
might panic and make a fool of myself   
0 1 2 3 
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10 I felt that I had nothing to look forward 
to   
0 1 2 3 
11 I found myself getting agitated   0 1 2 3 
12 I found it difficult to relax   0 1 2 3 
13 I felt down-hearted and blue   0 1 2 3 
14 I was intolerant of anything that kept 
me from getting on with what I was doing   
0 1 2 3 
15 I felt I was close to panic   0 1 2 3 
16 I was unable to become enthusiastic 
about anything   
0 1 2 3 
17 I felt I wasn’t worth much as a person   0 1 2 3 
18 I felt that I was rather touchy   0 1 2 3 
19 I was aware of the action of my heart in 
the absence of physical exertion (e.g., 
sense of heart rate increase, heart missing 
a beat)   
0 1 2 3 
20 I felt scared without any good reason  0 1 2 3 
21 I felt that life was meaningless 0 1 2 3 
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Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale 
(RSE; Rosenberg, 1965) 
 
Below is a list of statements dealing with your general feelings about yourself. If you 
strongly agree, circle SA. If you agree with the statement, circle A. If you disagree, 
circle D. If you strongly disagree, circle SD. 
 
 SA Strongly 
Agree 
A  
Agree 
D 
Disagree 
SD Strongly 
Disagree 
On the whole, I am satisfied with 
myself 
SA A D SD 
At times, I think I am no good at 
all 
SA A D SD 
I feel that I have a number of 
good qualities 
SA A D SD 
I am able to do things as well as 
most other people 
SA A D SD 
I feel that I do not have much to 
be proud of 
SA A D SD 
I certainly feel useless at times SA A D SD 
I feel that I’m a person of worth, 
at least on an equal plane with 
others 
SA A D SD 
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I wish I could have more respect 
for myself 
SA A D SD 
All in all, I am inclined to feel 
that I am a failure 
SA A D SD 
I take a positive attitude toward 
myself 
SA A D SD 
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  Response Styles Questionnaire – State Version 
(RSQ-S, (Ciesla et al., 2012) 
Using the scale below, please indicate how frequently have you done each of the 
following today: 
(0) Not at all; (1) Occasionally; (2) Often; (3) All the time 
 0 Not 
at all      
1 
Occasionally      
2 
Often 
3 All the 
time 
Thought “Why do I always react this 
way?” 
0 1 2 3 
Thought “What am I doing to deserve 
this?”         
 
0 1 2 3 
Thought “Why do I have problems other 
people don’t have?” 
0 1 2 3 
Thought “Why can’t I handle things 
better?”            
0 1 2 3 
Analyzed recent events to try to 
understand your feelings 
0 1 2 3 
Went away by yourself and thought 
about why you felt how you did 
0 1 2 3 
Wrote down what you are thinking and 
analyzed it                         
0 1 2 3 
Analyzed your personality to try to 0 1 2 3 
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understand why you are depressed 
Tried to understand yourself by focusing 
on your depressed feelings 
0 1 2 3 
Thought about how sad you feel 0 1 2 3 
Isolated yourself and thought about the 
reason you feel sad 
0 1 2 3 
Thought about all your shortcomings, 
faults, and mistakes 
0 1 2 3 
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  Positive and Negative Affect Schedule 
(PANAS; (Watson et al., 1988) 
 
This scale consists of a number of words that describe different feelings and emotions. 
Read each item and then list the number from the scale below next to each word. 
Indicate to what extent you feel this way right now, that is, at the present 
moment. 
 
1  
Very 
Slightly or 
Not at All 
2  
A Little 
3  
Moderately 
4  
Quite a Bit 
5  
Extremely 
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 Valued Living Questionnaire 
(VLQ; (Wilson et al., 2010) 
 
Below are areas of life that are valued by some people. This questionnaire will help 
clarify your own quality-of-life in each of these areas. One aspect of quality-of-life 
involves the importance you put on different areas of living. Rate the importance of 
each area (by circling a number) on a scale of 1-10. A “1” means that area is not at all 
important. A “10” means that area is very important. Not everyone will value all of 
these areas, or value all areas the same. Rate each area according to your own 
personal sense of importance.  
 
Area: Not at all                                                         
Extremely                                                                                                                        
important                                                       
important 
Family (other than marriage 
or parenting) 
1       2       3       4       5       6       7       8       9       
10 
Marriage/couples/intimate 
relationships 
1       2       3       4       5       6       7       8       9       
10 
Parenting 1       2       3       4       5       6       7       8       9       
10 
Friends/social life 1       2       3       4       5       6       7       8       9       
10 
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Work 1       2       3       4       5       6       7       8       9       
10 
Education/training 1       2       3       4       5       6       7       8       9       
10 
Recreation/fun 1       2       3       4       5       6       7       8       9       
10 
Spirituality/meaning & 
purpose of life 
1       2       3       4       5       6       7       8       9       
10 
Citizenship/community life 1       2       3       4       5       6       7       8       9       
10 
Physical self-care (nutrition, 
exercise/movement, 
rest/sleep) 
1       2       3       4       5       6       7       8       9       
10 
 
In this section, please give a rating of how consistent your actions have been with 
each of your values. Please note that this is not asking about your ideal in each area, 
nor what others think of you. Everyone does better in some areas than in others. 
People also do better at some times than at others. Please just indicate how you 
think you have been doing during the past week. Rate each area (by circling a 
number) on a scale of 1-10. A “1” means that your actions have been completely 
inconsistent with your value. A “10” means that your actions have been completely 
consistent with your value.  
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During the past week… 
Area: Not at all                                                         
Extremely                                                                                                                           
consistent                                                       
consistent 
Family (other than marriage 
or parenting) 
1       2       3       4       5       6       7       8       9       
10 
Marriage/couples/intimate 
relationships 
1       2       3       4       5       6       7       8       9       
10 
Parenting 1       2       3       4       5       6       7       8       9       
10 
Friends/social life 1       2       3       4       5       6       7       8       9       
10 
Work 1       2       3       4       5       6       7       8       9       
10 
Education/training 1       2       3       4       5       6       7       8       9       
10 
Recreation/fun 1       2       3       4       5       6       7       8       9       
10 
Spirituality/meaning & 
purpose of life 
1       2       3       4       5       6       7       8       9       
10 
Citizenship/community life 1       2       3       4       5       6       7       8       9       
10 
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Physical self-care (nutrition, 
exercise/movement, 
rest/sleep) 
1       2       3       4       5       6       7       8       9       
10 
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Appendix 4: Instructions to Participants 
 
Task instructions for value-affirmation condition (VA) 
 
This task is about values.  Please read the following information and complete the 
task. Once you have completed the task, you will be asked to complete some 
more questionnaires on the computer. 
 
Values are a life direction, an internal compass. They are leading principles that 
can guide you and motivate you as you move through life. 
Values are what matter to you in the big picture, what you want to stand for, and 
the personal qualities you want to develop. 
Values are not the same as goals. Values are directions you keep moving in, 
whereas goals are what you want to achieve along the way. 
Values are unique to you. Not everyone has the same values, and this is not a test 
to see whether you have the "correct" values.  
 
1. On the table in front of you is a pack of cards listing aspects of life that are 
valued by some people. Please read each card and sort it into one of three 
piles: 
Very important to me 
Quite important to me 
Not important to me 
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If you wish to include a value that you feel is missing, you can do so by writing it 
on one of the “other” cards in the values pack. 
 
ONCE YOU HAVE DONE THIS, PLEASE TURN OVER FOR THE NEXT 
TASK 
 
2. Now you have sorted the cards, please discard the values in the ‘quite 
important’ and ‘not important’ pile, so you only have values that are ‘very 
important’ left. 
 
Which of these values is the most important to you?  Choose the one value that is 
the most important to you. 
 
3. Please use the lined paper to describe why this value is important and 
meaningful to you. Think about a time in your life that this was particularly 
important to you and made you feel good about yourself. Write as much or as 
little as you wish and don’t worry about how well it’s written. Just focus on 
expressing your memory of the event and the feelings that you had at the time.  
 
Please do your best to think and write about this event and your feelings about this 
value for the next 10 minutes. This is personal to you. There are no right or 
wrong answers.  
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Set the timer for 10 minutes. If you complete the task before the 10 minutes is up 
please ‘pause’ the timer- please do not close the timer window. 
 
 
4. Again, think about your most important value. Below your essay, list the top 
two reasons why this value is important to you.  
 
5. Now you have finished writing, please leave the cards on the table and place 
these instructions and your lined paper in the envelope.  
 
You can now complete the next set of questionnaires on the computer. 
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Task instructions for value-affirmation plus goal-setting condition (VA+GS) 
 
This task is about values.  Please read the following information and complete the 
task. Once you have completed the task, you will be asked to complete some 
more questionnaires on the computer. 
 
Values are a life direction, an internal compass. They are leading principles that 
can guide you and motivate you as you move through life. 
Values are what matter to you in the big picture, what you want to stand for, and 
the personal qualities you want to develop. 
Values are not the same as goals. Values are directions you keep moving in, 
whereas goals are what you want to achieve along the way. 
Values are unique to you. Not everyone has the same values, and this is not a test 
to see whether you have the "correct" values.  
 
1. On the table in front of you is a pack of cards listing aspects of life that are 
valued by some people. Please read each card and sort it in to one of three 
piles: 
Very important to me 
Quite important to me 
Not important to me 
If you wish to include a value that you feel is missing, you can do so by writing it 
on one of the “other” cards in the values pack. 
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ONCE YOU HAVE DONE THIS, PLEASE TURN OVER FOR THE NEXT 
TASK 
 
2. Now you have sorted the cards, please discard the values in the ‘quite 
important’ and ‘not important’ pile, so you only have values that are ‘very 
important’ left. 
 
Which of these values is the most important to you? Choose the one value that is 
the most important to you. 
 
3. Please use the lined paper to describe why this value is important and 
meaningful to you. Think about a time in your life that this was particularly 
important to you and made you feel good about yourself. Write as much or as 
little as you wish and don’t worry about how well it’s written. Just focus on 
expressing your memory of the event and the feelings that you had at the time.  
 
Please do your best to think and write about this event and your feelings about this 
value for the next 10 minutes. This is personal to you. There are no right or 
wrong answers.  
Set the timer for 10 minutes. If you complete the task before the 10 minutes is up 
please ‘pause’ the timer- please do not close the timer window. 
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4. Again, think about your most important value. Below your essay, list the top 
two reasons why this value is important to you.  
 
ONCE YOU HAVE DONE THIS, PLEASE TURN OVER FOR THE NEXT 
TASK 
 
5. Values can provide a deep motivation that helps us to pursue important goals 
in life.  
What could you do to help live your life in accordance with this value?  
We would like you to set a short term goal to focus on over the next two weeks. 
 
Ideally, you want to set a ‘SMART’ goal. This is what ‘SMART’ means: 
Specific: what exactly will you accomplish? 
Meaningful: is this goal in line with your most important value? 
Adaptive: is this goal likely to improve your life? 
Realistic: can this goal be achieved in your life right now? 
Time-framed: can this goal be achieved within the next two weeks? 
 
Please write your goal here:  
 
…………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………
 216 
 
…………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………… 
 
Please also write your goal underneath your essay.  
 
Please take this piece of paper home with you as a reminder of the goal you have 
set today, to be completed in the next two weeks. 
 
6. Now you have finished writing, please leave the cards on the table and place 
these instructions and your lined paper in the envelope. Please take this piece 
of paper with your goal written on home with you. 
 
You can now complete the next set of questionnaires on the computer. 
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Task instructions for non-affirmation control condition (NAC) 
 
This task is about values.  Please read the following information and complete the 
task. Once you have completed the task, you will be asked to complete some 
more questionnaires on the computer. 
 
Values are a life direction, an internal compass. They are leading principles that 
can guide you and motivate you as you move through life. 
Values are what matter to you in the big picture, what you want to stand for, and 
the personal qualities you want to develop. 
Values are not the same as goals. Values are directions you keep moving in, 
whereas goals are what you want to achieve along the way. 
Values are unique to you. Not everyone has the same values, and this is not a test 
to see whether you have the "correct" values.  
 
1. On the table in front of you is a pack of cards listing aspects of life that are 
valued by some people. Please read each card and sort it in to one of three 
piles: 
Very important to me  
Quite important to me 
Not important to me 
If you wish to include a value that you feel is missing, you can do so by writing it 
on one of the “other” cards in the values pack. 
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ONCE YOU HAVE DONE THIS, PLEASE TURN OVER FOR THE NEXT 
TASK 
2. Now you have sorted the cards, please discard the values in the ‘quite 
important’ and ‘very important’ pile, so you only have values that are ‘not 
important’ left. 
Which of these values is the least important to you?  Choose the one value that is 
the least important to you. 
 
3. Although this value is not important to you, please use the lined paper to 
describe why this value might be important and meaningful to someone else. 
Describe a time in someone else’s life that this may have been particularly 
important to them and made them feel good about themselves. Write as much 
or as little as you wish and don’t worry about how well it’s written.  
Please do your best to think and write about why this value might be important to 
someone else for the next 10 minutes. There are no right or wrong answers.  
Set the timer for 10 minutes. If you complete the task before the 10 minutes is up 
please ‘pause’ the timer- please do not close the timer window. 
 
4. Again, think about your least important value. Below your essay, list the top 
two reasons why this value is NOT important to you.  
5. Now you have finished writing, please leave the cards on the table and place 
these instructions and your lined paper in the envelope.  
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You can now complete the next set of questionnaires on the computer.  
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List of values used in each condition (R. Harris, 2011) 
 
1. Acceptance: to be open to and accepting of myself, others, life, etc. 
2. Adventure: to be adventurous; to actively seek, create, or explore novel or 
stimulating experiences 
3. Assertiveness: to respectfully stand up for my rights and request what I want 
4. Authenticity: to be authentic, genuine, and real; to be true to myself 
5. Beauty: to appreciate, create, nurture or cultivate beauty in myself, others, the 
environment etc 
6. Caring: to be caring toward myself, others, the environment, etc 
7. Challenge: to keep challenging myself to grow, learn, improve 
8. Compassion: to act with kindness towards those who are suffering 
9. Connection: to engage fully in whatever I’m doing and be fully present with 
others 
10. Contribution: to contribute, help, assist, or to make a positive difference to 
myself or others 
11. Conformity: to be respectful and obedient of rules and obligations 
12. Cooperation: to be cooperative and collaborative with others 
13. Courage: to be courageous or brave; to persist in the face of fear, threat, or 
difficulty 
14. Creativity: to be creative or innovative 
15. Curiosity: to be curious, open-minded, and interested; to explore and discover 
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16. Encouragement: to encourage and reward behaviour that I value in myself or 
others 
17. Equality: to treat others as equal to myself and vice versa 
18. Excitement: to seek, create, and engage in activities that are exciting, 
stimulating or thrilling 
19. Fairness: to be fair to myself or others 
20. Fitness: to maintain or improve my fitness to look after my physical and 
mental health and wellbeing 
21. Flexibility: to adjust and adapt readily to changing circumstances 
22. Freedom: to live freely; to choose how I live and behave, or help others do 
likewise 
23. Friendliness: to be friendly, companionable, or agreeable toward others 
24. Forgiveness: to be forgiving toward myself or others 
25. Fun: to be fun loving; to seek, create, and engage in fun-filled activities 
26. Generosity: to be generous, sharing and giving, to myself or others 
27. Gratitude: to be grateful for and appreciative of myself, others, and life 
28. Honesty: to be honest, truthful, and sincere with myself and others 
29. Humour: to see and appreciate the humorous side of life 
30. Humility: to be humble or modest; to let my achievements speak for 
themselves 
31. Industry: to be industrious, hardworking, and dedicated 
32. Independence: to be self-supportive, and choose my own way of doing things 
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33. Intimacy: to open up, reveal, and share myself, emotionally or physically in 
my close personal relationships 
34. Justice: to uphold justice and fairness 
35. Kindness: to be kind, compassionate, considerate, nurturing, or caring toward 
myself or others 
36. Love: to act lovingly or affectionately toward myself or others 
37. Mindfulness: to be conscious of, open to, and curious about my here-and-now 
experience 
38. Order: to be orderly and organized 
39. Open-mindedness: to think things through, see things from other’s points of 
view, and weigh evidence fairly. 
40. Patience: to wait calmly for what I want 
41. Persistence: to continue resolutely, despite problems or difficulties. 
42. Pleasure: to create and give pleasure to myself or others  
43. Power: to strongly influence or wield authority over others, e.g., taking charge, 
leading, organizing 
44. Reciprocity: to build relationships in which there is a fair balance of giving 
and taking 
45. Respect: to be respectful towards myself or others; to be polite, considerate 
and show positive regard 
46. Responsibility: to be responsible and accountable for my actions 
47. Romance: to be romantic; to display and express love or strong affection 
48. Safety: to secure, protect, or ensure safety of myself or others 
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49. Self-awareness: to be aware of my own thoughts, feelings and actions 
50. Self-care: to look after my health and wellbeing, and get my needs met  
51. Self-development: to keep growing, advancing or improving in knowledge, 
skills, character, or life experience.  
52. Self-control: to act in accordance with my own ideals 
53. Sensuality: to create, explore and enjoy experiences that stimulate the five 
senses  
54. Sexuality: to explore or express my sexuality 
55. Skillfulness: to continually practice and improve my skills and apply myself 
fully when using them 
56. Supportiveness: to be supportive, helpful, encouraging, and available to 
myself or others  
57. Trust: to be trustworthy; to be loyal, faithful, sincere, and reliable 
58. Other: 
_______________________________________________________________ 
59. Other: 
_______________________________________________________________ 
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Appendix 5: Skew and Kurtosis Z Scores Pre- and Post-transformation 
 
 Variable Pre-Transformation Post-transformation 
Skew 
(Z) 
Kurtosis 
(Z) 
Skew 
(Z) 
Kurtosis 
(Z) 
VA 
RSQ-RRS 
1.89 
(p>.001) 
-0.82 
(p>.001) 
No transformation 
required 
DASS-21-D 
5.33 
(p<.001) 
2.09 
(p>.001) 
0.69 
(p>.001) 
0.55 
(p>.001) 
DASS-21-A 
3.01 
(p>.001) 
1.03 
(p>.001) 
-0.95 
(p>.001) 
-1.02 
(p>.001) 
DASS-21-S 
0.84 
(p>.001) 
-1.10 
(p>.001) 
-1.86 
(p>.001) 
0.90 
(p>.001) 
RSE 
0.46 
(p>.001) 
-1.15 
(p>.001) 
No transformation 
required 
VLQ 
0.91 
(p>.001) 
-0.82 
(p>.001) 
No transformation 
required 
T1 RSQ-S 
3.97 
(p<.001) 
1.41 
(p<.001) 
0.86 
(p>.001) 
-1.36 
(p>.001) 
T1 PANAS-
PA 
-0.80 
(p>.001) 
-1.19 
(p>.001) 
No transformation 
required 
T2 RSQ-S 4.79 1.93 1.46 -1.21 
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(p<.001) (p>.001) (p>.001) (p>.001) 
T2 PANAS-
PA 
1.84 
(p>.001) 
0.49 
(p>.001) 
No transformation 
required 
T2 
Manipulation 
Check 
-8.97 
(p>.001) 
3.50 
(p<.001) 
No transformation 
required 
T3 RSQ-S 
3.69 
(p<.001) 
0.93 
(p>.001) 
0.82 
(p>.001) 
-1.23 
(p>.001) 
T3 PANAS-
PA 
0.29 
(p>.001) 
-1.10 
(p>.001) 
No transformation 
required 
VA+GS 
RSQ-RRS 
1.29 
(p>.001) 
-0.90 
(p>.001) 
No transformation 
required 
DASS-21-D 
7.98 
(p<.001) 
3.64 
(p<.001) 
1.94 
(p>.001) 
1.41 
(p>.001) 
DASS-21-A 
4.08 
(p<.001) 
1.67 
(p>.001) 
-0.18 
(p>.001) 
-1.09 
(p>.001) 
DASS-21-S 
5.60 
(p<.001) 
2.72 
(p>.001) 
-0.25 
(p>.001) 
1.76 
(p>.001) 
RSE 
-0.33 
(p>.001) 
-0.57 
(p>.001) 
No transformation 
required 
VLQ 
0.26 
(p>.001) 
0.79 
(p>.001) 
No transformation 
required 
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T1 RSQ-S 
4.42 
(p<.001) 
1.40 
(p>.001) 
1.69 
(p>.001) 
-1.27 
(p>.001) 
T1 PANAS-
PA 
1.94 
(p>.001) 
0.59 
(p>.001) 
No transformation 
required 
T2 RSQ-S 
5.81 
(p<.001) 
2.15 
(p>.001) 
2.82 
(p>.001) 
2.15 
(p>.001) 
T2 PANAS-
PA 
0.88 
(p>.001) 
-1.11 
(p>.001) 
No transformation 
required 
T2 
Manipulation 
Check 
-9.16 
(p>.001) 
3.87 
(p<.001) 
No transformation 
required 
T3 RSQ-S 
5.85 
(p<.001) 
2.41 
(p>.001) 
2.38 
(p>.001) 
-0.69 
(p>.001) 
T3 PANAS-
PA 
1.46 
(p>.001) 
-0.78 
(p>.001) 
No transformation 
required 
NAC 
RSQ-RRS 
3.01 
(p>.001) 
1.25 
(p>.001) 
No transformation 
required 
DASS-21-D 
4.21 
(p<.001) 
1.52 
(p>.001) 
-0.02 
(p>.001) 
-0.64 
(p>.001) 
DASS-21-A 
4.63 
(p<.001) 
1.99 
(p>.001) 
0.23 
(p>.001) 
-0.92 
(p>.001) 
DASS-21-S 1.16 -0.57 -2.61 1.38 
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(p>.001) (p>.001) (p>.001) (p>.001) 
RSE 
-0.84 
(p>.001) 
-0.58 
(p>.001) 
No transformation 
required 
VLQ 
1.93 
(p>.001) 
-0.84 
(p>.001) 
No transformation 
required 
T1 RSQ-S 
3.76 
(p<.001) 
0.86 
(p>.001) 
1.58 
(p>.001) 
-1.35 
(p>.001) 
T1 PANAS-
PA 
-0.04 
(p>.001) 
-1.20 
(p>.001) 
No transformation 
required 
T2 RSQ-S 
5.48 
(p<.001) 
2.03 
(p>.001) 
2.49 
(p>.001) 
-0.68 
(p>.001) 
T2 PANAS-
PA 
0.50 
(p>.001) 
-1.08 
(p>.001) 
No transformation 
required 
T2 
Manipulation 
Check 
1.16 
(p>.001) 
-0.49 
(p>.001) 
No transformation 
required 
T3 RSQ-S 
3.06 
(p>.001) 
0.54 
(p>.001) 
0.54 
(p>.001) 
-1.28 
(p>.001) 
T3 PANAS-
PA 
0.88 
(p>.001) 
-1.18 
(p>.001) 
No transformation 
required 
Note. VA – Value-affirmation; VA+GS – Value-affirmation plus goal-setting; NAC – 
Non-affirmation control; RSQ-RRS: Response Styles Questionnaire – Ruminative 
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Response Scale; DASS-21: Depression, Anxiety and Stress Scale; RSE – Rosenberg 
Self-Esteem Scale; T1: Time 1; T2: Time 2; T3: Time 3; RSQ-S: Response Style 
Questionnaire – State Version; PANAS-PA: Positive and Negative Affect Schedule – 
Positive Affect; VLQ: Valued Living Questionnaire.  
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Appendix 6: List of Goals set by Participants in VA+GS Condition 
 
Value (frequency) Goal 
Love (5) 1. Unknown  
2. Take time every day to tell someone that I love them and give 
them a compliment. Every day remember something good I did.   
3. To tell my close friends and family that I love them at least 
once a week out loud or via text  
4. To love those I encounter on the street: the homeless, the 
beggars etc. To stop, to engage with them, to help them, to care 
for them, to love them. 
5. To enable my husband to have a better/longer nights’ sleep by 
going to bed earlier myself thereby not preventing his early night. 
Aim for 10-10.30 except bridge nights when it would have to be 
11. 
Trust (5) 1. I will arrange with my partner time for us to spend together 
(quality time) over the next two weeks. I will also arrange to 
spend quality time to see friends, meanwhile he will no doubt 
spend time away from me. 
2. Do at least one hour of maths revision a day until Jan 14th to 
help me hopefully pass my maths test first time. 
3. Unknown.  
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4. Open up properly to the people that I live with about how I feel 
and make them understand that equally it is not their fault.  
5. To contact two friends via text/call to have a catch up and see 
how they're doing 
Honesty (4) 1. Share my thoughts when I really want to share my feelings or 
thoughts but feel prohibited for no good reason (by fear of being 
too straightforward, or the answer I will get) I will just do it, as 
long as it does not affect others negatively. 
2. Always try to be honest to myself. If I don't want to stay with 
my friends, have a time to be alone. Don't hesitate to tell my 
friends that I'm tired and want to stay in my room. When I want 
to stay with my friends, just enjoy time with my friends.  
3. To be honest with my boyfriend about how I am feeling when 
we speak about making plans for the next year. 
4. To talk to accommodation on Monday about doing a room 
swap, as living at X is doing more damage to my mental health 
than good, and to see if they will let the room swap happen after 
the Christmas holidays. 
Kindness (4) 1. I will only buy organic dairy products over the next two weeks.  
2. I will try to help my Dad convert the videos to DVD to save 
him time over the next week.  
3. Becoming volunteer tutor for young refugees in the local area 
by completing the application form asap. 
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4. I will be more tolerant of people I don't know (public!). Be 
kinder to them and their needs. Take a deep breath when 
frustrated and smile. 
Open-mindedness (4) 1. To have written up notes to begin my next assignment. 
2. Not quickly attribute blame to someone when something goes 
wrong. 
3. In the next two weeks I will engage with the American news 
(read article?) regarding Trump/Clinton election. I am not 
currently open-minded about this - could do to weigh up some 
evidence more fairly.  
4. Reading up on things that I have deep interest for and 
developing my knowledge which I can apply to my character and 
life experiences. 
Contribution (3) 1. To start looking into voluntary charity work over the next 
fortnight, specifically those which only require a few hours a 
week. 
2. Unknown. 
3. Unknown. 
Flexibility (2) 1. Get a job  
2. I will be flexible in coming up with a plan for moving house, 
taking all the information into account. The plan will be agreed 
on in the next two weeks 
Freedom (2) 1. To immerse myself in books, education and learning without 
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being distracted or restricted by social obligations.  
2. To try something new that I haven't done before, so that I can 
find and express who I truly am. 
Humility (2) 1. Unknown. 
2. When I receive my grade for my next assignment which should 
be in the next two weeks, I will not boast about my result if I do 
well and only tell my friends/peers if they ask. 
Independence (2) 1. Spend time with my 6 year old little brother  
2. Unknown. 
Respect (2) 1. To try and understand people's opinions which aren't the same 
as mine so that I can see their point of view more clearly  
2. To be respectful towards myself and others. To help other 
people who are in need if it is achievable for me and give others 
and myself positive feedback 
Self-development (2) 1. To focus on my degree by studying and catching up 
2. To research cultural things to do with Madrid and make a plan 
for our trip 
Supportiveness (2) 1. Support my ex boyfriend and help him achieve his mental and 
physical goals whilst being friendly.  
2. I wish to spend more quality time with my family, without 
distractions that are trivial (phones, social media). They need to 
feel that I am always there even if I'm away at university 
Authenticity (1) 1. Feel happier about myself as a person. Notice specific 
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behaviours, such as judgement of others, and make a concerted 
effort to change them (behaviours which are not in line with who 
I am) 
Compassion (1) 1. Speak to a homeless person to understand their history and 
background. This will help me to understand what other people 
go through 
Excitement (1) 1. Unknown  
Gratitude (1) 1. At the end of each day, think of one thing I am grateful for. 
Other: 
closeness/belonging 
(1) 
1. I will arrange to meet with my close friends in London and do 
a Christmas night together 
Persistence (1) 1. To try and not get so worked up about events in my life I 
cannot change. To pinpoint when they are affecting me and to try 
and not let them worry me or make me anxious. 
Reciprocity (1) 1. To encourage and allow others to help me, I do not need to 
keep all my worries to myself and panic when I have supportive 
people around me 
Responsibility (1) 1. To show my children I am responsible for the way I act by 
admitting when I don't act in line with one of my important 
values e.g., patience, kindness 
Self-awareness (1) 1. Within the next two weeks, I would like to have done my best 
with mu coursework essay, been preparing further for my lab 
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report and enjoyed my weekend away without feeling over run or 
anxious. I want to make time for myself, as well as my family, 
friends, and work. I would like to make progress instead of 
dwelling on previous weeks. 
Unknown (9)  
 
